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PREFACE 
My numerous debts to those who have already •vo:r.ked 
on this problem will be obvious from the acknowledgements 
in the text. In particular I am in debt to those who have 
taught at the University of Canterbury ov.er the years that 
I have been a student there - too often I have expressed a 
view which should rightly be attributed to one of these 
teachers but have remained aware only of its presence and 
not of its source. Any errors in the presentation of such 
views canno~, of course, be attributed to their original 
authors. 
I am ~lso very grateful to Zeno Vendler and Paul 
Crittenden, both of whom led me to material I might 
otherwise have overlooked. 
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i. 
ABSTRACT 
Faced ~ith an apparent conflict between two approaches 
to the teaching of deaf children : (i) that we should teach 
deaf children a language so that they can think~ and (ii) that 
we should teach deaf children to think so that they can then 
acquire a language - I have examined the assumptions about 
thinking assumed by these two schools of thought. 
Reductionists hold that thinking is nothing but such 
things qs i:,nner speech (they identify thinking with its 
expression). 
Duplicationists argue that this is an inadequate 
explication of the concept of thinking (that it is only half 
the story) and they argue that th_i~king is something else as 
well as its exp~ession. If.succes~ful Duplicationism becomes an 
objection to Reductionism. f!nfortunately it results in an 
infinite regress. 
A third atternative account of thinking (Ryle's Adverbial 
account) regards:thinking as an adverbial characterization: 
thinking is the way or circumstances in which we·pei>form certain 
diverse and neutral (vis-a-vis ~hinking) activities. By such 
an account the elements of.thinking which Duplicationists 
accuse Reductionist8 of ignoring become conditional dispositi6ns. 
I a~gue that they should be regarded as categorical dispositional 
ascriptions. Additionally Ryle assumes a '"process" account 
of thinking when in point of fact an "episodic" account is 
required~ 
ii. 
The thesis concludes by arguing that we need an ontology 
sufficiently large to take in all the aspects of·thinking and 
that in turn this will generate not one precept but a matrix 
of precepts for the education of the deaf. 
-ooOoo-
1. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
II W"illiam James, in order to shew that thought is possible without 
speech, quotes the recollection of a deaf-mute, Mr Ballard, who wrote that 
in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had thoughts about God 
and the world. --- What can he have meant? --- Ballard writes 'It was 
during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation 
into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the 
question howcame the world into being?' ~--Are you sure --- one would like 
to ask --- that this is the correct translation of your wordless thought 
into words? And why does this question --- which otherwise seems not to 
exist--- raise its head here? Do I want. :to say that the writer's memory 
deceives him? --- I don't even know if I ~ho~ld say that. These recollections 
are a queer memory phenomenon, --- and I do not know what conclusions one 
can draw from them about the past of the man who recounts them. II 
- Wittgenstein (PI I, 342) 
2. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED. 
In 1974, while I was in training to become a teacher of 
the deaf, New Zealand was visited by "Leahea Grammatico, 
director of the Peninsula Oral School for the Deaf in California. 
Grammatico had been brought out to Australasia by the Shepherd 
Centre at Sydney University to talk about how she achieved 
such unusually good results at her school. In the aftermath of 
her visit it became apparent to me that many of my fellow teachers 
had taken her to be saying something like, "language comes from 
the development of thought and the desire to express ~.i.t: so begin 
not by teaching deaf children language - rather begin by teaching 
them how to think". Now this is a precept in stark contrast to 
that which we had found implicit in the traditional methods for 
teaching deaf children with which I was then gaining some 
familiarity. Here the precept seemed to be something like, "the 
ability to think comes from the development of language : so 
begin by teaching deaf children language". The apparent conflict 
between these two schools of thought within the field of the 
education of the deaf can perhaps be characterized by opposing 
the titles of two vapers : 
Shallcrass, J. "Thinking and· 
How to Teach It. :Educmtion ~0, 
1974 : 9-11 •. 
Davi~son, S.G. "Mental Develop-
versus ment Through Language Study. " 
Ameri~an Annals of the Deaf 59, 
1914 : 113-117. 
or by comparing what goes ·on in most schools for the deaf with 
the thinking laboratory for. deaf children at the Department of 
Special Education, State University College, Geneseo, New York. 1 
1. cf. "Appendi~ 1 : A thinkini~:r,laboratory· for deaf children." In Furth,H.G. 
Deafness and Learn-Lng : A PsyahosocnaZ Approach. Belmont, Wadsworth, 1973 p.lOS-11:!1 
3. 
The choice between these two approaches to the teaching 
of deaf children appeared to us to be all the more critical 
because of the reports we were seeing of their results. Teachers 
of the deaf are only too aware of the rate of success of our 
tradi tiohal methods. A commonly acknowledged statistic, f.or 
instance, is that most deaf children reach a reading age plateau 
of something like seven or eight years old beyond which they have 
great difficulty in advancing. Thus Furth2 reports that "from all 
available evidence, even a moderate criterion of success, such 
as a reading level of better than (American) grade four, is only 
achieved by about 25% of all deaf children when they finally 
leave s~hool after twelve o~ more years" and that, "If anything, 
this figure is inflated by the exclusion of children who because 
of suspected retardation and other aggravatin~ handicaps are not 
admitted to the ordinary schools for deaf children. Additionally, 
the figure includes postlingually deaf children and perhaps hard-
of-hearing cases that should not be classified with the majority 
of prelingually deaf children. One must add to these considerations 
the 'floor' effect of achievement tests - for instance, on an 
intermediate battery one cannot get a reading score lower than 
grade two". In contrast, Dale3 , at present a senior lecturer in 
the education of deaf children at the University of London Institute 
of Education, reports that of the 160 schools for the deaf that he 
has ~isited in fifteen corintries the Peninsula Oral School is 
2. Furth, H.G. Deafness and LeaPning : A Psychological Approach. Belmont, 
Wadsworth, 1973, p.32-33. These figures are confirmed for New Zealand in Huston,E. 
"Reading attainment of hearing and deaf children" NewZealand Journal for Teachers 
of the Deaf~ 1967 : 4-14 •. 
3. Dale, D.M.C. "The patriotic sandals." Education 2~ 1974 p.23. 
4. 
obtaining the best results. So much so, in fact, that he writes 
that, "in many cases when the children reach the age of seven 
or eight years one began to wonder whether they were deaf at all". 
An apparent conflict between two working assumptions has 
been a consistent generator of "philosophical analysis. Examples 
include : 
(1) All things, we are inclined to say, including conscious 
actions, have causes. What then of man's freedom of action? 
Yet we do want to hold men responsible for their conduct. 
(2) We believe that a physical world exists outside of 
our consciousness; yet in opposition to such a common-sense 
belief it is argued.that since we have access only to the 
physical world through our own senses some doubts might be 
entertained. (cf. Berkeley: "esse est percipi 11 , & Phenomen-
alism generally.) 
(3) Lastly, we say that a man has both a mind and a body 
which influence each other in a number of ways. But on the 
other hand it might be argued that a human being is nothing 
more than a body. (cf. Central State materialism.) 
My concern will be to examine the concepts.and assumptions that 
are basic to these two opposing views on how we might best teach 
deaf children. In particular I wish to examine the concepts of and 
assumptions about thinking and language to which I believe these 
two approaches variously find themselves commit:ted e.g. that 
thinking is language dependent/independent; that thinking is a 
distinct mental activity or process/is to be identified with its 
expression, etc. 
My realization that the field of education of the deaf faced 
a choice between these two approaches coincided with a renewed 
5. 
interest, on my part, with Gilbert Ryle's current discussion 
' ab0U~thinking. My additional concern, then will be to subject these 
two approaches to the arguments presented in that discussion, that 
is, Ryle's philosophical inquiry into the nature of thinking but 
the truth here, if it can be achieved, could have empirical 
implications (at least for the theory relating to the empirical 
data) • 
On the other hand, the two approaches to teaching the deaf 
would probably pin their colours to the pragmatic test, viz. their 
success in practice. 
But in the pragmatic test a satisfactory criterion is truth? 
In other words, the theoretical framework supplied by one or 
other (or both) of the approaches may be mistaken. 
In summary, 
at the present time, the field of the education of the deaf is 
facing up to a conflict between two basic approaches. One begins 
by teaching language {if for no other reason) in order that deaf 
children might think. The other begins by teaching deaf children 
how to think {if for no other reason) in order that they might 
acquire language. The logical relations of the ideas about thinking 
to which these two approaches find themselves committed are to be 
examined in the light of Ryle's current discussion_of that topic. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE THREE CLAIMS TO BE CONSIDERED. 
Ryle, 4 ih his paper "Thinking and saying" (1972) asserts that, 
"The specific notion of Thinking", ·which is our long-term concern, 
has been duly deflated by some philosophers into Nothing But Such 
& Such; and duly reinflated by others in Something Else as Well." 
4. Ryle, G. "Thinking and saying." Rice University Studies 58., 1972 : p.l24. 
6. 
On the one view, Rodin's Le Penseur's thinking is just the 
working of a non-man- made computing machine; or else, on the 
contrary view, his thinking is something special which could 
not without logical absurdity be credited to a mere machine.". 
That approach to the teaching of deaf children which seeks 
to teach them language in order that they may think could be 
interpreted as essentially Reductionist in that it deflates 
thinking to nothing but (something like) talking to oneself. One 
subsequent difficulty is now to account for the mental aspect of 
speech (intelligible speech versus babble, mere noise - the 
meaning-dimension). 
That approach to the teaching of deaf children which seeks 
to teach them how to think in order that they may acquire language 
could be interpreted as essentially Duplicationist in that it 
inflates thin~ing to something else as well as language on the 
grounds of (at least) priority : we first learn how to think and 
then we acquire language, i.e. thinking and speaking are to be seen 
as two distinct activities. ·This raises some questions or 
difficulties, for example (i) how are the two processes related?, 
and {ii) What is the medium of thinking? Is it symbolic? 
5 It is Ryle's argument that these are the "heads and tails of 
one and the same mistake". ·Now, Ryle is concerned with a very 
specific notion of thinking : roughly, that of pondering or trying 
to solve a problem; thus his use .of Rodin's Le Penseur~ though in 
his discussion he does occasionally cast a wider net. In his 
paper "Thinking" {1953) Ryle6 writes, "A man in a daydream is think-
ing", for instance. I will seek to show that Ryle's argument for a 
s. Ibid.~ p.l24. 
6. Ryle, G. "Thinking". In his CoZZectqd pC!pers~ volume 2. London, Hutchinson, 
1971, p.299-300. 
7. 
common mistake can be made to apply to the notions of thinking 
found in the two approaches to the teaching of deaf children 
as discussed here. 
The common mistake which Ryle has attempted to lay at the 
feet of the Duplicationists and the Reductio~ists with re~ard to 
the concept of thinking is that they both ignore the way or 
circumstances in which the activities we want to call thinking are 
7 performed. Thus, considering intentions and skills, Ryle writes, 
"Intentions and skills are overlooked by the Reductionist since 
they are no part of the photographable muscular moveme~ts to which 
he categorically mis-deflates actions. By the Duplicationist they 
are not ignored b~t they are categorically mis-inflated into 
extra, but nonmuscular·Actions which, because Inner Actions, 
transcend the spectators' observations." 
8 Ryle, therefore, offers a third account of thinking which 
he terms an 11 adverbial 11 account. According to the ''adverbial account, 
~hinking is no longer seen as being itself an activity, rather, 
thinking gets analyzed as the rnahner in which and the context in 
which we perform a range of diverse activities which could equally 
be performed by a non-thinker. It is by this move that Ryle hopes 
to occupy the middle ground between Reductionism and Duplicationism, 
avoiding the problems besetting both those accounts. 
In summary, 
the concepts of thinking implicit in the two approaches to the 
teaching of deaf children have been identified as being committed 
to either the Reductionist or the Duplicationist theories. An 
7. Ryle, G. "Thinking anq saying." Rice Universi-ty Studies, 58, 1972 : p.l25. 
B. The "adverbial" account of thinking is introduced as such by Ryle in his paper 
"Thinking and Reflecting" (1966-67) and then is developed in a later paper 
"The Thinking of Thoughts" (1968). Both these papers can be found in Ryle, G. 
CoZZeeted Papers, Volume 2, London; Hutchinson, 1971. 
8. 
advocate of the precept that "language comes from the development 
of thought and the desire to express it : so begin by teaching 
deaf children how to. think" might commit himself to a Duplicationist 
view of thinking as something else as well as (something like) talk-
ing to oneself - e.g. he might treat thinking as independent of or 
prior to speaking a language. An advocate of the precept that "the 
ability to think comes from the development of language : so begin 
by teaching deaf children language" might commit himself to a 
Reductionist account of thinking as nothing but (something like) 
talking to oneself (this inner speech being parasitic on talking 
to others). Ryle is credited with identifying a common mistake made 
by both accounts : that of overlooking intentions and skills (at 
least) - that is, the way or circumstances in which such activities 
as talking to oneself get performed. Ryle offers an "adverbial" 
account of thinking which is held to avoid this error. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE MAIN RELEVANT FEATURES OF THESE THREE 
ACCOUNTS OF THINKING. 
(1) The Reductionist Account. 
As a point of ep:i]stemt6'bgy the Reductionist account is 
fundamentally empiricist. As Ryle 9 observes, "Our Reductionist 
is ex officio a zealous empiricist, whose constant complaint is 
that his Platonic or Caresian or Hegelian opponent always fetches 
in unverifiables or unobservables to provide him with his 
occupational Something Else as Well." Locke., an empiricist of course!. I 
presents the classic form of duplicationism. Ryle is using 
'empiricist' in a loose or broad or perhaps contemporary sense 
broad empiricism as against Platonism or Rationalism; ·contemporary 
9. Ryle, G. "Thinking and saying." Rice University Studies~ 58~ 1972 : p.l26. 
9 . 
empiricism in a mechanistic or perhaps behaviouristic version 
(re~ucing mental phenomena to behaviourist criteria). This 
particular wielding of Occam's Razor results in such slogans as 
"Thinking is Talking to Oneself". 
10 . Max Black has suggested that such a Reductionist account 
uses the model of the melody to explain the relationship between 
thought and language. In such a model we cannot imagine a melody 
separate from any acoustic embodiment, though the same melody 
may appear in different keys or be played on different musical 
instruments. 
Thus arises the argument that we must first provide deaf 
children with instruments (such as language) so that they will 
then be able to play a melody (that is, do some thinkir.g). 
Oh, yes, we might say, but pre-linguistic deaf children 
still seem to do some thinking, even if only of a primitive sort. 
Our Reductionist then explains that this is quite true, but that 
some stress must be placed on the term 'primitive'. Primitive 
instruments (such as sensori-motor actions} are used and these 
allow only a primitive sort of thinking. The reductionist is 
likely to argue as well that primitive thinking is to be reduced 
to - is identical with - sensori-motor activity (is nothing but 
that •... ). It is only when the child is taught a language that 
full-blown thinking becomes possible and that this is so by 
definition for full-blown thinking just is some inner use of 
language (or of a public symbol system). Essentially the Reductionist 
wants to eliminate occult·· ~r purely inner phenomenon. 
10. Black, M. The Labyrinth of Language. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968. p.86~87. 
io. 
(2) The Duplicationist Account. 
If the Requctionist account is epistemologically empiricist 
then the Duplicationist acc:ourit exhibits "the lavishness of the 
transcendentalist". 11 Some occult 'Ghost in the Machine• eventually 
gets posited. But note, as against Ryle, that Locke12 was a 
duplicationist - i.e. Duplicationism is a temptation for more 
that the transcendentalist (it is the common - perhaps the 
'common-sense' view on this - which is not to say that it is right, 
of course) . 
13 
Black suggests that a Duplicationist account eillploys 
a model of the garment to explain the notion of thinking. In this 
model thoughts are put·into words just as a body may be suited up 
in some dress or other. More commonly the vehicle-cargo model 
(or metaphor) gets mooted. Here language becomes the vehicle for 
our thoughts and we are seen as thinking in snatches of words and 
phrases. Such an account may readily accept other 'vehicles' such 
as a succession of mental images and it may even wish to 
characterize language as 'the best vehicle there is'. But the 
important point, on this view, is that thinking is a distinct 
sui·~eneris process. 
Within the logic of such an account it would be absurd 
to think of one's not first having some thoughts which are then 
embodied in some vehicle or.()ther. Indeed, some versions of the 
account may identify thinking with having-· mental images {this 
seems to be true of Locke) and others may be tempted to go so 
11. Ryle, G. "Thinking and saying". Rice University Studies, 58. 1972 : p.l27. 
12. " ••• words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but 
the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever or care-
lessly those ideas are collected.;from the things which they are supposed to 
represent". (Essay Conceming Human·.vnderstanding, Bk.III, ch. ii, sec.2, original 
underlining. } 
11. 
far as ·to postulate 11 naked thoughts" or 11 naked thinking 11 • 14 
From a pedagogical point of view the Reductionist account 
seems to provide some conceptual foundation for our traditional 
stress on teaching deaf children language. Conversely, a switch 
to an early etnphas~s on teaching .. deaf children how to think 
receives support not just from the practical results of a teacher 
such as Grammatico but also these results get explained as 
fulfilling the child's need for some thoughts which can then be 
expressed in a language. But this involves the question of what 
Grammatico means when she speaks of 'tep.ching the deaf to think' 
independently of teaching them a language. 
{3) The Adverbial Account. 
Ryle's adverbial account of thinking cannot allow anything 
like 11 naked thinking.. : one must be doing something else which 
then gets qualified as thinking. The appearance of anything like 
·"naked thinking" would signal a failure to have completely 
analyzed out of his action-ontology thinking. Thus both the 
adverbial and the Reductionist accounts share a common logical 
abhorrence of "naked thinking". This is an abhorrance tl)at, as 
I shall show, may be equally shared by some forms of Duplicationism. 
In the adverbial account of thinking as :portrayed by Ryle, 
adverbs which normally qualify thinking, such as "carefully" 
cannot now do so, in the final analysis, or again he will have 
failed to get rid of thinking as a basic category. Thinking, the 
anti]..ysandu~, is specified in terms of an adverb qualifying a range 
of activities within which thinking itself must not appear. The 
14. The question of how one would look for such ~ phenomenon is puzzling -
but some psychologistsl5 have discussed the matter -
15. cf. Boring, E.G. A History of Experimental Psychology~ 2nd Edition, New York, 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950 : pp.303-411. 
12. 
activities which do fall within·this range, must be neutral with 
respect to thinking 
(a) on peril of reintroducing the analysandum, 
(b) but they must still be the sort of activities that can 
be qualified by such a~verbs as "c~refully••, As Sibley16 
argues, by-this account "carefully" cannot now ·finally 
qualify a verb which it commonly does, such as the 
verb "to ponder" because thinking-impregnated verbs and 
adverbs have to be analyzed out of the ontology under 
the restrictions of the theory. 
The adverbial account of thi11king remains, though, only the 
key to a larger discussion of the notion of thinking. I have 
introduced it here because it is essentially the alternative 
account of thinking offered most recently by Ryle. 
In terms of models Ryle consistently urges us to drop the 
vehicle-cargo model because it misleads us into thinking that we 
can somehow unpack thinking from its embodiment. Just as we cannot 
isolate "hurrying" from some activity such as walking or running so 
we cannot isolate "thinking" from such activities as speaking, 
writing, observing, driving a motor car, swinging a racquet, or 
17 
saying words to oneself. Max Black, points out that models are 
not right or wrong but rather more or less fruitful for comparison:: 
"The decision to be made is whether it conduces better to under-
standing and illumination". Ryle would favour the model of the 
melody but still hope for some even better prespective. Indeed, in 
introducing the account, Ryle.suggests that the label "adverbial11 
16. cf. Sibley, F.N. "Ryle and Thinking." In Wood, o.P., and Pitcher., G. 
Ryle. London, MacMillan, 1970, p.79. 
17. Black, M. The Labyrinth of Language. Harrnondsworth, Penguin, 1968. p.87. 
13. 
is itself to be taken metaphorically. It remains to be seen whether 
it p~ovides the improved perspective we require. (Substantially the 
point I take up in Chapter IV Sections 5 & 6.} 
To summarize, 
we find ourselves within each account following two roads :on one 
we sketch out the ontology and the logical entailments and 
allowances of the notion of thinking involved. On the other, we 
find ourselves offered a model or metaphor which; it is proposed, 
serves to best illuminate how the relevant notion of thinking occurs 
or behaves. We have then : -
(lj Reductionist Account 
(a} empiricist (-behavi.ourist) 
(b) model of the melody 
(2) Duplicationist Account 
(a) transcendentalist 
(b) vehicle-cargo model 
(3) Adverbial Account 
(a) thinking is the way or circumstances in 
which other activities are performed; 
{b) the very account itself may be metaphorical 
on final analysis. 
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES NOW TO BE TAKEN UP. 
Our search will be for an account of thinking which will 
prove a good conceptual tool for ~he specific purposes of teaching 
children. This criterion for such a conceptual tool (and hence a 
solution to the problem of how to give an account of thinking) is 
not purely pragmatic i.e. practical success. There are other 
14. 
criteria which are relevant e.g. the account must be coherent and 
it must reflect an adequate ontology. This needs to be taken into 
account if we are to know what is involved in a theory for which 
practical success is claimed. (For example, the theory subscribed 
to by followers of Grammatico may be a mistaken account of what she 
is doing in practice.) Currently it appears that teachers of the 
deaf may be tempted to divide themselves between an account of 
thinking which assumes either a Duplicationist or a Reductionist 
position. Ryle's adverbial account may provide an alternative from 
which well-founded precepts might be developed. I shall argue that 
Ryle's account of thinking also raises certain problems and will 
then proceed to suggest a fourth alternative. 
(1) General points of ~oncern. 
The initial, and perhaps sole, approach t6 the nature of 
thinking has to be in terms of its expression or embodiment. This 
raises three general matters which require some clarification: 
(a) a possible confusion between a supposed embodiment of the 
object of our thoughts and a supposed embodiment of the activity 
of thinking (as taking place in some medium or other); (b) the 
significance of the proliferation of the proposed 'vehicles' of 
thinking or thought; and (c) a possible confusion in regard to the 
reference of such terms as 'thinking', 'thought', 'speech', and 
' language' . 
(a) on embodiment 
We may avoid some confusion if we. distinguish the supposed 
embodiment of the activity of thinking and the supposed embodiment 
of the objects of our thought. Indeed, we could proceed a step 
further and also distinguish the embodiment of the results of our 
thinking. This is, in effect, to distinguish three sorts of 
15. 
questions: 
(i) We may ask if the activity of thinking (the process) 
"must, or need not, have some expression in "heard" 
words or "seen" pictures, and whether this question is 
even intelligible", 18 j_ .e. is ',pure' thinking possible? 
(ii) We may ask if thinking about a cat need involve our 
seeing a cat in our mind's eye or saying the word 'cat' 
to ourselves, or using some other mental symbol. Must 
the object of our.thoughts have some embodiment? Sibley 
suggests that traditionally the dispute over embodiment 
has centered on this question. 
(iii) We may ask if the res.ult of our thinking need have some 
embodiment. This question may be approached in two sorts 
of ways. It is clear that in order to communicate our 
thoughts we must express our thoughts in some communicable 
form (its::, being highly unlikely that others will be able 
to read our minds). But there is a logical point, made by 
Ryle. In his paper "Thinking and reflecting" Ryle19 
--· 
asserts that, "I do in fact think that an unworded 
argument belongs where an unworded quatrain belongs -
no-where". The logical point is that the results of some 
forms of thinking must be playable, sayable, paintable 
or whatever. But with Sibley, we must take care not to 
confuse this question with (i) and (ii) above i.e. from 
the fact that some thoughts, if expressed, must be put 
into words, it does not follow that the thinking of them 
must be in words as well. There is even a certain amount 
18. Sibley, F.N. "Ryle and thiniing." Iri Wood, o.:P. and Pitcher, G. Ry"le. 
London, Macmillan, 1970; p.lOO. The distinction between (i) and (ii) is 
discussed over pages 99-100. 
19. Ryle, G. "Thinking and reflecting." In his CoUected Papers. Volume 2. 
London, Hutchinson, 1971, p.472. 
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of 'vehicle interchangeability' at this level. Recently the NZBC 
reco~ded several of my poems and illustrated them with sympathetic 
camera work. When such film footage is good enough a poet might 
well concede that the film also did a good job of expressing his 
-tho-l]ghts. . . . as well, perhaps, as. his own words. Of course, visual 
pictures, music etc. may be used to tell a story~ express a mood 
etc. - especially when accompanying something verbal. But used in 
this way pictures are highly ambiguous because there are few 
conventions. The problem about pictures - physical or mental - is 
how they are to be interpreted - see Wittgenstein on this, PhiZo-
sophinaZ Invest1gations 3 p.54c, (b) & the note at the bottom 8,pllc. 
Can any real dictinction be made between a vehicle of thought 
and a vehicle of thinking - between the supposed embodiment of the. 
object of our thoughts and the embodiment of the actual process of 
thinking itself (the ability)? I suspect that this is the question 
raised by Sibley in the quote above where he writes "and whether this 
question is even intelligible". 
It is perhaps intelligible if we can imagine thinking about a 
cat and having in mind a<vi~ual image of a cat while our thinking 
(the activity) consists of saying to oneself a number of things 
about cats. Or is it? How do we know that the men.tal sentences about 
cats are instances of activity --embodiment while the visual image 
·instances of object-embodiment? What would be the basis for our 
distinction? Could I riot say rather that both the mental sentences 
and the mental images of a cat were what I was thinking about and 
with what I was doing some thinking? Or will I say that both are 
instances of the means by which I did some thinking about cats but 
that the object of my thoughts remained unexpressed in any way. 
Isn't this just to say that I had no particular cat in mind? 
. h. bl . t . 20 . t Fac1ng t lS pro em W1ttgens e1n wr1 es: 
II Experiencing a meaning and experiencing a mental 
image. "In both cases', we should like to say, "we are 
experiencing something, only something different. A 
different content is proffered -' is present - to 
consciousness." -What is the content of the experience 
17. 
of imagining? The answer i~ a picttire, or a description. And 
what is the content of the experience of meaning? I don't 
know what I am supposed to say to this. - If there is any 
sense in the above remark, it is that ·the two concepts 
are related like those of 'red' and 'blue'; and that is 
wrong. II 
Here the ·problem is one of experiencing a meaning and experiencing 
a mental image or a description. Is that what we mean when we try 
to distinguish an embodied object of thought and an embodied bit 
of thinking (activity)? 
W • d d f P • 21 h Tol • tt t • ( th t ) e are rem1n e o r1ce w en nl gens e1n on e nex page 
suggests that a verbal description can take the place of an image 
but this relationship can hardly be identified with the vehicles 
of (i) and the vehicles of (ii). 
At least one advantage of any theory which allows or requires 
'naked thinking' may be in its succeeding to avoid this problem 
altogether. But at what price? 
I shall take up this matter more fully in Chapter III, 
section 9. 
20. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. Anscombe, G.E.M.· (trans.) 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1968. p~l7Se-176e. 
21. see section (b) following : footnote 22. 
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(b) o.n vehicle candidates 
Traditionally our chief concern, as in the teabhing of 
the deaf, has been to ask "Must our thinking- be in a language?" 
But if we consider other sorts of sensory impairments apart from 
deafness, such as blindness, we.might well go on to ask about 
such mental images as visual imagery. This is the topic raised 
by Price with his concepts of 'quasi-instantiative particulars' 
and 'non-instantiative particulars'. For Price images are quasi-
instantiative particulars and words (except for onomatopoaeic 
words) are non-instantiative particulars. Price 22 contends that, 
·;.-,--,. . 
"when we think in images, thinking in absence comes much nearer to 
perceiving in prescence than verbal thinking can. And this is the 
way in which words are cashed by images. By means of images, a kind 
of cashing in absence is made possible". But is it that images 
are like what they are images of whereas words are not like 
their referentes? Of cour~e, not all words have references, e.g. 
syncategorematic terms, but this is important since it makes 
possible for certain combinations of words (e.g. sentences) to 
express whole thoughts, describe situations, ask questions, etc. 
Images, by contrast, are ambiguous - cf. Wittgenstein's point about 
the boxer (Philosophical Investigations_p.lle). This might suggest 
that Price has· misinterpreted the situation - provided the emphasis 
is placed on sentences not simply on words. 
Sometimes· we :--even ··constrl,lct- complex models ··of _ tqinkiiig as_ . 
involving~-a- matrix :of different vehicles. Thus:.:.Kari P:tibram23 :has 
talked about holographic thinking which uses the concept of the 
22. Price, H.H. Thinking and Experience. London, Hutchinson, _1953. p.255. 
23. cf. Pribram, K.H. Languages of the Brain : Experimental Paradoxes and 
Principles in Neuropsychology. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1971, 432p. · 
Might the hologram be an attempt to present a complex picture with lines of 
projection (i.e. a picture-diagram with the interpretation built i.n - if this is 
possi~e) such a device, if successful, would do what sentences do. 
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hologram to assemble such a matrix. Again Ryle has criticized 
Zeno.Vendler for his concept of thinking as involving "a cine-
matographic seque'rice of instantaneous mental exposures to 
· · ·,. 
24 I · t h · uence of thera propos1t1ons . mages, even c1nema ograp 1c seq , 
lack the assertion character of propositions. Hence we would 
want to ask "How does one have an image of negation, for example, 
or disjunction?" 
Suffice it for now to say that with respect to question (i) 
to (iii) a range of candidate vehicles or combinations thereof 
might·be considered and·that this raises a problem of their 
interrelations. There is a tendency on the part of both approaches 
to the teaching of deaf children to consider 'language' or 'public 
symbols' as somehow "better" or "more advanced" than the ether 
candidates. I suspect that the reasoning behind this view is 
essentially Price's idea that the non-instantiativeparticulars 
are bound to the here and now whereas the quasi-instaniative 
particulars allow us to tb~nk about a situation which is not 
present. F~r teachers this would be the cash value of the distinct-
ion drawn by Jean Piaget between concrete operations and formal 
operations. Against this it must be said that one of the features 
of Hans Furth's Thinking Without Language : Psychological Impliaa-
tions of Deafness is the idea that even people who are drastically 
linguistically impoverished can still exhibit Piagetian formal 
operations when they are presented with non-verbal or "performance" 
intelligence tests. 
(c) Pivotal terms 
In our consideration of the arguments for and against the 
24. Ryle, G. "Mowgliin Babel." Philosophy. 49, 1974 p.ll. 
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Duplicationist, Reducti?nist, and Adverbial accounts of thinking 
we face the danger that in interpreting such terms as 'thought', 
'thinking' , 'speech' and 'language' differently those accounts will 
fail to truly conflict (or agree). Some initial attempt must now 
be made to mark off the bounds of their dispute. 
If we examine Ryle's review of Vendler's Res Cogitans~ his 
eight papers on thinking pUblished since The Concept of Mind~ and 
h .. t . 'th B M d' th t S1'bley 25 h 1s 1n erv1ew. Wl ryan · agee we 1scover a , as . as 
observed, he does not always "draw the boundaries of thinking in 
the same way". 
Ryle makes a basic distinction between the engaged ana the 
disengaged thinker. As an example of the former he suggests an 
other-than-thoughtless tennis player and as an example of the latter 
he uses Le Penseur. Of the two Ryle remains primarily interested in 
the kind of thinking Le Penseur might be doing~ ~his disengaged 
thinking we can divide into three kinds: 
(i) what we might term 'active' types of thinking such as 
pondering, composing, calculating or computing, and solving 
a problem. All these examples appear frequently in Ryle's 
· discussion and in each case the thinker is trying to do some-
thing such as compose a poem. 
(ii) what we might term 'passive' types of thinking such as 
going over something in our heads or just reflecting. Here 
the thinking is more in the nature of a recollection or a 
mere review of something. These examples appear rather less 
frequently in Ryle's papers. 
(iii) on four occations Ryle includes daydreaming or drifting 
25.Sibley, F.N. "Ryle and thinking." In Wood, O.P. and Pitcher, G. RyZe. London, 
Macmillan, 1970, p.75 
21. 
in idle reverie in his catalogue of types of thinking. 
Ryle explicitly excludes that use of thinking which denotes 
belief or believing and I shall follow him in this. That is, 
the concern is with episodic thinking rather than dispositional 
attributions of thinking. I am e~sentially in agreement with 
Sibley in his classifications of what Ryle will count as thinking. 
The boundaries between these three sorts or types of thinking 
remain ill-defined. Drifting in'idle reverie seems to shade off 
into mere recollection and reflecting into pondering. Thinking as 
in the case of pondering remains Ryle's prime concern. 
It is my belief that thinking as in the case of·pondering 
(perhaps spelled out as abstract, logical thinking) both in a 
"thinking that ..•... " and 11 thinking about/of ...... sense also 
remains the prime concern of the educators of the deaf whom I 
have grouped as Reductionists and Duplicationists. I believe 
that this is shown by their willingness to talk about primitive as 
against full-blown thinking. Further support for this claim comes 
from their concern withfue concept of cognition, an English word 
which comes to us from the Latin 'cognosce' or 'I learn'. There 
is a suggestion that the primitive sorts of thinking, if I may 
call them that for a moment, are not learned, or at least not in 
schools whereas quite the reverse is held to be the case for 
something like abstract, logical thinking. While this is to 
oversimplify vastly their respective positions I believe that in 
focusing on the type of thinking we call pondering we will be able 
to discuss that notion of thinking of primary concern to all 
three approaches. 
26 Black, in considering the key terms 'thought' and 'thinking' 
draws a distinction between three "distinct but related uses" : 
26. Black, M.Gp.cit., p.85. 
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(i) a non-specifying process use, to be contrasted with 
such other mental processes as 'hoping' and 'wishing' (and, 
he would add, 'daydreaming'). Black would identify such a 
use when there is no ready answer to. the question "What 
are you thinking?" 
(ii) an episodic use as in the case "The though flashed across 
my mind that .... " 
(iii) a propositional use where we ~efer to the "cognitive 
kernel of certain remarks". 
I think that (iii) corresponds largely with what I have 
referred to as the'object of our thoughts', but these may not be 
expressed verbally as remarks, .and that (i) and (ii) serve to poin.t 
out that we can refer to either a specific instance of the activity 
of thinking or ju~t non-specifically to the general process itself 
as against some other process such as volition. 
Our concern is to ask whether one can think about anything 
without some expression or formulation or embodiment becoming 
involved. This expression may be in a language ~ either (it is 
supposed) inner or outer speech (however well formed. this may be). 
Thus one claim is that thinking is saying (to oneself); it would 
be rather a different claim to identify thinking with language. 
I shall take it that teachers of the·· de_.af. either agree or disagree 
with the claim that thinking is saying (whether or not they wish 
to go on to consider other sorts of expression such as mental 
images). 
(2) The Three Views. 
My argument over the next three ·chapters will take the 
following line : in the next two chapters I shall (with Ryle}, 
show why the Reductionist and Duplicationist theories are untenable 
23. 
and in Chapter IV I sha~l consider certain problems with Ryle's 
adverbial account of thinking (problems which have not been solved 
in his discussion of thinking published since Sibley's "Ryle and 
Thinking"). The vroduct of this discussion will be three-fold:-
(i) Since Plato philosophers have traditionally used the 
case of the deaf as a test-case for their views on thinking, 
but often as not they have misrepresented that case. I hope 
to show where they go wrong. 
(ii) The discussion will prsQ.uce·a number of conceptual 
clarifications which have bearing on the education of the 
deaf. 
(iii) In turn, a rather more soundly based methodology than those 
already in force may come into view. 
In "Thinking and Saying" Ryle suggests that the essential 
argument for the Reductionist approach is a wielding of Occam's 
R~zor against unobservables in our ontology. Conv.ersely, the 
Duplicationist seeks to account for the difference between two men, 
both of whom are muttering to themselves, but only one of whom 
is thereby thinking. (One might, for instance, be merely muttering 
phrases from a. foreign language he has overheard but as ye·t does 
notunderstand.) In short, argues Ryle, the Reductionist is too 
"stingy" while the Duplicationist is too "lavishly transcendentalist". 
Both have a valid point to make but both take their points too far. 
I intend to argue that this characterization can be largely 
substantiated. The Duplicationist is correct in seeing a difference 
between the two men; but in Chapter IV I shall attempt to show why 
this is not an 'occult' difference. In Chapter II I shall attempt 
to prove that the Reductionist does·not in fact succeed in ~eeping 
"unobservables" out of his ontology. 
Sibley ha~ traced three separate accounts of thinking 
provided successively by Ryle: 
(a) A MuZtiple-Activity Account of Thinking. 
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With this· account Ryle attempts to show that "·thinking" refers 
not just to one single activity but rather to a diverse range of 
separate activities such as pondering, remembering arguments, 
computing, composing and so on. What Ryle does not set out to do 
is ·to consider various possible arguments for an essential-ingredient 
of thinking. I shall consid~r such possibilities in section three 
of that chaptei, e.g. (for abstract thinking) the manipulation of 
symbols. 
(b) A PoZymorphous Account of Thinking. 
In addition to heterogeneity, the distinguishing feature of 
the multiple-activity account of thinking, a polymorphous account 
holds that this range of diverse activities must be neutral vi~-~­
vis the "collective" activity (e.g. "thinking"). I shall attempt to 
show that while this may hold true of one kind of thinking it cannot 
of another. Thus the arm movement of a thoughtful tennis-player may 
be a neutral activity but the pondering of a Le Penseur is already 
thought-impregnated. I shall discuss this problem in section four 
of Chapter III. 
(c) The AdverbiaZ Account of Thinking. 
My argument with Ryle's adverbial account of thinking is that 
it involves a mistaken application of Occam's Razor (entia non sunt 
muZtipZicanda praeter necessitatem). For Ryle "thinking" is the 
manner in which and the circumstances or context in which we perform 
a diverse range of (hetergeneous) activities which are neural with 
respect to thinking (they must be available to both non-thinkers 
and thinkers alike). Thinking, then, is to be analysed 
25. 
out in terms of a neutral activity, let us say, X-ings, qualified 
in a certain way. 
I shall argue that such an account fails on two.counts. 
(i} Ryle argues that the frames of mind (which d~stinguish the 
thinker from the non-thinker each performing ·the same neutr.al . 
X-ing) are neither pieces of behaviour (activities) nor non-physical 
occurences. Hence he argues that they are episodes (an instance 
of thinking is an episode) of a played~out conditional disposiiton. 
I shall argue that such dispositional ascriptions must be 
categorical. (ii) Ryle assumes a process or procession account of 
activity. I shall argue that.when we talk about the activity of 
thinking we should assume an episodic account of activity., 
My conclusion will be that all three accounts of thinking 
discussed here i.e. the Duplicationist account, the Reductionist 
account, and the Adverbial Account, seek ~o pola~ize. our ontology. 
Either thinking takes place in one world or two (Duplicationists 
argue for two, Ryle and the Reductionists for one). I suggest that 
this is far too simplistic a view : what we need is not one world 
or two but as large an ontology as the facts require. Consequently 
we require not this precept or that for the teaching.of deaf 
children but rather· a matrix of precepts to cover the range of 
things we must do to assist a deaf child to become tr~ly a thinker 
in the fullest sense of that word. One component of that process 
may very well be teaching deaf children a natural language. 
-ooOoo-
CHAPTER II 
THE REDUCTIONIST_ 
ACCOUNT OF THINKING 
26. 
II 
A Stroangero froom EZ.ea. Well, thinking 
and discourse are the same thing, 
except that what we call thinking is, 
precisely, the inward dialogue carried 
on by the mind with itsGlf without 
spoken sound. II 
Plato (Sophiat 3 263E.) 
27. 
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Traditionally teachers of the deaf appear to have tended 
to hold as a tacit assumption some variant of the Reductionist 
account of thinking; that is, an account not unlike that of the 
stranger from Elea. As· a result, most schools for the deaf, even 
today, see as th<~ir primary aim the teaching of language, and this 
despite the fact that "under our pr~~ent educational system the 
vast majority of persons, born deaf, do not acquire functional 
zanguage competence, even after undergoing many years of intensive 
' ' II 1 tra~n~ng 
r.· THE CONTEXT FOR SUCH AN ASSUHPTION :A WIDE ACCEPTANCE 
OF A REDUCTIONIST ACCOUNT OF_THINKING & THE HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND. 
Such an assumption needs to be seen in context. To begin vlith 
the view of thinking as inner speech is a fairly widely accepted 
notion of thinking in srpite of such non-Reductionist colloquialisms 
as "I just don't have the words to express my thoughts about .... " 
John B. Watson. was perhaps distilling such a view for American 
behaviourism when he wrote that " ••• according to my view, thought 
processes are really motor habits in -the larynx''.~ The naivite of this 
extreme view, that thinking is just subvocal uttering of sentences or 
snatches of speech, is perhaps matched only by the naivite of our 
understanding of the condition of deafness up until quite recent times. 
J 
It is still possible, for instance, to find elderly patients in New 
Zealand mental institutions who were_, as young children with hearing 
problems, mis-diagnosed as mentally retarded and who were 
------- -····------------------
l.Furth, H.G. Thinking without language : psychological implications of deafness. 
New York, The Free Press, 1966, p.l3. -
2.Watson, J .B. "Psychology as the beahviourist views it." Psychological Review 20 
1913 : quoted in Slobin, D.I. PsychoZinguistics. Glenview, Scott, Foresman and ~o., 
1971, p.98. 
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subsequently incarcerated as such for the rest of their lives. 
Until about the 17th century the prevailing understanding of 
deafness was essentially Ar~stotelian, which is to say, an under-
standing based on profound empirical ignorance. To be fa±r to 
Aristotle it must be recognized that he did do a vast amount of 
empirical work, especially in the area of Biology (Darwin paid him 
a great tribute in this respect). But {i) his empirical inquiries 
did not go very far in many areas; {ii) they were sometimes mixed 
up with ill-founded theories (see below); and unfortunately (iii) 
subsequent wrtters, for a long time, tended to take him as the 
last word - for which he cannot be blamed. 
Thus, Aristotle claimed that "large and protruding ears are 
a sign of foolishness and loquacity" (Hist. Anim.~I) and he wrote 
of ears that 11 Some are fine, some are coarse, ·and some are of 
medium texture; the last kind are the best for hearing 11 • (Hist. Anim.~ 
XI.) . 
. In contrast to our modern understanding which traces the 
process 6£ hearing from the outer ear through the middle ear to the 
cochlea and from there along the 8th nerve to the brain Aristotle 
wrote, 11 The passage of hearing ••••• ends at the place where the 
innate spiritus causes, in some animals, the pulsatibn of the 
heart, and in others, respiration : wherefore also it is that we 
are able to understand and repeat what we have heard, for as was 
the movement,which entered through the sense organ, such again is 
the movement which is caused by means of the voice, being, as it 
. ~ 
were, of one and the same stamp, so that a man can say what he has 
heard. 11 (De Gen.~ V.2.). 
The deaf were seen as denied the ability to think, for 
Aristotle wrote,· 11 Those who are born deaf all become senseless and 
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incapable of reason'', and he goes on, "Men that are born deaf are 
in all cases dumb; that is to say, they can make vocal noises but 
they cannot speak ..•.• Children, just as they have no control over 
other parts, so have no control at first over the tongue, but it 
is so far imperfect and only frees and detaches itself by degrees, 
so that in the interval children mostly lisp and stutter." (Hist. 
Anim., IV, 9.) 
The deaf, it was argued by reference to Aristotle, cannot 
speak because their tongues remained, unlike normal people, tied. 
And, continued the argument, since the deaf cannot speak, therefore 
they cannot think, for thinking just is inner spe~ch, thou~h, of 
course, Aristotle himself did not consider that t~inking is just 
inner speech. 
This view of the deaf and their problems appears to have 
remained unquestioned until about three hundred years ago and 
laymen still appear to be susceptible to the myths it engendered. 
In .1648 Dr John Bulmer published a book in part titled Phi loaophus: 
Or the Deaf and Dumb Man's Friend, Exhibiting th~ Philosophical 
Verity of that Subtile Art, which mai Enable One with an Observant 
Eie to Hear what any Man Speaks by the Moving of his Lips ..... 
Apparently Proving that a Man Borne Deafe and Dumbe may be Taught 
to Hear the Sounds of Words with his Eie and thenoe Learn to Speak 
with his Tongue, and we find, at about ·the same time, Descartes 
writing, "Of Hearing : Fourthly there are two nerves within the 
ears, so attached to three small bones that are mutually sustaining, 
and the first of which rests upon a small membrane that covers the 
cavity we call the tympanum of the ear, that all the diverse 
vibrations which the surrounding air communicates to this membrane 
are transmitted to the mind by these nerves, and the vibrations give 
31. 
rise accQrding to their diversity, to sensations of the different 
sounds." (Principia Philosophiae, IV. ?.). 
Descartes' was one of the first truly modern contributions 
to an account of the physiology of hearing. (This must be distin-
guished from his dualism. For Des~artes; thinking is the essential 
characteristic of the soul or mind (res cogitans) and so it is 
quite distinct from any corporeal manifestation such as in speech, 
i.e. it is consistent with his view that the deaf, lacking speech, 
are still able to and do think ~ although the power of speech, as 
Descartes argues in the Discourse, is the primary sign that man 
is a thinking thing.) 
Once the mechanism of hearing was understood and the possibili-
ties of lip reading realized a more positive approach became possible: 
by means of lip reading, sign language, and/or the use oi residual 
hearing by means of hearing aids the deaf could begin to acquire a 
language and learn how to speak and thus it was argued, become able 
to think. Thus Dr Samuel Davidson2writes, in 1914, " •.. let the 
teacher alw.ays keep in mind that her work is to develop the 
faculties of her pupils through language, rather than to teach 
language itself. All her methods will then, naturally and almost 
automatically, be directed to this end. If, on the other hand, she 
thinks of language as a formal study, her work will be formal, 
mechanical, lacking in interest, and ineffective as a means of 
developing either thought or language." 
It is possible to see, therefore, a tendency to Reductionism 
in traditional education of the deaf as a confluence of a widely 
accepted notion of thinking as talking to oneself and an only very 
gradual growth in our empirical knowledge about the condition of 
deafness. 
3.Davidson, S.G. "Mental development through language study." American Annals of 
the Deaf 59, 1914 : quoted in Groht, M.A. Natural Language for Deaf Children. 
Washington, D.C. Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf, 1958, p. iW. 
II. THINKING AS SUB-VOCAL SPEECH 
ACCOUNTS OF THINKING. 
32. 
WATSON 1 S AND NEO-WATSONIAN 
If our notion of thinking still rem~ins susceptible to a 
naive view of thinking as sub-vocal speech then that view as 
formulated by Watson has come under strong criticism. Watson's 
accoul'rb of thinking as just subvocal speech (clearly an identity 
thesis of a certain kind) can be disproved by any evidence of 
thinking taking place without the presence of subvocal speech. 
On Watson's account a person who had his speech musculature 
neutralized would thereby lose the ability to think, much in the 
same way that a follower of Aristotle might hold that a man whose 
tongue remained tied would therefore be unable to speak and 
therefore also be unable to think. One example of the sort of .. , 
empirical evidence to be brought against the Watsonian account 
is provided by Smith, Brown, Toman and Goodman (1947). 4 They were 
interested in the analgesic properties of a form of the drug 
Curare (p-tubocurarine). Smith volunteered to take some intra-
venously and after a time experienced complete muscle paralysis 
including the loss of the ability to make voluntary gestural or 
vocal movements. Upon recovery he was able to report that his 
awareness of what had been happening to him remained unimpaired 
and that he had known what was going on around him - his memory 
of the events that took place during the experiment was reported 
to be excellent by the other researchers. Throughout the experiment 
his EEG remained normal and he responded normally to pattern vision. 
Thus, though he had lost control .of his speech musculature his 
ability to think apparently remained unaffected. 
4. Cofer, C. "Experimental studies of the role of verbal processes in concept 
formation and problem solving." Annals of the New York Academy of Science 
91, 1960 : 94-953 quoted in Slobin, D.I. Psycholinguistics. Glenview, Scott, 
Foresman, 1971, p.99-100. The reference is to : Smith, E.M., Brown, H.O., 
Toman, J.E.P., and Goodman, L.S. "The lack of cerebral effectsof d-tubocurar.in 
AnaesthesioZogy 83 1947 : 1-14. 
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Wittgenstein refers to ~uch a Watsonian type a6count (Philosophical 
Investigatio'Y!s 'Bk~i. 376) when he writes that "when I say ABC to 
myself, what is the criterion of my doing the same as someone else 
who silently repeats it to himself? It might be found that the same 
thing took place in my larynx and in his. (And similarly when we 
both think of the same thing, wish the same, and so on.) But when 
did we learn the use of the words: "to say such-and-such to oneself?" 
by someone's pointing to a process in the larynx or the brain? Even 
if there was a larynx or brain mechanism would this solve our 
puzzlement about what account to give of thinking? To begin with 
the criteria we have .for deciding whether a person is thinking or 
not are quite different from the criteria we use to decide if a 
larynx or br.ain P:t:::Pcess·:.is. tCJ._klJ1g: .pia;~e. 4 (Anthony Kenny makes a 
Watson could make his claim secure against such evidence as 
provided by Smith et al. either by making his claim unfalsifiable 
and hence unscientific (a proposal to which I shall shortly return) 
or, alternatively, he might retreat to an identification of thinking 
with certain brain-movements which ~ould presumably not be affected 
b y d-tubocurarine. (After all, the EEG is reported to have 
remained normal throughout the experiment.} Thus, on this latter 
or neo-Watsonian type of.account there would be no observable 
movements of the speech musculature but yet there would still be 
observable movements (of the brain) at least in principle. 
An advocate of a neo-Watsonian-type account might wish toidentify 
thinking in a variety ofways, presented either separately or together 
invoking la-ryngeal movements,_ brain processes, and so on. Thus, 
Kenny, A. Wittgenstein. _Londo~, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1973. p.l46. 
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Max (1937) hypothesized that the linguistic mechanisms in the 
fingers of deaf subjects who had been taught a sign-language would 
increase during the solution of 'thought' problems. His positive 
findings have received some confirmation in studies by Novikova 
(1961) and Me Guigan (1971). 6 Yet it would be nonsense to suggest· 
that their subjects' thinking consisted in finger twitchings and 
jerks alone. 
At best this amounts to a form of central state materialism 
which holds that such psychological occurrences as consciousness 
or thinking are identical with brain events. Much depends on what 
is meant by ;'identical" in this context. Smart, Place, and even 
. : ... _ .· .··~. - . . . . ~ 
·.:..-
perhaps Hobbes . (who :held that thought was ·a motion in the brain) 
might .be seen as arguing that consciousness is empirically identical 
with brain processes much in the way that a cloud is identical with 
a mass of particles in suspension. A follower of Brentano would 
probably argue in reply that the intentionality of thinking can 
never be adequately expressed in just neurophysiological terms. A 
reply to this might be that the identity theory is not a theory 
about the translatability of mental terms into neurophysiological 
terms (even if it is sometimes misunderstood as such). Though 
there may be a brain state difference }?etween two people thinking 
about different things (or, for a neo-Watsonian, laryngeal or 
digital process differences as well) this does not mean that we 
can translate "I am thinking about my wife" into a statement about 
neura~·processes. A neo-Watsonian would probably want to hold that 
eventually we should be able to replace.our "everyday" terms such 
as "thinking" with "scientific" physiological ones. There are 
6. cf. Max, L.W. "An experimental study of the motor theory of. consciousness. 4. 
Action-current responses in the deaf during awakening, kinesthetic imagery 
and abstract thinking~''! JournaL of Camp. Psychology 24~ 1937 : 301-344; Novikova, 
L.A •. "E1ectrophysica1 investigation of speech~''! In 0 'Connor, N. (ed.) Recent 
Soviet Psychology. New York, Liveright Publ., 1961; McGuigan, F.J. "Covert . 
linguistic behaviour in deaf sUbjects during thinking.'~ Journal of Comparat-z-ve and 
Physiological Psychology. 75, 1971 : 417-420. 
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those, such as Strawson, who would probably want to reply that 
if we ·did so something would be lost and our account of thinking 
would remain incomplete. 
This neo-Watsonian thesis is perhaps best summarized by 
7 John Tyndall: 
"The human brain is said to be the organ of thought 
and feeling; when we are hurt the brain feels it, when we 
ponder it is the brain that thinks, when our passions or 
affections are excited it is through the instrumentality of 
the brain. Let us endeavour to be a little more precise 
here. I hardly imagine there exists a profound scientific 
thinker, who has reflected upon the subject, unwilling to 
admit the extreme probability of the hypothesis thu.t, for 
every fact of consciousness, whether in the domain of sense, 
of thought, or of emotion, a definite molecular condition of 
motion or structure is set up in the brain; or who would be 
disposed even to deny that if the motion or ptructure be 
induced by internal causes instead of external, the 
effect on consciousness will be the same? Let any nerve, 
for example, be thrown by morbid action into the precise 
state of motion which would be communicated to it by the 
pulses of a heated body, surely that nerve will declare 
itself hot - the mind will accept the subjective intimation 
~ . 
exactly as if it·were objective. The retina may be excited 
by purely mechanical means. A blow on the eye causes a 
luminous flash, and the mere pressure of the finger on the 
external ball produces a star of light, which Newton compared 
to the circles on a peacock's tail. Disease makes people see 
7. Tyndall, J. "'l'be: Limitations of Scientific l-taterialsim" in Edwards, P. and 
Pap, A. (eds) A Modern Introduction to Philosophy : Readings from Classical and 
Contemporary Sources. Revised Ed. New York, The Free Press, 1957, 1965, p.218. 
36. 
visions and dream·dreams; but, in all such cases, could we 
examine the organs implicated, we should on philosophical 
grounds, expect to find them in that precise molecular. 
condition which the real objects, if present, would 
superinduce." 
Now we note that the identity, as here suggested, is infered on 
empirical grounds (not logical). Indeed, on potentially empirical 
grounds (for the th~sis trades largely on future technological 
abilities- not current ones). But even if we had such evidence 
firmly in hand I should still regard the account (Of thinking as 
such) as inadequate. At the very least we would have a vie~ of 
thinking which is in marked conflict with what we normally say 
about ourselves (we want to say that we think - not that we have 
neural processes of this or that type). Yet I concede that we seem 
to have the greatest difficulty in accounting for ·the ontological 
status of the non-physical mental occurrences which might account 
for thinking in terms larger than just movements 0f the brain, 
larynx, or (in the deaf who have learned a manual means of 
communication) hands. 
If, in contrast to an empirical explanation a neo-Watsonian 
alters his thesis to one opposing some form of materialism to 
8 
epiphenomenalism then, as Smart has said, "there is no conceivable 
experiment whiqh. could decide between" the two accounts. It is at 
this point that Smart invokes the principles of parsimony and 
simplicity in deciding in favour of a brain-process theory. 
In summary, we might divide accounts of thinking in terms of 
some physical process into two groups. On the one hand we would 
have the na.:i:ve account of thinking as. movements in the speech 
8. '.Smart, J.J.C. "Sensations and Brain Processes" In Edwards, P. and Pap, A. 
Op. cit. p. 235. 
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musculature and on the other an· identity of thinking with (at least) 
cerebral activity. The former account fails both for its very 
naivete and by the empirical evidence we might bring against it. 
The latter type of account can also be divided into two versions. 
One version holds an empirical identity between thinking and 
certain physical processes (particularly neural ones). This 
account trades on future technological capabilities in the area 
of neurophysical research. At best it might be shown to be a 
correct account of thinking. A second version requires a logical 
identity. Not only does this account run counter to the way in 
which we normally describe thinking (certainly not in terms of 
neural processes alone) but also-it attempts to sway us on such 
grounds as that it provides "the simplest" or "most elegant" 
explanation. Those philosophers who do not feel the temptations 
of Occam's Razor may wish to continue the attempt to provide some 
well-founded theory which yet does not run counter to our normal 
way of f~lking about thinking. It remains to be seen if, in doing 
so, they can maintain a Reductionist position. 
III. THINKING AS INNER SPEECH. 
Instead of identifying thinking with some (at least in 
principle) observable physical process a Reductionist might wish 
to identify thinking with (at least) inner speech. Traditionally 
teachers of the deaf have either (a) tended to assume some vague 
and general identification between thinking and inner speech or 
(b) they have felt that, at the very least, thinking of a certain 
type, i.e. abstract thinking, is language-dependent in the sense 
that a person who has not learnt to speak a public language would 
not be able to think in this way, or, on this level. 
There has often bee:o., !_would suggest, a tacit ass~ption in 
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deaf education that language is, as a symbol system, inseparably 
lin~ed with, at least, abstract forms of thought. The radical nature 
of Hans Furth's book Thinking Without Language for a teacher of the 
deaf is not that it asserts that deaf children can think without 
a ·language but that it asserts that deaf children can think 
abstractly (that is, perform at Piaget's formal operational level) 
without language. 
It may be, of. course, that Furth's deaf subjects were 
employing some symbol system or quasi-system other than a natural 
language. Thus in experiment 11 : ''Logical Symbol Discovery and 
9 Use" three elementary logical connectives (conjunction, negation 
and exclusive disjunction ..... ".", "/" and "-") were employed. The 
results of this experiment (perhaps the most crucial in the 
collection) revealed that,.while the tests differentiated between 
the high and low intellige.Jlce groups among both deaf and hearing 
adults, if that variable is isolated, deaf and hearing su~~cts 
showed little difference in their ability to comprehend and use 
these three symbols {a previous.· experiment on "Symbol Discovery", 
though, showed the hearing to be better at the discovery of a 
symbol solution to a task). 
Now (a) and (b) (above) make quite different (although not 
necessarily incompatible) claims. Moreover, it is not immeidately 
clear that either (a) or (b) is Reductionist as against Duplica-
tionist. 
Thus a Duplicationist might identify thinking with inner 
speech, specifying inner speech as a mental language (inborn or 
derived from sense-perception : a Rationalist might be drawn to 
9. Furth,. H. Op. cit. _,p. 136-143. This is a. report of Furth, H. G. and Youniss, 
J. "The influence of language and experience on disc;:overy and use of logical .. 
symbols. British Journal of Psychology 5~_, · 1965. 
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postulate the former; an Empiricist the latter - for the 
Empiricist-Duplicationist, inner speech would probably consist 
of images). In either case, thinking is seen as a distinct process, 
independent of speaking a language : when a person speaks two 
processes occur, i.e. thinking (inner speech) and speaking (of 
a conventional translation or communication of thought). As 
regards the deaf : it could be granted that they possess inner 
speech (i.e. the ability to think) - are born with it (the Ration-
alist hypothesis)" ..... or .that they come to possess it through sense-
~· . . . . : 
experience other than of· an auditory sort (the Empiricist hypothesis) 
It could even be granted, further, that the d~af possess linguistic 
competence in·some broad sense: but because of their auditory 
impairment they are unable to readily learn a language and hence 
are largely unable to exercise their linguistic competence or 
potentialities. 
As regards (b) : this claim is compatible with some versions 
of Duplicationism i.e. (b) says that thinking of· a certain type 
is language-dependent; but, as it stands, it leaves open the 
. . 
question whether thinking of the specified type is distinct from 
speaking. A Duplicationist who holds (a) could also hold (b) i.e. 
he says that a certain type of thinking (inner speech) is developed 
only by way of learning a public language. But a Rationalist who 
thinks of inner speechas innate would probably not make this 
exception. 
(b) becomes a Reductionist thesis only when it is maintained 
that speaking a public language in a certain way just is thinking 
;' 
in the required sense (abstract thinking) whether one speaks to 
others or to oneself. 
Now my general concern here is whether thinking is (public-) 
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1angua9e dependent (particularly in connection with the deaf) and 
then whether it consists in inner speech of some form which is 
parasitic on having learnt a (public) language. Those who say 
that it is (whether Reductionists or Duplicationists in the 
philosophical terms) could perhaps be described as Reductionist 
in a broader and slightly different sense : they rule out 'pure' 
or 'naked' thinking' or sui generis. accounts of thinking (and hence 
reduce it to ·or towards a language connection); they are also 
'Reductionist' in a sense which might be looked on as a bad pun, 
viz., they 'reduce' the number of thinkers in the world by ruling 
out the deaf (at least in regard to certain types of thinking). 
We can now return to the physicalist thesis that thinking 
consists in brain-states and brain- 'movements' (at least) to which we 
found th'e account of thinking in terms of sub-vocal speech 
retreating. Such a thesis (provided the identity as variously. 
specified makes sense) could be 'dualist' i.e. it distinguishes 
thinking and spe~king as two processes - where thinking is part 
of the cause of speaking and speaking is a translation, in a 
conventional form~ of thinking (brain-states). If so, thinking is 
in principle observable and independent. But the thesis might hold 
for a two-way process - having certain brain-states is dependent 
on having learnt a language - i.e. the deaf are unable to have 
certain brain-states and hence cannot think in certain ways (that 
is, partake in certain forms of abstract thinking, if not al.l ) ... 
The thesis would then be 'Reductionist' in the way specified in 
the last paragraph. 
Now a general difficulty for physicalism is that consciousness, 
i.e. conscious experience, appears to be treated as epi-phenomenal, 
as external and-accicfental to the process of thinking (brain-states) 
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it appears as if brain-states (thinking) are independent of 
the_subject 1 s consciousness of them : a strange consequence. There 
is also the problem that consciousness of a thought on the part of 
a subject is not consciousness of a brai~-state. Physicalists, of 
course, attempt to meet the latter objection in terms of opacity 
of reference, e.g. I can be conscious of the person in the dark 
suit without being conscious of theVib~Chancellor even though the 
person in thedark suit is the Vice-Chancellor. 
In summary, a Reductionist might wish to hold that the possess-
ion of a natural language (as a symbol system) is required in order 
that, in its use as inner speech, it simply can be thinking (of 
the required sort, viz. abstract thinking). This would be to be 
1 Reductionis·t 1 in a double sense for it would reduce the number of 
thinkers in the world (in one sense or level of thinking) by 
eliminating those who have failed to acquire a language (though 
leaving open the possibility that they might still be able to think 
abstractly by using some other symbol system - it might then be 
further argued, of course, that language has certain inherent 
advantages over these other symbol systems - but this would be a 
further argument). 
Does this version of Reductionism entail Physicalism? At 
first glance we have one thesis that thinking is brain-states 
(Physicalism) and on the other that (a certain advanced form of) 
thinking just is inner speech (Reductionalism). So our question 
comes down to the relationship between what we mean, on the one 
hand, by "brain-states", and, on the other, by "inner speech". 
In section II., I argued that the naive Watsonian position 
might well be developed into a more powerful thesis which identifiec 
(either empirically or logically). thinking with (perhaps ccnjunctivel~!i 
brain-states or processes, movements in the speech musculature, and 
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(perhaps in the manual deaf) movements in the hands. This 
amounts to identifying "inner speech" with "brain states" or, at 
least, regarding them as closely bound up together in one system. 
We might summarize this account with the.phrase "We think with our 
bodies". On such an account thinking just is. "inner speech" 
understood as certain bodily processes and movements. 
I have briefly raised certain problems for a Physicalist-
Reductionist account of thinking in both sections II and III, and 
then, just as briefly, attempted to indicate how a Physicalist 
might reply to these objections. 
But a Reductionist might wish to hold that "inner speech" 
should not be identified with movements in the brain, larynx, hands 
or whatever. This is not to imply that he would deny the existence 
of such physical bodily movements and states but rather that he 
would assert that they are not a sufficient explanation of what 
we mean by "inner speech". Certainly he might agree, it sounds 
odd and at variance with how we feel we ought to speak of 
thinking, to explicate thinking solely in terms of such bodily 
occurrences as a twitching of the hands of a (thoughtful) deaf 
man. It sounds just as odd, he would want to say, to explicate " 
"inner speech" in terms of larynx jerks, movements in the brain, 
and so on. But then he would probably go on to deny that this 
implies that thinking is something else as well as (at least) 
inner speech (the Duplicationist thesis)~ Rather thinking just is 
(at least) inner speech (and here he might add mental images etc.) -
though again reiterating that inner speech is· not to be understood 
simpZy as brain states, and so on. 
A number of points need to be raised before we can adequately 
assess the adequacy of this non-Physicalist form of Reductionism~ 
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IV. GN A PROCESS BY WHICH THE LEARNING OF A PUBLIC LANGUAGE 
(PERHAPS UTILIZING CERTAIN INNATE LINGUISTIC CAPACITIES) 
MIGHT GIVE RISE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INNER SPEECH. 
Towards our assessment of a non-Physicalist form of Reductionisn. 
we need bDiefly to give some ac?ount of how the acquisition of a 
public language might give• rise to or make possible the development 
of inner speech (which the Reductionist of a certain persuasion 
holds just is a certain form (at times) of thinking (abstractly)). 
One such account, familiar to. -ritost teachers of the deaf in New 
Zealand, is provided by the Russian researcher Vygotsky. 
Vygotsky originally wrote do··m his views on the relationship 
between thinking and language in the 1930's but these were 
suppressed until the mid-1950's when they were revived by Luria. 
Vygotsky's major work, Thought and Language~ appeared in the West 
in 1962 from the M.I.T. Press with an afterword by Jean Piaget in 
which Piaget acknowledges that where they differ Vygotsky tends 
to be right. It is not, therefore, surprising that Vygotsky's account 
should have such a profound effect on New Zealand teachers of the 
.· 
deaf for New Zealand was one of the first countries to place a 
major emphasis on the discussion of Piaget•s work in the area of 
child development in its teacher training colleges. 
Vygotsky argues that thought and speech have different 
genetic origins and that at first they develop independently of 
each other. He suggests that in the normal young child there is 
a prelinguistic phase in thought and a preintellectual phase in 
speech. It is only later that the two become correlative and "thought 
becomes verbal and speech rational". 
At first sight this appears to be a Duplicationist account 
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of thinking as something else as well as speech; but this problem 
is met.by the Reductionists as follows : prelinguistic thought is 
to be seen as nothing but (gets reduced to) sensori-motor activity. 
(At this early level the Duplicationist ~ust assert that the 
infant performs sensori-motor activities and some primitive yet 
s~parate mental activities as well. The difficulty for the 
Reductionist at this level is how to account for the mental aspect 
of the sensori-motor behaviour - how, for instance, to distinguish 
sensori-motor behaviour-cum-thinking from sensori-motor behaviour 
which is instinctive or innate such as the sucking reflex. The 
conflict between the Duplicationist and Reductionist accounts is 
not necessarliy avoided by a. retreat to the very young child.} 
Researchers in child development such as Piaget and Vygotsky, 
tend to locate the age at which language and thought begin to lose 
their independence at around about two. It is interesting to note 
that deaf children tend to babble up to about this age after which 
they, unlike normally hearing children, tend to stop. They cease 
babbling, of course, because they are not getting acoustic feedback 
from their own. voices and one of the urgencies of early identification 
is that it allows us to provide amplification of this babbling by means 
of hearing aids utilizing any residual hearing that may remain. 
Vygotsky disting~ished a number of stages in the development 
of thought and language as noted by J. Nash. 10 
"First, there is a primit~ve stage of preintellectual 
·speech and parallel but separate preverbal thought. 
'•.' 
. The second stage involves accumulation of naive 
psychological experiences of his own body, of objects, 
and of the use of tools. In parallel, speech becomes 
10. Nash, J. Developmental Psychology : A Psychological Approach. Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1970, p.345. 
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grammatically correct, though the child does not yet 
understand the logic of grammar. He masters the syntax 
of speech before the syntax of thought. The third stage 
involves egocentric speech arid, in thought, the use 
of external signs or operations (~.g. counting on 
fingers) to aid it. The fourth stage is one of 
"ingrowth", or inner speech, in whi6h the operations 
are internalized, and thought and language converge. 
The child begins to use "logical mem6ry" {such as mental 
~oun~ing) and to operate wit~ inherent relationships and 
inner signs. For speech development, this is the final 
stage of inner or nonverbal speech. There remains an 
interaction between inner and outer operations, with 
rapid shift from one to the other. Though so interrelated, 
inner speech and thought are nat the same. Much thought 
can be wordless - even without inner words - as, for 
example, is the thought manifested in the use of tools. 
However, Vygotsky insists that the later development 
of thought is largely determined by language and that the 
child's full intellectual growth is contingent on his 
acquiring language or the social means of· thought. " 
I began by distinguishing two versions of the Reductionist 
account : 
(a) thinking as subvocal speech, and (b) thinking as inner speech. 
With respect.t:o the second version we can again distinguish two 
views : 
(i) a naive view that thought and inner speech are the same. 
(ii) a view that much of oun thought becomes (after being 
something else) inner speech, but. not all (as when we think 
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in a succession of meptal images), but also that full 
intellectual growth is contingent on the acquisition of 
a language. 
This last point appears to have been conceded by Flurt.h. After 
asserting the possibility of thought without language nhe 
< 
recognizes that thought with language may be more efficient, more 
objective, and more flexible~. 11 Along the same lines, "Pettifor 
(1968) has demonstrated that it is the higher levels of conceptual 
thinking that are most affected by linguistic deficiencies due to 
deafness concrete levels of conceptual thinking (those 
involving, for example, manipulations of visual perceptions) are 
less dependent on langtiage". 12 
It is this second, less naive., view of thinking which, I want 
to suggest, lends itself to a Reductionist interpretation by 
. teachers of the deaf. On this account thinking is at first nothing 
but (at least} sensori-motor behaviour. Gradually thinking comes 
to be more and more nothing but inner speech (at least) and 
thinking as inner speech becomes critical at what is termed the 
"higher" levels of thought- abstract, logical thinking·- Piaget's 
formal operational level. 
There is in all .this, an underlying assumption that for 
abstract thinking a certain level of linguistic competence is 
necessary. This need not be a solely Reductionist·belief. A 
Duplicationist might also hold that though thinking is something 
else as well as (for instance) inner speech, for· the higher forms 
of thought language is necessary. Thus the precept "teach deaf 
children a language so that they may think" might be taken as 
suggesting "teach deaf children a language so that they may think 
fully". I turn to this matter in the following section. 
11. Op. cit., p. 347. 
12. Op. ait.,p. 347. The reference is to : Pettifor, J.L. "The role of language 
·in the development of abstract thinking ."Canadian Journal of Psychology 22, 
1968 : 139-156. 
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V. THINKING (ABSTRACTLY) WITHOUT A LANGUAGE. 
The question of whether the deaf who do not possess a 
language can think (abstractly) was the subject of some debate. 
at around the turn of the century. The case of the deaf-mute 
Melville Ballard, referred to by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical 
1nvestigations~ arose in this context. The case .of Ballard's recol-
lections of his thinking prior to his acquisition of language was 
originally presented by Samuel Porter in the Princeton Review 
(1881) and some of this wa~ subsequently republished by William 
James in his The Prindiples of Psychology (1907). In addition, 
James added another deaf~mute's recollections to the literature 
with the case of Theophilus d'Estrella (Philosophical Review~l892J. 13 
One force of the Ballard and d'Estrella recollections is to 
establish the possibility of thought without language (without 
language in a double sense : (i} without the prior acquisition of 
a natural language and (ii} without its ~ubsequent employment as 
inner speech). Now neither a Duplicationist nor a Reductionist need 
dispute such a claim and, further, both might wish to go on to 
agree with James 14 that "Of course no man can think without some 
kind of mind-stuff to think in", though a Reductionist would want 
to assert that our thinking just is this "mind-stuff" while a 
Duplicationist would assert that our thinking is something else 
as well as the medium it appears in. 
Thought without language suggests two possibilities " (i) that. 
we can employ a va·riety of what Price has termed 11 quasi-instantiative 
particulars 11 ( 11 mind-stuffs 11 or "mediums" - such as words, images, 
13. I have reprinted these reports as Appendix I of this thesis. 
14. James, W. "Thought before languag,e : A deaf-mute's recollections" 
Philosophical Review~ 2. 1892, p.623. 
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gestures, diagrams and the like). Thus I have been car~ful so 
far. to specify "inner speech (at Zeast) ". (ii) It may be, the 
deaf being a good example of this, that these mediums are to a 
certain extent interchangeable. Denied access to one it seems 
likely that.we .can often employ another. 
This "interchangeability" or "plasticity" is probably not 
unrelated to a certain plasticity in the brain itself. 
Studies of brains of patients who have suffered specific areas 
of damage tend to show (i) a complex and only partially understood 
relationship between anatomical area and psychological process 
and (ii) a profound re~erve capacity of the brain for using 
alternative anatomical areas in theface of such damage (such as 
a tumor or.head injury) -a capacity which seems to decrease with 
15 
age. Indeed, such studies tend to show that beyond puberty the 
brain tends to become "set in its ways". It may be that a deaf 
person who does not receive rem~dial help in the acquisition of 
language i~ childhOod and who develops alternatives to language 
and speech may find it inc~easingly difficult to break out of 
such a pattern and acquire language later on. If this is true then 
it mitigates against a precept ~hich urges us to "teach a deaf 
child to think so that he may·the better (later) acquire language". 
The theory may sound attractive in principle but fail for 
neurological reasons in practice. 
The other, and for our purposes, more critical, implication 
of these recollections is the suggestion that the deaf, despite a 
lack of language, may not thereby be denied the ability to think 
15. See for instance : Lenneb~rg, E.H. BioZogicaZ Foundations of Language .. 
New York, Wiley, 1967. 
49. 
abstractly. 
Thus Porter argues of Ballard that "It is clear that the 
mental processes he describes were of a high order of conceptual 
16 
thought." and James, referring to the same case, writes that 
Ballard's "narrative shows him to have had a very extensive 
command of abstract, even of_metaphysical conceptions, when as 
yet his only language was pantomime confined to practical home 
affairs". 17 So convinced was James of the implications of d'Estrella' 
reminiscinces that he concluded that d'Estrella's narrative "tends 
to discountenance the notion that no abstract thought is possible 
without words." 18 
Various possibilities suggest themselves : 
(i) Ballard and d'EstPella posaPssed more language tha~ they 
remember they had. 
Thus we note that Ballard was not born deaf but lost his 
hearing during his infancy. We are not told whether this was 
bE7fore ·or after the age of two (or how long afte.r the age of two). 
It is questionable wh~ther he was a truly "languageless" deaf 
- . . 
person. In the third paragraph of his narration Ballard reveals 
that his mother, prior to the age of five, attempted to undertake 
remedial action and began early speech triining. d'Estralla was 
apparently born deaf but we do not know the extent of.his hearing 
loss nor the extent to which he might have derived some benefit 
·from what residual hearing he had left to him. He does point out 
(paragraph two) that he did have some degree of hearing in his 
left ear, and this at least to the extent that as a young child 
he could respond to sound (so much so that he even comes to question 
16. Porter, s. "fs thought possible without language? Case of a deaf-mute." 
Pr>inaeton Review January, 1881, p.ll4. 
17. James, W. Op. ai't. 3 p. 613. 
18. Ibid. 3 p. 623. 
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whether or not he was congenitally deaf).· 
It is impossible to judge, of course, whether either of 
them had sufficient language to develop inner speech of the 
order required for its use as a medium of thinking. We do not 
even know how much would count as "sufficient". 
(ii) Then there is Wittgenstein's point (PhiZosophicaZ 
Investigations Bk. I, 342) that we are dealing here with 
recoZZections. To what extent can we trust these memories? Are 
they a "queer memory phenomenon", has their subsequent acquisition 
of language "coloured" their memories, or what? I have :nc doubt 
that both narrators have made an honest attempt to remember accurate-
ly what they experienced but we must all admit that often .::>ur 
memories of our childhood can not be entirely. trust~d. 
(iii) Finally, even if both of the above "objectibns" were 
to prove unfounded this does not mean to say that either of these 
two deaf people possessed some innate private language as against 
some degree of inner speech developmentally derfved from the 
(partial) acquisition 6f a natural language. It remains possible 
(indeed, Furth's findings suggest this is the case) that some 
"system" other than one based entirely on a natural language was 
developed and employed by them in their abstract thought. Until 
such a possibility is disproved Whately's19view that "A deaf-mute, 
before he has been taught a language, - either the finger-language 
or reading, - cannot carry on a train of reasoning, any more than 
a brute", remains, at best, sub Judice~ and at worst, unlikely. 
The position for a .. -Reductionist remains as follows : for 
certain forms of abstract thinking we require as a pre-condition 
19. In Porter, Op.cit., p.l05. 
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the a~quisition of a language. This in turn enables us 
(perhap$ by some such process as is indicated by Vygotsky) to 
develop the "knack'' of inner speech. Thi~king at this level just 
is the employment of such a medium. Some Reductionists might 
even go on to argue that a natural language remains the best 
medium we have for such "advanced" levels of thinking and they 
would then want to argue that the. deaf, presumably employing 
other symbolic mediums, fail to develop abstract thinking to 
the extent that they otherwise might. 
One advocate of a Reductionist account such as I have outlined 
above is the philologist Max MUller. In his view thought and 
speech are inseparable, but under 'speech', as James 2 ~ pointed 
out, "he includes any conceivable sort of symbolism or even 
21 
mental imagery". As MUller writes, "I have freely and fully 
admitted that thoughts may exist without words, because other 
signs may take the place of words. Five fingers or five ·lines 
are quite sufficient to convey the concept of five, between people 
speaking different languages, possibly between deaf and dumb 
people who speak no language at all." 
One feature then, of the Reductionist account is its inherent 
pervasiveness : whenever that we want to call thinking is to be 
considered present so then must something like inner speech be 
present at the risk of constantly swelling 'speech' (or, perhaps, 
'medium of thought') to account for all instances. There is a 
danger that such a policy becomes ad hoc and that rather untenable 
"mind stuffs" get postulated to account for the less typical 
examples of thinking such as daydreaming or drifting in idle 
reverie. 
20. ·James, w. The principles of psycho'logy Volume I. London, Macmillan, 1907. 
p.269 (footnote). 
21. Muller, F.M. Science of thought. New York, Scribner's Sons, 1887, p.Sl. 
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Then too, such a policy seems to run foul of such phrases 
in our language as "I haven·':t the words to express my thoughts 
b t II M""ll. 22 . b bl h h a ou ..... u er, 1s pro a y correct wen e suggests that 
by such a phrase "we generally mean mere states of feeling, which 
can never be rendered into language except approximately, 
metaphorically, or poetically " but perhaps we m_ight doubt 
whether, as he goes on to assert, "all this only seems to show 
that thought without words is impossible." A Reductionist account 
does seem to be committed to not allowing a 'pure' or 'naked' though ,I 
For such an account thinking is nothing but ....•. (here some 
conjunction of MUller-type 'speech' acts) .•.. 
What is our Reductionist to make of the followinq case : a 
scientist working at the very boundaries of his field develops 
a totally new concept for which he has to coin a new word. What 
is the nature .of his thought prior to his coining· of the new 
term? A Reductionist seems to be compelled to assert that his 
·• pre-linguistic' thinking must be in some non-verbal form, perhaps 
a succession of mental images, but not that it might be, even in 
only some small part, 'naked thought'• 
In such a context Mliller23 faces the test case of the deaf ' 
II A final fact adduced against the theory that it is 
impossible to think without language, which was formerly 
very popular, is that deaf and dumb people cannot speak, 
and yet can think. At present, however, it is well known 
that, if they can think and reason, they have learnt it 
from those who use words, only substituting other signs 
for their words and concepts; while if they are not so 
taught, they never rise beyond what we may call thinking 
.even in. ani~als, nay, often remain entirely imbecile. I 
22. Ibid.,p.54. 
23. Ibid.,p.63. 
53. 
may cite the authoritative words of Professor Huxley 24 
"A man born dumb, notwithstanding his great cerebral mass and 
his inheritance of strong intellectual instincts, would be 
capable of few higher intellectual manifestations than an orang 
C• 
or a chimpanzee, if he were confined to the society of dumb 
associates. • II 
-ooOoo-
24. The reference given by Muller is to ; Hale, H. '1The origin of languages". 
Kant, Anthropologie~ ql6. ~886, p.36. In section v. I have attempted to 
provide an alternative to Muller's conclusions about the deaf. 
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VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF 'NAKED' THINKING. 
To ask whether we can think 'nakedly' is to ask whether 
thinking requires a medium or 'vehicle'. Even if the answer is 
"yes" it would be a further (Reductionist) .step to identify 
thinking with its vehicle or (to speak in Duplicationist terms) 
it embodiment. The rejection· :of 'pure' or 'naked' thinking is 
not a sufficient condition for Reductionism·, though it is certainly 
a necessary one. Such a rejection is not a sufficient condition 
for Reductionism because a Duplicationist might also reject the 
possibility of 'pure' thinking (if that means thinking without 
the use of any medium - whether innate, derived from sense-
experience, or from a public language). 
Let us consider a number of possible assertions in turn: 
ASSERTION I THINKIN~. REQUIRES THE PRESENSE OF PRIVATE IMAGES, 
SILENT SOLILOQUIES, AND UNOBSERVABLE VEHICLES 
GENERALLY. 
This is the claim that the ascription of thinking implies~ 
the possession of private items. 
·MY answer is a guarded "no". Many.instances of thinking seem 
to remain totally public and observable. Much of the sensori-motor 
thinking of the young child would fall under this heading. Ryle's 
papers are dotted with instances of adult thinker& keeping their 
thinking largely in view. : an example of this is provided by Ryle' s· 
example of the tennis-player. "The tennis-player is thinking about 
what he is doing, and Rodin's Le PenseuP is obviously thinking. 
But while we would happily descrl.be Le PenseuP as musing, meditating, 
reflecting, pondering, deliberating, ruminating, or being pens1ve, 
we would rather not so describe the tennis-player - save in the 
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unoccupied intervals between rallies, games, or sets ... the 
tennis-player's thinking almost consists in his whole and at 
least partly schooled attention being given to, inter alia~ the 
flight of the ball over the net, the position of his opponent, 
the strength of the wind, and so on." 25 Even aLe Penseur-type 
thinker, such as the Pythagoras of "Conversation-. with Gilbert Ryle" 2 f 
may "keep his cards on the table'', as it were, until his wife or 
Magee requires him to "keep his thoughts to himself". 
ASSERTION II SILENT (AND PARTICULARLY ABSTRACT) THINKING 
REQUIRES NO PARTICULAR TYPE OF VEHICLE BU'l' 
CERTAINLY AT LEAST SOME VEHICLE OR OTHEP .. 
I would argue that. abstract thinking requires the use of 
some symbol (s) or other by definition : to say that abstract 
thinking requires that sort of vehicle we identify as a symbol 
amounts to a tantology. I think that.the work of Furth and others 
.with logical notations and deaf child·r~n .shows that the 
requirement need not be for a natural language (though that 
symbol system has the advantage of being a means of public communi-
cation not everyone knows the notions of formal logic). 
Thus I cannot agree that the deaf cannot think nor even that 
they are, without language, denied abstract, conceptual thought. 
An acceptance of "wordless thoughts" is not an acceptance 
of "vehicleless" ones. As Rudolf Arnheim27 says, "Thoughts need 
shape, and shape must be derived from some medium. "To accept 
"vehicleless" or "mediumless"· thoughts would be to accept "naked 
thoughts or thinking" and this would raise a seemingly insoluble 
25. Ryle, G.· "Thinking and Reflecting" In Collected Papers Volume 2. London 
Hutchinson, 1971. pp.465-466. 
26. Magee, B. Modern British Philo~ophy. London, Seeker and Warburg, 1971. 
27. Arnheim, R. Visual Thinking. London, Faber and Faber, 1970, p.226. 
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ontological problem : the problem of a "shapeless thought". 
Sibley points out that Ryle's 'adverbial' account (which I 
shall be considering in Chapter IV) requires vehicles of some 
sort "The Penseur's X-ings precisely are such things as 
manipulating words, tunes, images, or diagrams in the mind's 
.. 28 
eye or ear ..•... 
ASSERTION III SILENT THINKING CAN OCCUR IN A PURE OR NAKED 
FORM. 
When Ryle asks us to "jettison" the vehicle-cargo model he 
might be taken as courting this i..hird, extreme assertion. I do 
not believe that that is RyJe's intention. Rather, in so doing, 
Ryle is seekiilg to avoid the luplicationist position which attempts 
to make the "cargo" some "unearthly, nonmuscular" thing: : which 
assigns the vehicle to one world and the cargo to another. 
Certainly some of our idiomatic ways of talking suggest 
such an assertion, as when we talk about "putting our thoughts 
into words" but this need imply no morethan that we are putting 
our thoughts (already in something) into speech to be communicated 
to others. 
1 1 . 1 ' 29 d. . f h . . At on y one p ace 1.n Ry e s 1.scuss1.on o t e top1.c can I 
find even a suggestion that he might support the possibility 
of "pure or naked" thinking -(my underlining is marked with 
a "*") 
" Let's suppose - and now you have to ignore questions 
of chronology - let's suppose that Pythagoras was sitting in 
his study, ·'or, if ·you like, on a ·rock outside, with his chin 
28. Sibley, F.N. "Ryle and Thinking" In Wood, O.P. and Pitcher, G. RyZe. 
London, Macmillan, 1970, p.99. 
29. "Conversation with Gilbert R)(le" In Magee, Op.cit., pp.ll2-113. 
57. 
in his hand, trying to find the proof of the theorem that 
the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle 
is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides, 
or whatever the theorem was; and let's suppose that as there 
is no one else around he is not bothering to bottle up the 
things that he's going through, so he's muttering •... for 
example, "The square on this side plus the square on that 
side would not equal the square on this third side", or 
something of the sort; and then he says, "Oh damn, that gets 
me nowhere"; and so on. So there he is, muttering away; he's 
still baffled; and not yet getting anywhere in particular. Now 
let's suppose that his little son, if he had a son, joins him 
there. He hears his father muttering, and being a mimic he 
echoes what he hears his father saying. For full measure, 
there's also a parrot there, or if you like a tape recorder, 
or both. The parrot too mimics what Pythagoras is muttering, 
and the tape recorder takes it down to play back later on. 
So there are four things,.or creatures, all producing Greek 
sentences in which the Greek equivalents of phrases like 
'right-angle' and words like 'hypotenuse' etc., keep on 
cropping up. We certainly don't want to say that the tape 
recorder is thinking out a proof, or trying to think out a 
proof of Pythagoras' theorem. We certainly don't want to 
say it of the parrot either, because obviously the parrot 
is simply parrotting. (The tape recorder.isn't even doing 
that.) Of the boy, if he's past a certain age, we want to 
say that he's mimicking his Dad, but it's a bit more than 
parrotting, because some of the words in it mean something 
to him. He's not trying to solve a geometrical problem, but 
still it isn't just noises for him, as it had been for the 
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parrot. So what is Pythagoras himself doing that none of the 
others is doing? To say that he's trying to think out what 
arguments would establish the truth of the theorem is 
perfectly true, but only repeats the question. We hanker to 
say that besides the noises, the words~ phrases, etc~ that he 
produces, and which the boy, the bird and the gadget mimic 
or reproduce, there's something eZse that Pythagoras is doing 
as well - namely - and now we produce vague phrases like 
trying to solve the problem? aut notice my phrase 'we hanker 
to say that he's doing something else as well'. It is this 
'something else as well' thaL is the source of the whole 
trouble, because if we stop Pythagoras from muttering, e.g. 
by giving him aphasia for a minute or two, he's going to 
stop thinking about his geornetircal problem. So his thinking 
isn't something else that he's doing as well as muttering the 
things that he mutters, and he isn't merely rn'uttering either, 
which is what his son is doing, and what the parrott is doing, 
and what the tape recorder will play back. So the question is 
how to describe the thinking that he certainly is doing (1) 
withouttaking seriously the tempting statement that 'inside' 
him he's.doing something else as well as mutter, and (2) also 
without reducing what he's doing to mere muttering ••.•. 
MAGEE : •••••. Suppose Mrs Pythagoras carne out to the rock because 
it was a nice day, and suppose she brought her ~nitting. She 
might say to her husband, 'Oh for God's sake can't you stop 
that endless muttering? I can't concentrate on my pattern with 
all that muttering going on.' So Mr Pythagoras goes on with 
solving his problem but without doing any more muttering. It's. 
perfectly conceivable that he might stop muttering without 
stopping thinking. 
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RYLE : Cert.ainly, certainly. But what he 1 s going on doing 1 in 
his head', if anything*, will be, so_to speak, some 'As if' 
muttering, or something like it.· " 
I suspect that the "if anything" is merely a colloqualism 
meaning "nothing more th~n •.•. ". It would be perilous to identify 
Ryle with an acceptance of "naked thoughts" on the basis of just 
one such.remark'ifi"a· radio interview. The quotation does, though, 
support my suggestion that a Le Penseur-type thinker need not 
always employ s·ilent, unobservable mediums. Silent thinking would 
.. seez:n, :1:;.<?: be 'As_ if.' we were thinking 'out loud' in some sense -
the presence of silent thought need not force us to an acceptance 
.· 
Of I ria:k'ed thought 1 • 
The test for naked thought must be the attempt to try to do 
some. But this would bean empirical test of a rather special 
sort for, since others lack direct access to our thoughts, they 
could~not verify an assertion on our part of having had a naked 
thought. 
Another way of going about it envis.ages a tautology parallel 
with that other that abstract thinking involves the use of 
symbols. It might be argued that for thinking to take place, 
thinking must take some form or shape (substantially Arnheim's 
claim) • 
By this second, a priori, argument, to talk of naked thoughts 
would be like talking about naked rocks. If someone said he had 
experienced a naked rock (one that was neither lava, nor granite, 
nor ••••• - a rock that had no "embodiment i•) we would not even 
want to say that he had been seeing things - we would say that his 
talk was pure nonsense. 
"What did you see in your mind's eye?" we would ask of the 
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man claiming to have had a naked thought; He must reply 
"Nqthing'' for if it had been observable in some 'As-if' visual 
sense it would not have been naked. Nor could it be 'As if' tastabl: 
or 'As if' hearable, and so on. "Then'', we would want to say, 
"how could you possibly know that you have had· a naked thought?" 
If he answers 'iBecause it had no shape or form (embodiment)" -
that is, he has used some kind of process of elimination, then I 
would suggest that his awareness of his own thoughts is simply 
playing him foul. 
. 30 ., As Pr1ce has put 1t : 
II· It would seem that there ·is no such thing as pure or 
naked thinking; or if conceivably there could be it is beyond 
the reach of" human frailty, even though superhuman intelligence~ 
1 
may be . capab~e of it. The human mind, it seems, must always hav(i 
sensible or quasi-sensible particulars to 'carry' its thought, 
sensible or quasi-sensible media 'in' which we think. " 
To summarize, though this has n~t been conclusively established'! 
'i' 
I think that something ·like the·following view has been given an. 
initial plausibility. 
"Primitive" forms of thinking involve_direct awareness ·and 
manipulation. Though we do call it 'primitive' there is no reason 
to suppose that it is ineffective, nor even that we do not often 
employ this type of thinking even as adults. The tennis-player 
and (at times) a Pythagoras may be doing something like this. 
A problem with this form of thinkingj often referred to as 
'sign-cognition', is that it is tied to the here-and-now- the 
present. A more developed form of thinking frees us from concrete 
reality. In some wide sense of the term 'symbol' this would be 
'symbolic' thinking or cognition. There is no reason to suppose 
30. Price, H •. H. Thinking and Experience~ London, Hutchinson, 1953. pp.237-238. 
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that the deaf are necessarily denied either of these levels or 
forms of thought, though with the former they may lack the auditory 
aspect of sign-cognition, and with the latter they must like the 
rest of us, learn some symbol systen1, a natural language being 
the preferable candidate (since it is a commonly understood 
means of interpersonal communication). 
I have denied the possibility of 'bare' or 'naked' thinking 
for I believe that we do need some medium in which to think. I 
have suggested that Ryle would agree with such a view. I have 
further suggest_ed that -at._ least to a large extent there is a 
certain plasticity between the various available mediums (most 
commonly images or words)• There may be exceptions to this but a 
consideration of that topic is beyond my scope here. 
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VII. THE IDENTIFICATION OF THOUGHT WITH ITS MEDIUM. 
I shall now examine the Reductionist claim that we 
should identify thinking with the medium in which it is expressed. 
Such a claim is often made in the form "Thinking is Saying". 
(1) An immediate clarification·: more than just speech is 
involved in thinking. 
One immediate clarification we would want to make has already 
been discussed : either we add to the list more than just speech 
(for instance, certain sensori-motor acts) or we achieve the same 
effect by broadening the standard definition of 'speech', as 
MUller appears to have done. We c~uld, of course, go in the 
opposite direction, and begin to restrict the meaning of the 
term 'thought' (for instance, we might start by jettisoning 
daydreams as only parasitic on the notion of 'thinking:) until 
we achieved an identity of thought and speech by definition - but 
this would simply be to avoid the issue and it would still leave 
us with the problem of accounting for the mental aspect of those 
'speech' acts we did wish to consider. 
(2) Grammatical problems for an identity thesis. 
If thought and speech are identical then we sould be able to 
interchange the two terms 'thought' and 'speech' in every sentence 
in which they occur. That this can be immediately shown to be 
impossible can be made plain by raising the matter of thoughtless 
speech. One example of this would be to utter nonsense words, or 
just to utter the first words that come into our head without 
first thinking about them or with any_ intention to use them 
other than for the purpose of this experiment. Similarly, in a 
·-
state of delirium we might suddenly shout, "The Prime Minister 
has been shot", but no one would want to call this speech an 
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examp+e of thinking. 
Certainly we could not, at first sight, make such a substitu-
tion in the injunction "Think before you· speak" without going 
to some lengths to explain exactly what we mean. 
31 Rulon Wells suggests another possibility : perhaps we 
could argue that where we made such a substitution that did result 
in a change of sense we might be able to argue that it results 
from something other than a non-identification of thought and 
speech. As for this possibility he can only say that, "I can't 
conceive all conceivable theories, and so am not in a position 
to de.clare it impossible, but neither am I acquainted with nor 
able to conjure up any such account." 
The possibility of interchanging these words is not as :1 udicrous asi 
as at first it might be thought, for it will be remembered that 
a MUller will give 'speech' a very broad definition indeed. In 
fact, so broad a definition will he supposedly allow that all 
examples of thinking will be· taken into hand. Thus, if my thought 
consists of a succession of tactile mental images 'speech' will 
be allowed to cover such a case. This is tantamount to a 
tautology and at first sight only a case of 'naked thinking' 
would seem to serve as a counter-example; but, as I have argued, 
that is a counter-example unavaiJJ.able to us. 
I have already alluded in my introduction {Chapter I} to 
one reason why thought and speech are not co-extensive : both the 
terms have more than one meaning : thus 'thinking' or 'thought' 
can refer to ·at least the activity of thinking and the object of 
thought. Equally 'speech' and 'speaking' have various uses in 
31. Wells, R. "Comprehension and expression." In Cowan, J.L. Studies in 
thought and language. Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1970, p.39. 
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our l~nguage. As Wells 32 notes " 'speech' does not stand in the 
same semantical relation to 1 speak 1 as 'thought' to 'think', for 
whatever one thinks is a thought, but no~ whatever one speaks is 
a speech", at least in ordinary usage. 
It remains, of course, true, that a Reductionist of this ilk 
might argue that despite such grammatical (and hence semantic) 
difficulties, all that has been shown is that certain alterations 
to how we normally understand how we speak about such matters are 
required. 
(3) Ontological identity. 
A Reductionist wishing to view these as mere grammatical 
difficulties will assert some non-grammatical (rather ontological) 
identity. This would be to identify thought with its embodiment 
or expression (though this is not to suggest that one distinct 
thing gets placed in another •.•• rather, that just as objects 
occur wifh their adjectival attributes (and not nakedly) so 
thinking always appears as nothing but (something like) muttering to 
oneself. This leaves. the problem of how to distinguish muttering 
(or whatever) which is thinking from muttering which is just plain 
muttering. 
Three considerations additional to those we have already '! 
considered are often brought in to support a Reductionist account 
which identifies (on ontological grounds) thinking with its vehicle. 
(a) Introspedtion often reveals us talking to ourselves. 
At least those of us not born with the sensory impairment 
of deafness, on introspection, often do seem to find oursleves 
talking in our heads. This, of course, does not mean that we 
32. Ibid. 3 p.39. 
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always find this n.or that we must. Ryle, for instance, 
concedes this on a number of occasion~~ For instance, in "Thinking 
and Saying" he writes " 34 
"It is declared (by the Reductionists) with partial, 
but only partial truth, that in the pondering in which 
Le Penseur is still engaged before he solves. or abandons 
his problem, he must be inwardly conducting, however 
intermittently and fragmentarily, worded monologues; he 
must be soliloquizing in his head or·sotto voce." 
Yet even when we go on to point out that introspection often 
reveals ~till other of the variotis mediums (such as mental images) 
this is not sufficien~ to make the case for Reductionism. A 
Duplicationist might concede that mediums are involved but then 
he will go on to assert that they alone do not explain what we 
mean by thinking (to a Duplicationist); a full account of thinking 
will involve some additional process or activity as well as the 
·occurrence of inner speech, mental imagery, and so on. 
35 
Lloyd raises yet another problem for the Reductionist argument 
from introspection : how can we be sure that in remembering the 
·particular medium of our thoughts our memory has not played a trick 
on us and invented something that did not happen at all? 
Reductionists, in particular, may subconsciously want to find what 
is not really there. 
33. cf. "A puzzling element in the nqtion of thinking" P.393; "Thinking and 
reflecting" p.47i;."Thinking and-self-teaching" p.l21- In Collected Papers., 
Op. cit. and Rice University Studies, 58, 1972. 
34. Ryle, G. "Thinking and saying" Rice University Studies., 58, 1972 : p.l28 
35. Lloyd, A.G. "Thinking and language"."In Symposium : thinking and language." 
In Freedom., language and reality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume XXV, 1951 : p. 61. 
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(b) The time it takes to think something out. 
36 
Yet another argument is presented by Sibley : we feel compelled 
to say that until a man cah express his thoughts we will not allow 
that he has really thought something· rout. What is more, Sibley 
suggests as a general rule, thqt the time it takes a man to state 
an argument in words is roughly the time we expect a man to take 
in thinking out the argument to himself. Calculating prodigies 
are to be seen as the exceptions who prove the rule. 
One objection to Sibley's argument might be that we have 
here a case of one human ability casting its mould in our imagina-
tions over another. A similar fallacy might (it could be argued) 
be found in the suggestion that since we have to learn how to walk 
as a child so too we have to learn how to suckle. In fact the fonr~cr 
is a learned ability whereas, we are told, the latter is an innate 
reflex which we do not have to learn but simply are born being 
able to do. Therefore_, it might be argued, thinking (if of only 
a primitive, sensori-motor sort) is at least in some small way 
an innate human ability whereas we learn how to talk in a social 
context (denied such a context, as the deaf are, we do not learn 
how to talk, yet the deaf do seem to be able to think, notwith-
37 
standing MUller's belief that "The uninstructed deaf and dumb, 
I believe, have never given any signs of reason, in the true 
sense of the-word." 
I 
(c) "Thoughts" as found in words. 
There is a meaning of the terms 'thinking' and 'thought' 
exemplified in such phrases as "Plato_' s thoughts" or in a book 
36. Sibley, F.N.Op. cit. 3 p.l02 .and p.l04. 
37. quoted in Porter, S. "Is thought possible without language? Case of a 
deaf-mute." Princeton Review. 1881 : p. 105. 
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series of "Great Thinkers of Western Civilization". Here we are 
inclined to believe, lies the thinking of great men - and it 
is all in words. Perhaps it would be better to say that here 
lies the results of their thinking in a form communicable to others. 
In summary I would argue that the case for the identity thesis 
as proposed by certain forms of Reductionism has yet to be 
satisfactorily made out. 
While it may very well be that thinking does require a medium 
(indeed, I have argued that it does) this does not establish that 
that is all thinking is. 
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VIII. THE IDENTIFICATION OF THINKING WITH ITS MEDIUM (BUT NOT 
THE MEDIUM WITH PHYSICAL PROC.ESSES) . 
The consideration of the various related topics of sections 
IV to VII completed (which at most assist in clarifying the 
Reductionist position and perhaps slightly inclining us toward 
such an account) we must now return to the quest.ion we left 
unanswered at the end of section III : can a Reductionist identify 
thinking (either logically or empirically) with the mediums or 
vehicles of thought (e.g. inner speech) but then go on to deny an 
identification (either of a logical or empirical sort.) between 
these me.diums and physical processes in the brain, .speech muscu-
lature, hands or wherever? This would be a form of Reductionism 
which purposts to stop short of Physicalism. 
A Reductionist might wish to put forward the following 
theory. Thinking and its expression (or "medium" or "vehicle" -
I shall take these three terms as_roughly interchangeable for 
the purposes of this ac_courit) are to be seen as identical (it 
remains to be said .whether on logical or empirical grounds - the 
conditions for falsifiability of which would be quite different). 
Let us call the result of this identity (T). The theory would 
then go on to claim a constant concomitance between (T) and 
certain phys~ical processes or states (primarily ot" the brain) -
let us call these physical processes, movements, or states (P). 
Thus a Reductionist of this persuasion retains an identity thesis 
(of an as yet unspecified kind) between thinking and its medium 
but does not hold any identity between (T) and (P) : rather, he 
merely says that when (T) occurs then we shall also find (P) 
occurring. (He should not, by the way, hold the reverse, that 
when (P) occurs then we·shall also find (T) occurring : I might 
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move my larynx in a certain way but n.eed not be thinking in arty 
sense.) 
Let us examine the constant concomitance between (T) and (P) 
first and then go on to consider that identity which a Reductionist 
of this persuasion does wish tp retain {as specified above). 
{1) The constant concomitance of (T) and (P). 
This is clearly a riva1 form of Reductionism in opposition to 
any form of Reductionism which holds an identity either of a 
logical or empirical sort between (T) and (P). Thus it avoids 
the problems raised agains.t such accounts, viz., empirical 
falsification {e.g. the Smith et al. expe.riment (1947)) , the 
problem of trading on future technological capabilities in tbe 
area of neurophysiology, and perhaps over zealous application 
of Occam's Razor, and the necessity to clarify the point about 
opacity of reference. These might well be conceded as distinct 
advantages for such an account. 
The constant concomitance might (but need not) be seen as a 
cause and effect relationship. Hume thought that a cause and its 
effect are in constant concomitance; a-nimals with a heart always 
have a liver; gases expand when heated; and so on. But an under-
' 
standing of constant concomitance in these terms is probably 
best avoided for it raises a number of difficult questions : which 
is the cause- (T) or (P)? just how does one causethe other? etc. 
This constant concomitance need not be seen as accidental, 
though. Rather, it could be seen as ZawZike which would make it 
nomic concomitance - but not necessarily a lawlike causal 
connection~., .. As a 1awlike connection the concomitance would be 
empirical (hence falsifiable on empirical grounds). 
In order that empiri~al experiment might be conducted to test 
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this ~awlike concomitance (T) and (P) would each need to be 
ind.ependently identifiable. How this might be done remains a 
mystery in the theory. 
Alternately the co-occurrence might not be regarded as a 
lawlike empirical connection but rather as resting on a priori 
or philosophical grounds, e.g. that it does not make sense to speak 
of a case of thinking which is not accompanied by some physical 
process or other (though adding that nor does it make sense to say 
that they are identical). 
In order that this relation might be put to philosophical 
analysis (T) and (P) would still have to be independently 
identifiable - but not necessarily on empirical grounds. How 
this might be done remains equally a mystery in the theory. 
(a) Independent identification on empirical grounds. 
Given the state of our current technology within the area 
of neurophysiology it would have to ·be conceded that the 
identification of (P) will have to ~ait. on future technological 
breakthroughs. Thus the theory shares this problem with central 
state materialism. 
Thus the theory in regard to this matter would take the 
following form : "if test ·conditions C .are realized, then outcome 
E will occur; test conditions C are not currently technologically 
realizable but this is not·to say that this will always be the 
case; at least lines of scientific inquiry have been specified". 3, 
The hypothesis, in a word, is to.be considered testable in principle 1 
38. cf. "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance : Problems and Changes" 
In Hemple, e.G. Aspects of Scien,tific Explanation. New York, The Free Press,:· 
1965. 
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With regard to an .empirical specification of the various 
mediums of thought we may not be in -a much better position. 
Certainly a lot of work has been done in this area (as it has 
also been done in the area of neurophysiolog~). Bruner 39 has, 
for instance, attempted to delineate three ways in which we 
represent the environment around us : enactive representation (in 
terms of specific habitual action·- the perceptual scheme used 
by the young child), iconic r~presentation (in terms of images) 
. ·::.-
and symbolic representation.··(~~ terms of abstract schema; 
particularly language). 
Bruner has in turn drawn heavily on the work of Jean Piaget40 
in the area of empirical epistemology. His L'Image Men"taZe chez 
L'Enfant (1966) would be directly applicable to our understanding 
of iconic representation for instance. One wciuld want to know 
more about synaesthesia where the different modalities of imagery 
are mixed - where, for exmple, music might be "seen" as a flow 
·of coloured images. This is apparently sometimes present in 
certain mental conditions, when under the influence of a drug like 
LSD, and perhaps, .mOre commonly in the very young child. Robertson 
and Youniss• 41 (1969) studies of imagery in deaf and hearing 
children highlights such questions as the importance of imagery 
for thinking, particularly abstract conceptualization, and it 
will be remembered that mental imagery is only one of the vehicles 
of thought we would want to consider. 
Once again, on purely empirical grounds, definitive identificati< 
will have to wait upon future work in the area. 
39. cf. Bruner, J. s. et al. Studies in Cognitive Growth : A CoZZaboration at 
the Center for Cognitive Studies. New York, Wiley, 1966. 
40. cf. Piaget, J. L'Image MentaZe chez L'Enfant. Paris, Presses Univ. France,l96! 
41. cf. Robertson, A.de S. and Youniss, J. "Anticipatory visual imagery in deaf 
and hearing children". Child Development, 40, 1969 : 125-135. 
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(b) Independent identification on philosophical grounds. 
H.H. Price has done.some work in this area. He has, for instance, 
attempted to distinguish between the various types of mediums on 
a priori grounds. Thus images are to be regarded as quasi-ins..t.aniativ 
particulars while words (except for onomatopoaeic words) are to 
be regarded as completely non- instantiative particulars (for, he 
42 
argues, "when we think in images, .thinking in absence comes 
much nearer to perceiving in presence than verbal thinking can. 
And this is the way in which words are cashed by images.") 
Within the area of inner speech (taken as derived from a 
public language) one thinks of the extensive work of a J.L. 
Austin or John Searle in delineating the different kinds of 
speech acts we might perform. 43 
But the occurrence of such things as feelings and thoughts has 
peen claimed (as we have seen in sections II and II) to be identical 
with events occurring in the brain (sometimes as empirical identityr 
at other times as logical identity). It· is my vie~!l that a major 
problem within the controversy over the mind/brairi identity theory 
remains an adequate independent specification of (T) and (P). To 
regard them as identical would be, of course, to reject this 
requirement of independent or mutually exclusive identification. 
But to reject the identity theory (however understood) does require 
such an independent identification. Given the current state of this 
philosophical controversy44 a theory of constant concomitance 
42. Price, H.H. ThinkingandExperience. London, Hutchinson's 1953. p.255. 
43 cf. Searle, J.R. Speech Acts : An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970 or Austin, J.L. How to do 
Things with Words. London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1962. 
44. See for instance Borst, c.v. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory. London, 
Macmillan, 1970. 
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between (T) and (P) on either logical or empirical grounds must 
. remain s.ub judice. 
(2) The identity of thinking with its medium. 
This was the prime concern of section VII above but what I did 
not attempt there was a statement of the identity conditions for 
thinking (+) and its medium or expression (e). These can be 
regarded as taking two forms : empirical or a priori. 
Such an identity could be made on either of two grounds : sense-
perception (including scientific experimentation) or introspection. 
Both of these must be seen as dependent upon our experience. 
We have alreCl.dY suggested the difficulties attendant to a 
specification of the various (e) 's. How mu.ch more difficult must 
it be to separately specify ·(+)? 
A Reductionist of the sort we are considering will, of course, 
deny this possibility altogether {for he holds that (+) and {e) 
are the same thing). ·It is apparent,· then, that the onus·Jis upon 
a non-Reductionist to make such separate and mutually exclusive 
identifications. 
In the next two chapters I shall consider two .such attempts. 
In Chapter III I consider the Duplicationist argument that thinking 
is something else as well as its expression. I have already rejected 
one possibility for a Duplicationist : that thinking (+) can 
occur without any (e). In essence a Reductionist argues that (+) 
and (e) exist in one world (and then he goes on to argue for their 
identity). A Duplicationist essentially holds a two-world view 
that {+) exists in one and {e) in another. He might then go on 
to argue that (+) is always expressed in some {e) i.e. concede 
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the impossibility of 'naked' or 'pure' thinking and he might 
even consider the constant cbncomitance theory of the relationship 
between (T) (understood in Duplicationist terms) and (P) as 
worthy of continued investigation. My argument will be that a 
Duplicationist requires a distinction between (+) and (e) on the 
grounds that (e) alone does not adequately e~plicate our· concept 
of thinking. 
Ryle argues that both Reductionism and Duplicationism fail 
tb adequately account for our intentions in and our skills 
employed in thinking. I shall argue that this comes down to how 
he ontologically explains the status of "frames of mind". What 
Ryle must avoid doing, in giving some ontological status to such 
things as "frames of mind", is either cou:t:1.ting Reductionism 
(where "frames of mind" would be understood in terms of some 
function of (+) as (e)) or Duplicationism (where they would be 
understood as some function of (+) and (e) - probably as an aspect 
of (+) in that equation). 
In short, I have tried to show that a Reductionist account 
of thinking need not entail a Physicalist position. Yet whether 
it fully explicates what we mean by "thinking" remains to be seen 
in two senses: (i) much of the Redudtionist account remains sub- : 
judice and {ii) it may yet be shown that the account misrepresents 
the relationship between (+) and {e). 
-ooOoo-
CHAPTER III 
THE DUPLICATIONIST ACCOUNT 
OF 
THINKING 
II We can rather safely assume that we do 
generally regard thinking as, at least sometimes, 
an unobservable activity or process ....• " 
- Bruce Aune, "Thinking" (1967) 
75. 
I. THE TEACHING OF THE DEAF AND A TENDENCY OT ASSUME A 
DUPLICATIONIST ACCOUNT OF THINKING. 
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In opposition to the traditional precept in deaf education 
that we should "teach deaf children a language so that they may 
think" there appears to have arisen another, that we might instead 
"teach deaf children how to think in order that they m~ght acquire 
a language". Now I have thereby greatly oversimplified these two 
positions; but my intention is only to suggest the two views which 
I suspect are currently at work in the field of the education of 
the deaf. 
If we accept a developmental account which finds the child 
dev~loping the structures of thought prior to the acquisition of 
language there is an immediate pull towards a view which holds 
that in order to acquire a language we need first to develop 
certain cognitive abilities. Though this may be unwarranted, it 
is not too difficult to see how this might give rise to an 
assumption of something like a Duplicationist account of thinking 
as a typically unobser~abl~ mental activity or process. quite 
separate from such other activities as using a language in the 
form of inner speech. 
I suspect that this is a fairly new position for a teacher 
of the deaf to take for it does not seem to have appeared in 
the literature until quite recently. Grammatico, for instance, 
is reported to be preparing a book on her approach; but this has 
not appeared as yet. 
Certainly a major factor in the development of such a position 
must be Hans Furth'e Thinking without Language (1966) and the 
fairly extensive series of papers he has published on the thinking 
of deaf children. 
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Furth has pointed out a common assumption that has often 
been held when considering the thought of the deaf : that abastract 
thought is linguistic in character. Furth's basic argument is 
that we have often confused, as a result, linguistic deficiencies 
for a poverty of abstract or conceptual thought. Furth's experiments 
suggestth~twhile the deaf are poor performers on certain test 
tasks of a conceptual sort, on other tests of conceptual thinking 
they get much the same results as normally hearing people. By and 
large, the deaf were less able in working out (discovering) a 
principle for themselves, but were largely indistinguishable from 
their hearing peers in the comprehension and use of a principle. 
It is Furth's argument that a difference in the ability to 
discover a principle or concept need not necessarily result from 
any direct causal relationship between a lang.uage deficiency and 
intellectual functioning. A number of other factors intercede, 
most notably a restricted access to the world at large. As Furth1 
says, "The specific aspect of logical thinking resides in the 
interaction of the thinking person with reality." For a deaf 
person, the quality and quantity of that interaction is adversely 
affected by a lack of auditory stimulation. But it may not stop 
there. We might consider for a moment the concept of heteromodal 
reciprocity. All the different senses interact with and affect 
6ne another. We normally locate directions, for instance, with 
our senses of hearing and sight. It might be put something like 
this : that man does not have a number of separate senses so much 
as a sense system. It is frequently argued that when we lose one 
sense another tries to take over. Blind men are said to have an 
acute sense of hearing and the deaf are often termed "visually 
orientated". To an extent this is probably correct. But we are 
1. Furth, H.G. Thinking without language : psychological implications of 
deafness. New York, The Free Press, 1966, p. 194. 
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beginning to recognize that the very ability of one sense to "do 
the job" of another (to take up the slack, as it were) is itself 
adversely affected by a lack of interaction between the sense 
now doing overtime and the sense that is absent, or nearly so. 
This relates directly back to the notion of the "interaction of 
the thinking person with reality''. In practice we are becoming 
more and more inclined to regard the sensory handicapped as, in 
some sense, multiply handicapped people. 
There are, of course, still other reasons why the deaf may 
2 be poor ~t concept formation. As Furth suggests, "The deaf child 
fails to acquire language (often as not) because it is taught too 
late, in an unreasonable medium, in an unnatural way, and by the 
wrong person." 
Yet all this being so, Furth would probably concede Pettifor•s 3 
findings that it is in the "higher" levels of conceptual thinking 
that a linguistic deficiency due to deafness is most critical. 
Conceptual thinking at a concrete level (Such as the manipulation 
of visual perceptions) seems to be less dependent on a language 
than abstract, conceptual thought. 
In addition to the above, one other aspect of .Furth's work 
attracts my notice with regard to a suggestion of a Duplicationist 
. 4 
position : this is his consideration of a private language. Furth, 
for instance, suggests that "Perhaps we could learn much about 
that private symbol system of the deaf if we were content to study 
their manual signing in an objective fashion •.•.. " 
I want then, to suggest no more than that a Duplicationist 
' 
.account. of thinking might be .assumed by those who follow the 
2. Ibid., Thinking Without Language, p. 206·. 
3. Pettifor, J.L. uThe role of language in the development of abstract thinking." 
Canadian JournaZ of PsyehoZogy, 22, 1968 : 139-156. 
4. Op.eit., p.209 
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precept that we should first teach deaf children how to think 
in order that they might then be able to acquire language with 
some greater degree of success than is currently common. 
II. ABSTRACT, CONCEPTUAL THINKING TO TAKE A CENTRAL ROLE IN 
OUR DISCUSSION. 
Conceptual thinking and certainly 11 abstract 11 conceptual thought, 
is only one of the many varieties of thinking we would want to 
subsume under the notion of 'thinking'. But when it is denied 
that the deaf can think what is usually meant is that they do not 
exhibit the ability to think in such a fashion to the extent 
that we would otherwise expect. Few would want to hold, for 
instance, that the deaf are thereby denied the ability to perf0rm 
the sort of thinking picked out by Ryle in his example of the 
other than thoughtless tennis-player. 5 Nor. have I found it 
suggested that the deaf do not daydream, if daydreams or drifting 
in idle reverie are to be counted as instances of thinking. Again, 
few would doubt that the deaf cannot calculate, recall telephone 
numbers or instructions, and so on. But the ability to deduce 
when we heat a gas, it expands, may be quite a different matter. 
6 Bruce Aune suggests four general features of conceptual 
thinking 
(a) that typically conceptual thinking is unobservable. Thus, 
if we say that the thought that poetry is a hidden voice 
.occurred to us, it is presumed that something did occur to 
us, and that this occurrence need not have been marked by any 
audible expression. 
5. cf. Ryle, G. "Thinking and Reflecting." In Coteated Papers., volume 2. 
6. Aune, B. "Thinking" from Knowledge., Mind., and NatU!'e (1967) reprinted in 
Marras, A. Intentionality., Mind., and Language. Urbana, University of 
Illinois Press, 1972 • pp.249-286. cf. pp.249-25l. 
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(b) Franz Brentano has argued that what is really characteristic 
of the mental is that thinking is necessarily "intentional", 
"in the sense of referring to something 11 • 7 
(c) Thirdly, Aune suggests that conceptual thinking is "judgemental" 
in character : "to think of something is at least to entertain 
the idea of something's being so, being done, and so forth". 
This is to say that such thinking entertains a "that .... " 
clause; it is propositional. This introduces the notion that 
whatever can be said intelligently can also be thought, though 
this is to use "be said" in a. restricted sense, for we can 
say the connective words but might have some tr0uble l:hinking 
just th~m. (This might suggest that thoughts have to be linked 
primarily with sentences rather than words.) 
(d) Finally, thinking of this sort may be essentially bipolar. 
We perform such thinking carefully or carelessly, intelligently 
or stupidly, and so on. Problem solving may .be successful or 
unsuccessful, for instance. Furthermore, bipolarity may cover 
not only the activity of thinking but also the object of our 
thoughts, which may be true or false, well-grounded or not, 
and so forth. 
In summary, 
conceptual thinking might be seen as having four distinguishing 
features : (i) it may be somehow "inner", (ii) it may refer to 
something (intentionally), (iii) it may be propositional, and 
(iv) it might be seen as essentially bipolar~ 
Other forms of thought may not exhibit all of these four 
features. Concrete conceptual thinking may often tak~ the form 
7. ref. Brentano, F. PsychoZogie vo~ Empirischen Standpunkt. Hamburg, Meiner; 
1955. The quote is from Aune. 
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of overt sensori-motor behaviour; daydreaming is not at first 
sight "judgemental 11 in character, and we do not seem to drift 
carefully or carelessly in idle reverie. 
III. THE UNOBSERVABLE FACTOR 
ENTITIES INTRODUCED. 
THE ARGUMENT FOR THEORETICAL 
A Duplicationist account is, almost by definition, untroubled 
by unobservable or "inner 11 mental episodes or processes; but if 
it cares to account for unobservable behaviour in terms of observablE 
behaviour it might do so in two sorts of ways. 
On the one hand it might wish to pay some regard to the 
Vygotsk.flan idea of 11 internalization 11 as described briefly in 
Chapter II, section V. This would be to "reduce" inner mental 
behaviour to something developmentally parasitic upon formerly 
overt, public behaviour. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the features of such 
inner behaviour are also on display in our overt or "outer" 
thinking : as when what we think out loud in sentences we might 
also wish to say to ourseb;es "in our head". 
Ther,e might be a sense then, even in a Duplicationist account, 
in which our public thinking is to be viewed as "basic". 
But it would then have to be specified that by "inner behaviour" 
is meant "the employment or presence of some medium or vehicle 
of thinking". That is, to employ the symbols of Chapter II, section 
VIII, while the (e)'s may be observable at least in principle 
(a point on which Reductionists and Duplicationists might well 
agree), it ts by no means clear that a Duplicationist would want 
to say the same thing of (+) for, in a Duplicationist account, (+) 
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resides in another uworld '', which probably is essentially 
unobs~rvable, unless, perhaps~ by introspections. Indeed, (+) 
might well be regarded as a hypothetical construct, much like 
some of the hypothetical constructs of ~cience. To only slightly 
rephrase Carl Hempel, this is a descent below the level of 
familiar empirical phenomena. It is to argue that such a 
utheoretical entityu (as (+)) really is a real constituent of 
the world, (or, a world) because our explanations of "what is" 
requires it. It is to argue that the demand for only empirically 
observable phenomena may be overly stringent (though a Realist-
Duplicationist might go on to concede that sometime in the 
future we may acquire the ability to ~observe such entities -
not all Duplicationists, of course; feel the necessity of this 
. ) 8 concess1on . 
IV. LANGUAGE AS ESSENTIAL FOR ABSTRACT, CONCEPTUAL THINKING. 
The case for mental imagery as essential to abstract 
conceptucl thought seems open to question. Though a blind man may 
not possess visual imagery he still seems quite capable of this 
sort of thinking. Yet as we have seen, deafness which denies us 
an easy acquisition of language, may be a serious handicap in 
the development of abstract conceptual thinking. It is impossible 
to visualize a square circle; but we can examine such a concept 
in words, at least (e.g. to declare it contradictory). 
It may be that it is not so much a language that we require 
for such thinking as a symbol system. One thing that people might 
mean when they say that "Thinking is saying" is that for abstract 
8. My intention here is only to suggest the possible status a Duplicationist might 
assign to (+) . A fuller discussion of theoretical entities themselves can be 
found, for instance, in chapter 6 ,· section 4 of Hempel. C. G. , Philosophy of 
Natural Science. Englewood-Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1966. and Smart, J.J.C 
Philosophy and Scientific Realism.London, Kegan Paul, 1963. 
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conceptual thought we needs must operate with symbols and that 
a language just is a symbol system. · 
V. THE ARGUMENT FROM INTROSPECTION. 
Sometimes we want to say that when thinking we can hear 
ourselves talking "in our heads", or that we "see things in our 
mind's eye", though not always. 
In what objective sense can we know that these "mental copies" 
correspond to their supposed objects? "Thus, if P represents 
a covert thought, there could be no way (it is argued) of 
ascertaining whether P does or does not consistently occur in 
connection with, say, pains rather than feelings of joy. Indeed, 
it would be hard to see how the assumed reference of these inner 
. 9 
processes could e~er be understood." 
Once again we might refer to Vygotsky's idea that we must 
learn to keep our thoughts to ourselves, or to the notion that, 
perhaps feelings aside, we could always bring our thinking into 
public view by thinking out loud. Even in the case of feelings, 
such remarks as "I just don't have the words to express my love 
for you" might simply be taken as an idiomatic way of saying "I 
love you quite a lot". 
In general, claims made from introspection (perhaps 
considered as access to that "other world" in which (+)·resides) 
seem to me suspect, or, rather, unreliable. Often our thoughts 
proceed at such a pace that the very effort to "think about our 
thinking" seems to short circuit the whole process. So very often 
9. The quotation is taken from Aune, B. "Thinking" In Marras, A. Intentionality, 
Mind, and Language. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1972. p.262. 
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intro?pection seems to become a kind of dabbling and, hence, as 
"empirical data'' (if we want to even reg~rd it as such) it 
remains fragmentary. 
In summary, if the argument-for a Duplicationist account is 
based wholly or partly on intr~spection then I would want to 
regard the foundation for such an account as very shaky indeed. 
Yet direct access to our silent thoughts by intersubjective 
means is not necessarily required by a Duplicationist position. 
One alternative, the argument in terms of theoretical entities, 
has already been suggested in section III. 
VI. THE VEHICLE-CARGO MODEL OR METAPHOR. 
One way of arguing for a basic separability of thought and 
its expression (linguistic or otherwise) is to call upon the 
familiar model or metaphor of the expression as vehicle and 
t~·e th ht · Bl k 10 has h d th' th d 1 f u oug as cargo. ac rep rase · lS as e mo e o 
the garment. Here, for instance, a thought is seen as clothed in, 
for instance, some verbal dress. In such a model our thoughts 
are held to be logically distinct from our words in which they 
are couched. 
We might then proceed to think of a thought as the meaning.of 
such words. Words i of course, as members of a p-qblically conventional!' 
symbol system, still carry a meaning even when said without some 
thought "behind" them. Thus Aristotle11 has said that "spoken words 
are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the 
. .·- 12 
symbols of spoken words.". And Locke . writes, " •••• words, in their 
primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas 
10. Black, M. The Labyrinth of Language. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968. p.86 
11. Aristotle. De Interpretatione. i. 16a2f. 
12. Locke. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bk.III,ch.ii,sec.2. 
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in the mind of him that uses them~ how imperfectly soever or 
carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they 
are supposed to represent .... " 
We now find ourselves in a position to begin to see how 
a Duplicationist might answer the challenge we posed for him at 
the end of Chapter II : the provision of some mutually exclusive 
identification of (+) and (e). 
Within a vehicle-cargo model (e) •s are to be regarded as, 
at least in principle, publically observable 
phenomena. In semantic terms (+) is to be regarded as the meaning 
of (e). Thus the truth-value of a propositional thought (i.e. our 
thinking that something is the case) attains not to the (e) but 
rather to the (+)· - not to the vehicle, but to the cargo. 
In ontological terms the employment of some vehicle (e) and 
the having of some thought (+) are to be regarded as separate 
processes or activities - the one (e) empirically identifiable 
(at least in principle) and the other (+) required (as a theoretical 
entity) by an adequate account of the phenomenon of thinking. The 
argument from introspection aside (which I have questioned in any 
case) (e) ~~-~re observed and (+) is inferred. 
VII. THE PULL TOWARD. DUPLICATIONISM. 
In section VII of Chapter II., I listed some evidence which 
pulls us toward o·r inclirl~s us. to a Reductionist position. A 
Duplicationist might also present such a battery of points of 
consideration which might equally·incline us to his position. 
For instance, there do seem to be times when what we say and 
what we think appear to diverge. A prime example of this would 
be the telling of lies. Other examples might include malapropisms, 
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trial attempts at speaking foreign languages, and blurting out 
secrets inadvertently. 
The Duplicationist, of course, generalizes from these examples 
to all cases of thinking : attempting to establish that first we 
think and then we express our thoughts. He would argue that if 
thinking and its expression were identical or co-occurrent then 
when we had our expressions mis-carrying so then, presumably, 
would our thoughts. 
And yet, that is not quite the Duplicationist position for he 
might concede {as I have argued he should) that whenev2r (=) occurs 
there will always be some {e) • So, presumably, a case of on.r 
expression's miscarrying will have to.be regarded in something like 
the following model : 
at time +1 we have the occurrence of some 
{+) plus {e); 
··then, at time +2 , we express our thoughts in 
some further {e) and it is at that point that 
the mix-up occurs. 
So to say that first we think and then we express our 
thoughts is rather, for a Duplicationist, to mis-represent his 
position. But if this is the case, as I think it must be, on pain 
of introducing unwanted assumptions about •naked' thoughts, then 
the argument from a divergence of what we think and what we say 
carries little weight. 
Frames of mind and the like proved problematic for the 
Reductionist account. Sometimes when we say something we recognize 
~hat th~ expression of our thoughts has been inadequate~ I may·say 
"It's a nice day isn't it?" to my wife one morning but I feel that 
it is a really marvellbus day. Of course, sometimes we employ a con-
\ention where we share the knowledge that the EKpression is inadequate, asii 
l''i 
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I say that the play was pretty rough when you and I both know 
that that is to markedly understate my assessment. This is a 
little different. Here I mean to say exactly what I think but 
the words fail me (which is not to say that understatement is 
not intentional - to say that '!words fail me" is to employ the 
very same convention). 
Another variation of this theme is discussed by Vygotsky (1962)r
1 
II The flow of thought is not accompanied by a simultaneous 
unfolding of speech. The two processes are not identical, and 
there is no rigid correspondence between the units of thought 
and speech. This is especially obvious when a thought process 
mis-carries - when, as Dostoevski puts if~ a thought "will 
not enter words'! . Thought has its own structure, and the 
transition from it to speech is no easy matter. 
The passage seems to suggest that a theory which identifies 
thought and its expression will not always apply. It reminds us 
II 
of Theaetetus 189E-l90A where Plato is discussing the problem of 
false·mental judgements. Here Plato proposes a notion of thinking 
as inner speech which amounts to the suggestion that the logical 
properties of mental judgements correspond, at least in many ways, 
to the logical properties of linguistic assertions. Vygotsky seems 
to be arguing against any concomitance of a substantial sort 
between the structures of thought and language on the basis of 
examples of our intention to say what we think miscarrying. 
S t . Sl.'bley·.14 t h t h f th orne 1mes, as sugges s, we ave o searc or e 
13. Vygotsky, L.S. Thought and language. quoted in Slobin, D.I. PsychoZinguistics~ 
Glenview, Scott, Foresman and Co,m 1971, p.lOl. 
14. Sibley, F.N. "Ryle and Thinking·:" In Wood, O.C. and Pitcher, G. RyZe. 
London, Macmillan, 1970. p.l02. 
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exact or best words to express out thoughts. This in turn inclines 
us to'the view that thinking occurs prior to and independently 
of its expression. 
We allow such an argument as Sibley draws our attention t:o, 
to do little more than incline us to such a view (for prior and 
even naked thoughts which then get expressed) for an equally -; 
plausible account of such a process would be that we think in one 
medium, sometimes, and then translate it into another, and I would 
argue that this is the account that a Duplicationist must accept. 
Facing such problems Price15 writes 
II And it is not only images that we have trouble with. 
There are also obscure feelings of transition, feelings of 
direction, and the like. Even when the thought-process 
is verbalized, when it is running at its smoothest and 
most nearly approximates to an inner monoiogue, it isn't just 
that there is one word after another; there is a felt sense 
of direction, a fore-feeling of what is coming, an after-
feeling of what has gone before, a felt guidance as it were. 
What nonsense this sounds! I know it does, and I know how 
naughty it is to use the word "feel" at all. But I believe 
that if you will consent to try, you will be able to 
recognize in yourselves the things which I am trying, so 
clumsily, to describe. II 
The case for language and thought as co-extensive much less 
identical seems, at best, to be one which can mislead us as 
readily as any arguments which e~visage them as entirely separate 
and non-co~occurerit. 
15. Price, H.H. "Symposium on thinking and language". Op.cit., p.334. 
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But if thinking and its forms of expression are separate 
(even though co-occurrent) then what· is the account of the 
relationship between them? If thought (+) and language (e) t for 
. 16 instance, are qu1te separate, then, as Black suggests, in theory 
any thought might be matched to any utterance. 
Black goes on to consider how thought and language, as 
mutually independent, might be related : 
(a) If the relationship were a matter of casual interactions 
the relationship between thinking and, for instance, speaking 
would be like that between poverty and crime. The so called 
Wharf-hypothesis, that the grammar of a language shapes our 
view of the world,· would be an example of a case where speech 
would be seen as influencing thought. 
(b) An alternative to a causal relationship would be a 
logical one. Black suggests that on such a showing the 
relationship between thinking and speaking would be seen as 
as special case of the relation between a map and the terrain 
mapped. Or, another way of looking at a logical relationship 
would be to see thinking and speaking as just two ways of 
looking at one and the same phenomenon (something like a. 
Reductionist account). 
(c) Again, the relationship might be that of concomitance -
either nomic concomitance or parallelism. 
The vehicle-cargo model or metaphor has often been used to 
describe such an (unspecified) relationship. At heart two 
important features stand out : 
''"''!;'-:,·· 
16. Black, M. The Labyrinth of Language. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968, p.84. 
(i) thought is distinct from its embodiment 
or expression 
(ii) the vehicle-cargo model at least in principle 
allows for the possibility of naked thinking 
(though I have tr~.ed to show in Chapter II, 
section VI, that this is not possible) 
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To these two features we would be inclined, on the basis of 
some of the above examples, to add a third : 
(iii) thought often seems to overflow the bounds of 
of its expression - as in the case of frames of 
mind. 
A further step might be to view thought as the meaning of the 
expression. 
This further step would then allow for a view of thinking 
distinguished by 
(i) thoughts_ qccurring with their expressions 
(ii) expressions ~ean what the person has thought. 
An immediate problem for this second theory is that it must 
be conceded that we can utter words in the absence of.prior thought 
and, because of the social conventions of language, these words 
will not thereby be meaningless. But once this possibility has 
been admitted, we still seem to be left with something that 
might be called a Duplicationist account of thinking. 
Finally, in our survey of "inclinational" considerations, 
we should note that something like ·a Duplicationist account of 
thinking has l,ong been ID•.1currency as a common-sense notion of the 
matter at hand. 
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We have, for a start, a distinction in our language between, 
for instance ''thought" and "language", and to the uninitiated this 
might seem to suggest certain ontological implications. We really 
are often at pains to distinguish our thbughts from our "words" 
and "deeds", particularly when we are in a court of law. There is, 
for instance, a distinction in some countries, in law, between 
a pre-meditated murder and one committed as an act of passion 
or on the spur· of the moment. In one case we think about it, 
supposedly, first; where in the other we simply do it. 
Again, such a distinction seems to be in accord with both our 
distinctions between what we do as individuals and what we do as 
members of a society, and with a vague distinction between what 
is "inner" and .. what is "in public view", viz : 
" The topic, language and thought., will inevitably bring us 
to a consideration of the relation between a man and the society 
he belongs to, between the behaviour patterns regarded as 
'normal' in the culture he is brought up to share. 'Thought' 
a name for the most advanced forms of a man's mental activity, 
inward, never wholly revealed; 'language' - something that is 
audible and visible in the infant's environment long before 
he can take any part in it ; the inwardness of thought 
. 17 
stands over against language, something 'out there'." 
Indeed we talk of hearing people as 'normal' and the deaf 
as 'not normal' or 'handicapped' precisely beca:Use, in being born 
deaf, they fail to acquire this public thing, language. I suspect 
that one of the powerful attractions in this new, and alternative 
approach to the teaching of deaf children, as yet admittedly only 
17. Britton, J. Language and Learning.Hannondsworth, :Penguin, 1970, p.l90. 
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vaguely articulated though patently at work, is that it makes 
sense of something that we have always wanted to say = that 
behind their handicap there are normal, thinking intelligent people 
if only we could reach them - circumvent their deafness and resultant 
lack of language, as it were. 
In the face of our only particl success in helping deaf 
children to overcome their handicap and to become, ''despite it''. 
normal members of our society, there is a powerful attraction in 
any new approach which seems to suggest that our traditional methods 
have failed, or tended to fail, simply because they were not in 
accord with what common-sense has always known. The approach 
which says that teaching language first gets the cart before the 
horse immediately looks like letting us off a daunting task : 
teaching deaf children a language. How much easier (and "more 
natural") does it seem to begin by teaching them how to think, 
developing their intellectual abilities, with thi~ added payoff 
of thereby making the now later task of teaching_ them a language 
more likely of success. Teaching handicapped children has 
always been an extremelydifficult problem with very powerful 
human emotions.becbming constantly involved. In my discussion so 
far I think I have .tended to ignore these emotional overtones and 
though they may be unmentionable in journals of social science 
and education they probably remain the driving force behind the 
adoption of this or that new, alternative approach to "making 
handicapped children whole or well"; 
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VIII. ON PRE- AND NON-LINGUISTIC FORMS OF THOUGHT. 
A naive equation of thought and language {or speech) is 
easily demolished by reference to pre- and non-linguistic forms 
of thought as such an equation fails to cover the whole question 
of thought and its expression, but only one sort of expression. 
There are a number of aspects to such an account 
{i) If we accept those developmental accounts of the 
appearance of thought and language in the young child, we must 
accept, with such researchers as Piaget and Vygotsky, both an 
early stage in the development of thought at which it is 
pre-linguistic and an early stage in the development of 
language where it is pre-intellectual. It seems likely that 
the pre-linguistic stage in the development of thought 
persists for longer than normal in young deaf children who are 
not given specialized forms of help. Concerning-the relatively 
normal acquisition of language there is a sense in which the 
babtle:·. !has ~ been won or lost by the time a deaf child enters 
school, hence the very great emphasis placed on helping the 
parents of pre-school deaf in our modern appr6ach to the. 
teaching of deaf children. A deaf child can, for instance, 
enter a kindergarten in New Zealand at a younger age than 
a normal hearing infant and parent guidance plays particular 
attention to helping the parents of deaf babies. It is not 
surprising that early identification is often the key to 
later success in language acquisition for deaf children. It 
might also be suggested that such forms of thought remain 
available to adults, perhaps particularly at moments of 
stress. Is it possible that the "purposefully adaptive, 
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intelligent actions" of the pre-verbal infant are not unlike 
the non-verbal thoughts of adults as perhaps "manifested in 
the use of tools ... James Britton18 quotes John Holloway's 
examples of " 'intelligent overt behaviour on the part o:f 
ballerinas, sailormen, mountaineers, carpenters, cricketers, 
and many others .... •. 'In these fields' he says, 'it is 
possible.~ to "think,. (in the sense of "solve intelligently") 
with one's hands, or one's f~et, or one's whole body.' II 
In short, a Piagetian or Vygotskllan view of language and 
thought as ,. two forms of behaviour, powerfully interacting but 
' . 19 distinct in origin and with differing forms of development .. 
provides a sort of scientific plausibility for a Duplicationist 
account of thinking. 
(ii) When we report on our thoughts to others we often do 
seem to report· more than just unspoken and ,.inner" dialogues 
we have held with ourselves. We also report on the pictures 
or other images we had in mind, our general feelings about 
what we have been thinking about, and so on. Ryle 20 has 
described the sort o~.thinking Le Penseur seems to be doing 
as experimentally trying things out on ourselves. As he 
says in "Thinking and Self-Teaching", we might parody Plato 
and say that in thinking the soul is not just conversing or 
debating with herse·lf:(. she is experimentally conveying could-be 
lessons to herself. "So we report that with some excitement 
·we have successfully solved the problem of .where UFO' s come 
from. 
18. Holloway, 
quoted in 
19. Britton, 
J. Language and Intelligence. 
Britton, J. pp.oit. 3 p.206 
.. ' . 
J. Op.cit., p.206, 
London, Macmillan, 1951. p.77. 
20. Ryle, G. "Thinking and Self-Teaching. Rice University Studies. 58, 1972.p.l21. 
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When we describe another person as thinking we do not 
thereby imply that he is thinking in words. A tennis-player 
so described might very well be thinking "with his body", 
or a painter with thoughts of colour mixtures and brush strokes. 
But if one of the points made so far about thinking in this 
thesis is that it need not always be tied to language then 
another must be that all thoughts ~re necessarily tied to some 
form of expression. 
(iii) That words are not the only possible forms of expression~ 
types of thought has been shown in the experiment3 of the 
. . 21 
V.1lirzburg psychologists. Their experiments showed th.::~t 
''intelligent adaptive respons~s can occur in problem-solving 
situations without the use of either words or image~ of any 
kind. •set• and 'determining tendencies' operate without the 
actual use of language in helping us to think.purposefully 
d . 11' 1 22 an 1nte 1gent y. 
The results of the experiments _of Wlirzburg psychologists 
such as Watt and Ach seem to be about mental habits and 
dispositions which we might loosely translate as "frames of 
mind" or "dispositions to think about things in a certain way". 
This amounts to an argument that the vehicles or "forms of 
expression" are not the only features of thought for which 
we mus.t acc.ount.· Intelligent behaviour cannot be entirely 
accounted for by a mere analysis of language skills or even 
language skills and the other forms of expression such as mental 
imagery.or purposeful, ·sensori-motor behaviour. Thought, it 
.~ould .seem, cannot be simply identified with its expression. 
21. cf. Chapter eight in Thomson, R. The Psychology of Thinking. Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1958. pp.149-l63. 
22. Thomson, R. IOid, p.l65. 
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(iv) But, finally, what of the "higher" forms of thought & 
what we might call abstract~ conceptual thinking? 
We might (a) want to argue that ulanguage is a necessary 
condition for acquiring and developing many drills and skills 
(i.e. (iii) above) which are necessary for the more spohistic~ted 
types of thinking", 23 and/or :(b) that thought of this kind even 
requires the actual use of complex symbols or signs as found in 
a language. Such a thesis might be Duplicationist in that 
thinking is to be regarded as more than just its expression but 
Reductionist in that thought-is dependent on the acquisition of 
a language. ;Under such a thesis the deaf would be '.'allowed" to 
think but not in such a "powerful" fashion as the possession of 
language might,allow. ThiS"is a familiar argument from Chapter II. 
IX. ON THE RESULTS OF OUR THINKING. 
I must agree with Ryle (in"Thinking and Saying") that the 
result of some sorts of thinking seem to be necessarily stateable, 
playable, paintable, or whatever. As Ryle 24 states, "An unworded 
proof is no more a proof than an unworded poem is a poem". 
But this leaves a number of questions unanswered, for though 
a poem necessarily involves words, does the composition of a poem 
do so, as Ryle might be taken to suggest? 
The phrase "result of thinking" is itself an unclear term. 
Such results might include, it would seem, gettirig tired, solving 
a problem, failing to do something else, completing a poem, getting 
an argument right, and so on. But the·se sorts of results - or 
23. Thomson, R. Ibid.~ p.l65. 
24. Ryle, G. "Thinking and Saying". Rice University Studies~ 58, 1972. p.l28 
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consequences - are not our prime concern here. 
Let us return to a distinction made in Chapter one between the 
activity of thinking and the object of thought. 
A number of arguments suggest such a·distinction 
(i) the activity of thinking is either something which we dot or, 
as Price suggests, at least something which we find ourselves 
engaged in. Thinking is an event. (Price's point is a cautionary 
one : that we can be too activistic in our description of thinking 
but it would seem that we cannot be too "eventistic" with such 
descriptions.) 
The object of a thought does not appear to be an activity, nor 
a process, and probably not even an episode. This last point, 
concerning an eposodic sense, I raise here for two reasons. 
First, as we shall see in Chapter IV, Sibley argues that Ryle's 
adverbial account arises, at least partly, because Ryle assumes 
a "process" account of "activity". Sibley then asks us to consider 
the consequences of an "episodic" account of "activity". 
Secondly, it raises the matter of the temporal duration of 
a thought. When we say something it takes some actual time, 
however brief. We can tirrie:such· things with a stopwatch. If I 
say to myself the sentence : "I wonder what is the time-relation 
between an act of assertion and the words that express it", I 
could presumably time how long it takes me to say such a thing. 
But the object of'our thoughts cannot be episodes, for we do not 
seem to be able to specify their duration over time. Nevertheless 
we do seem to be able to say that· when I was four the objects of my 
thoughts were not the same as those I have today. So though they 
may not be episodes they are not altogether unrelated to time. (They 
are, of course, timeless in a colloquial sense " the thoughts of 
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Plato may be sometimes called timeless (rather than fads of the 
day) . ) 
Now, thinking entails having an object of thought (which we 
might assert mentally (thinking that .... ), or entertain (thinking 
about ..•.. ) etc.). (Notice that saying does not entail having a 
subject to talk·about.) We can say gibberish. But one wonders if 
we really can think in a gibberish fashion? What about contused 
thoughts, delusive thoughts and so on? We might say of someone 
who claims to have a "contradictory thought" that he thinks he 
had such a thought - in this case the attribution of thinking 
paradoxically cancels the implicatio·n that the person d:i d have 
the thought. 
More strongly, thinking is having an object of thought : having 
an object of thought is an event. It is something that may go on 
(a process of thinkirig) or happen (an episode of thinking ..••. a 
thought suddenly dawned on me). The actual object of thought is 
.not the event (it is on_ly ah "eventn in, perhaps, the colloqual 
sense that we d~ll certain soci~l occasions "events" i.e. be 
important in some sense). 
When we ask someone "What are you thinking?" or "What are your 
thoughts on this argume·nt?" or, even"A penny for your thoughts?" 
we do not expect them to attempt to recount the whole process 
(script) of their thinking (even if they could). Rather we want 
to know something about the objects of their thought. (Notice that 
we thereby, though, do suppose the activity of thinking, in asking 
for the object of a persbn's thO"ughts. And also, the reverse holds 
true : 
"Socrates to Theaetetus: "And if someone thinks, 
.mustn't he be thinking something?" 
Theaetetus: 25 ''Ye_s f he· must." " 
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There is a sense in which different people can have the same 
object of thought (e.g. that p, or of X etc.) but we do not want 
to say that two people might engage in or experience the very same 
activity or,.p.rq<;::ess or episode ··of thinking since that would involve 
' . ' - .. .. ' ·, .. ~- . . 
-.·_., 
thed!r havirig the same mind or brain. (Of course, they could experi-
ence very similar activities of thinking.) Furthermore, in the 
sense that thinking entails having an object of thought we might 
insist that no two people can have one and the very same object of 
thought (your thought that p is distinct from my thought that p 
even though we have the same thought- at.the very least the two 
thoughts are different in regard to possession ~ and if we do our 
thinking on separate occasions ~ in regard to the time that p was 
thought). 
When we consider the embodiment or expression of either the 
act of thinking or the object of thought we can at least make 
one distinction I may have the thought that 2+2=4 but the generic 
object of thought - 2+2=4 - is not embodied any more than numbers 
themselves, or, universals, are. What is embodied is my token of 
the type-thought "2+2=4". The generic object of thought has neither 
a possessor nor an: occurrence On"Friday afternoon though my token 
does. 
A Duplicationist of one persuasion might argue that thinking 
is an unobservable, inner, and non-physical sui generis activity 
or process which may give rise (be embodied in some additional 
process) to an expression (mental image, words, sensori-motor acts 
or whatever) which as_:,~pressi:ons of thought are objects of thought 
(in the token sense)' ... Thinking, on this .account 1 produces objects 
25 • This quotation is discussed in Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. 
/;.I · THE liBRARY 
. p·. , p.518. u•Y 
1..J.NIVERSITY OF CANTERB " . 
r~-lll!'':Tr''·" ":•.r:.H. N.'Z. 
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of thought. (These objects of thought might then cause (produce) 
still further acts of thinking- the inceptive factor of thinking.) 
Alternatively, a Duplicationist of a different stamp might 
argue that thinking is having objects of thought (token sense); 
that the aet of thinking and the object of thought are in p1•actic.e 
(but not in any Reductionist sense) one and the same - but that 
this is distinct from any overt verbal expression of thinking. We 
might think in a succession of images and then convey our thought in 
words (or even the sign language of the deaf). 
Normally when we speak of the result of our thinking we mean 
something like our thoughts as expressed in a public language - in 
a public, conventional device of communication. To be communicable 
our thoughts must be embodied in something that has a public or 
physical reality of some type. It is at this point that our Reduc-
tionist plays all his cards : thinking is speaking (or at least 
speaking to oneself which is either developmentally or descriptively 
(or both) parasitic on observable, public acts. 
While we might agree that a good proportion of our mental 
embodiments of thought can be expressed verbally, if we possess 
the language for the job, we will still want to hold that this 
leaves a lot of our thought-life-experience linguistically 
unexpressed. We have already discusses these "pulls toward 
Duplicationism" in section VII. Yet they, as they stand, carry 
insufficient weight to make out a water-tight case for Duplicationis1' 
. . I 
For instance, while it is perfectly true that we rarely say all 
that we think perhaps if we took the trouble and developed the 
language we could. This may be O'ne of the things a poet is 
engaged in. 
The logical point that Ryle makes, that an unworded argument 
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is no more an argument than an unworded poem is a poem does 
not alter the facts of· the substantial thesis as outlined, in 
any fundamental way. 
X. AN INFINITE REGRESS OBJECTION TO DUPLICATIONISM. 
We have an initial distinction between an activity of thinking 
as a process or as an episode. I shall put arg~ents for one or 
the other aside (for the moment) and talk about the act of 
thinking. In turn we have what we think about or of : the object 
of our thoughts. I shall adopt as a workable definition of "object 
of thought" Peter Sheehan's 26 
" that the object of thought is what is referred 
to by the phrase or clause in object position 
in the answer to the question 'what are you 
thinking of?' i.e. whatever is referred to by 
X in 'I am/was thinking of X'. II 
And, in similar vein, I shall adopt a definition of the act 
of thinking as what is referred to by the phrase or clause in the 
object position in the answer to the question "what are you 
doing?" i.e. when the answer is "I was thinking". 
With respect to the act of thinking (T)" I have argued that 
a Reductionist holds that thinking (+) is to be identified with 
its expression (e) - (T) is nothing but (e) as it were - while 
a Duplicationi_p:t holds that thinking (+) is.something else as 
well as its expression (e) _, (T)=(+) plus (e) as 1t were. 
We can now distinguish two separate problems 
(i) the problem of intentionality - how thoughts are related 
to their objects - how the thought of X is related to X (where X 
26. Sheehan, P. "Aquinas on Intenti.onality" In Kenny, A. Aquinas: a collection 
of critical essays. London, Macmillan, 1969, p.307. 
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may or may not exist)? To answer this question we have to explain 
what we mean by "object of thought (o)" .. If I am thinking of 
the moon then I would say that the object of my thought is the moon~ 
And, of course, my act of thinking (T) bears some relation (R) to 
the moon (o). Presumably, when we speak of "objects of thought" 
we do not mean things lik"e the"moon, but rather (perhaps) some 
mental counterpart which is a symbol of the moon, e.g. an image. 
But then we would not want to say that this mental counterpart 
is the object of my thought (for the moon is that) - rather it is 
the means by which we think of the moon (and we must use some means). 
The Mediaevals (and Brentano) speak of the mental symbol as 
existing intentionally - or rather, the object of thought (in this 
case, the moon) exists intentionally in our. mind (whenever \ve 
think of the moon). Of course, by-a further act of thought we can 
think of the intentional existence of something in our mind - in 
which case, it becomes the object of our thoughts. Now this is an 
interesting, if disputed, theory of thinking but the problem of 
intentionality is not my prime concern here. 
(ii) the problem of the relation between an "act" of thinking 
(+) and the mental symbols (e) it produces or results in - or in 
which it consists (its vehicle). 
The problem of (ii) above does not in a sense occur for a 
Reductionist, who holds an identity thesis between (+) and (e) -
so if he is to talk about a "relation" at all, it is one of identity 
(which is not to say that this is a correct account - but merely 
that it is the account given by a Reductionist). 
Now it is when a Duplicationist attempts to provide some 
account of the relation between (+) and (e) that an infinite regress 
results - at which point the Duplicationist account fails. 
Suppose that we maintain that at the time of the occurrence 
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of (e) we have a belief that it is related to a certain (+) -
that is, that at the time of the occurrence of some act of thinking 
(taken Duplicationally as existing in some other world.from its 
expressiqn or at least as a theoretical ~ntity) we have a belief 
that it is related to a certain expression (vehicle - instance 
of a given sort- perhaps a succession of mental images). On this 
assertion, for (e) to be the expression or Vehicle of some(+), both 
(+) must in fact be present (henrie the need for the theoretical 
entity (+) in bur theory) and there must be some (e) to which (+) 
is related present at the same time. If this were not so then how 
would we be certain that this (e) expressed that (+)? Yet to maintaill, 
(+)R(e) we must be able to think of (+) other than by means of the 
occurrence of (e) - hence the requirement that a Duplicationist 
account must be able to separately identify (+) and (e) - such 
identification must be mutually exclusive - the definition of one 
must not be in terms of the other. If a Duplicationist replies that 
our thought of (+)could consist in the occurrence of some (e 2 ), 
hence (+)R(e 2 ), he would be at ~he first stage of an infin~te regres~ 
for now he would need some (+)R(e 3 ) and so on ad infinit~m. 
Of course, a Duplicationist might argue that we need not 
believe that any given (+) is related to some (e) ((+)R(e)) at the 
time of the occurrence of {e) but that would mean that at the 
time of engaging in some act of thinking we would not really know 
whether our thinking was expressed in this (e) or that {whenever 
more than one (e) occurred). 
A Reductionist does not face this problem for, since in all 
cases, (+) just is (e), there can be no question of getting {e)'s 
mixed up. {This, of course, leaves him with the problem of sorting 
{e)'s which are thinking from (e)'s which are not as in the case 
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of two tennis--players ~winging a racquet where one is performing 
the action (e) thoughtfully and the other thoughtlessly.) 
Yet even if the infinite regress problem could be avoided 
there would remain the task of separately specifying (+) and (e). 
In Section VIII of Chapter II, I discussed the problems involved 
in specifying (e). In principle this could be done empirically along 
the lines I have indicated. While this remains a task facing both 
Reductionism and Dup'licationism we can at least see our way clear 
to an adequate specification of the mediums of thinking - the 
forms of expression of thought. 
I have suggested that a Duplicationist might want to regard 
(+) as a theoretical entity required by his theory. And yet it.is 
a theoretical entity of a rather special sort. The theoretical 
entities of science are standardly presented as empirically observabl 
in principle - given the technology. It is not clear that (+) will 
ever be empirically· observabl.e. A Realist form of Duplicationism 
might want to argue such a position but this would be to drop the 
"two worlds" theory. It would be "Reductionist" in that all mental 
terms would be viewed as designating.observable entities (at least 
in principle). At that point the distinction between Reductionism 
and Duplicationism would begin to break down. A non-Realist form 
of Reductionism retains the two-world theory (only one of which 
is available to empir~·cal observation and study). Clearly any 
. . . . -
account whichadequ¥t~Zy explains what we mean by "thinking" 
.. ·. 
and which yet' avoids postulating such things as unobservable, 
theoretical entities (i.e. a separate ~ctivity of thinking over 
and above (in another world from) its expression) must hold a 
certain attraction, if only as a seemingly defensible welding of 
Occam's Razor. 
-ooOoo"-
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ADVERBIAL ACCOUNT OF 
THINKING 
II 
MAGEE: 
RYLE: 
Are you in a position to say what sort of 
product is likely to come out of your 
current thinking qbout thinking? ..... ~ ... 
It depends whether I get anywhere. I've got 
now a hat and a cap and a scarf and a 
mackintosh, and one or two other things. 
The big thing I haven't got is the peg 
on which to hang them. II 
- Bryan Magee, "Conversation with 
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Gilbert Ryle" (1971) 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Traditionally we appear ,to have held two accounts of. 
thinking - that (by one account) thinking simply is the discourse 
the mind holds with itself or that (by another account) thinking 
is something else as well as such discourse. But a tacit assumption 
made by both these traditional accounts of thinking would seem to 
be· some such clause as "thinking" can be variously taken as either 
a· noun or a verb. We are all familiar with Einstein's point that 
science begins with basic premises which it assumes and then 
works out from. In proposing an "adverbial" account of thinking 
Ryle appears on the face of it to be calling into question the 
basic noun-verb characterization premise of the Reductionist and 
Duplicationist accounts of thinking. 
' . .:. ·-.<~ • 
Following the introduction this chapter will consist of six 
further sections. Section II explores the rarige of supposed 
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activities we will be prepared to count as thinking. Two points 
emerge: (a) some forms of thinking such as .. daydreaming or drifring 
in idle reverie may be counted as "secondary'' types of thinking, 
and (b) once again abstract, conceptual thought will prove our 
"test case". 
F.N. Sibley, in his paper "Ryle and Thinking" has divided 
Ryle's successive accounts of thinking into three : in sections 
III, IV ~nd V, I deal with these in turn. They are (successively) 
a multip1e-activity account of thinking, a polymorphous account 
of thinking, and the adverbial account of thinking. Ryle failed 
to distinguiih the first two accounts. and viewed them (as one) as 
his "last resort" : as such I attempt to show that it pr.oves fairly 
unsatisfactory : like riuplicationism and Reductionism it fails to 
account for this place of intentions and skillsin'the characteri-
zation of thinking. 
Section V, on the adverbial account, raises the problem 
of assigning some ontological status to such things as frames of 
mind, intentions, and relevant skills once they have been covered 
by the theory - a theory essentially propounded in the face of the 
problems besetting Reductionism and Duplicationism. In section VI, 
two major problems emerge for such an account (highlighted by the 
ontological predicament which emerges for Ryle) : (a) an overly 
restrictive concept of ."activity", and (b) an overly polarized 
ontology. An avoidance of (a:) and (b) point to a matrix of 
precepts for teaching the deaf as suggested in the final section(VIJ) 
My emphasis will not be on Rule's adverbial account, though 
attention will be paid to his contributions to the theory, but 
rather on the logical ramifications of such an account of 
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thinking as he proposes. My intentions are structural rather than 
biographical. 
In the bibliography I have provided abbreviations for the 
main references and these abbreviations are used throughout in 
lieu of extensive footnotes. 
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF THINKING. 
In Ryle's discussion of ·the topic of.thinking subsequent to 
Chapter IX of The Concept of Mind it is not always clear just 
what he will count as a case of thinking. His most frequent 
examples of thinking are·pondering, composing, calculating or 
computincr, solving problems, engaged thinking such as playing 
tennis (with one's mind on the game), going over something in 
one's head, and reflecting (in that order of frequency of use). 
On the other hand he is careful to declare himself (in these 
papers) as unconcerned with that notion of thinking which implies 
belief. As Ryle writes, "I am interested in cogitation, not 
credence; in perplexity, not unperplexity." (TS 127.) This raises 
a problem viz. does Ryle mean belief in a dispositional sense 
simply or does this include episodic belief - (actually) thinking 
that .•••.• The point is that it is difficult to see how any 
thinking can go on without at least_some admixture of 'thinking 
that' (believing that- episodic sense). 
Rather more rarely Ryle counts daydreaming or drifting in idle 
reverie as thinking. 
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(1) Ryle's Central Case. 
·Ryle primarily devotes himself to a consideration of that 
sort of thinking which Rodin's Le Penseur might be doing. Various 
descriptions might apply : pondering, reflecting, musing, meditating, 
and so on at the very least. Of this sort of thinking we might say 
two things 
(1) Le Penseur is what we might call a dis-engaged thinker. 
He is not totally aware of his immediate surroundings -for 
instance, the fly on his arm or his wife singing in the next 
room - it is sometimes as if he were in another world. 
(2) He is not necessarily 'getting anywhere', either. 
When we multiply 2 x 2 we get a result but often when we are 
pohdering some problem we fail.to find a solution. Sometimes, 
of course, we do succeed. 
The sort of thinking Le Penseur might be engaged in could 
very well be abstract, conceptual thought. Let us suppose that 
it is. 
(2) Engaged and Dis-engaged Thinking. 
Ryle makes a distinction (cf.TR 465 ff.) between a dis-
engaged thinker such as Le Penseur and an engaged thinker such as 
an other than thoughtless tennis player "While he is engaged 
in the game, with his mind on the game, he looks and mostly is 
~-reflective or un-pensive .•.. the tenni~-player's thinking almost 
consists in his whole and at least slightly schooled atention being 
given to, inter alia, the flight of the ball over the net, the 
posifion of his opponent, the strength of the wind, and so on." 
(TR 466.) It is unfortunate that Ryle does not go on to explain 
the "almost" in that quotation. 
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About an engaged thinker we would want to say that : 
(1) his thinking is tied in some way· to the concrete here-and-now 
situation, to what he is doing (where his action can be characterize( 
as other than thinking). 
(2) like Le Penseur 3 the tennis-player is concentrating, but in 
a different way. If Le Penseur concentrates for a moment on his 
wife's singing he loses his train of thought, but it the tennis-
player becomes too pensive for a moment he misses his shot. 
Sometimes our thinking seems to be neither entirely one nor 
the other, but rather, a bit of both. Ryle acknowledges such 
11 halfway-house cases of thinking 11 as when we do something pretty 
deliberately such as talk to our solicitor (TR 466). It is not 
clear to me that thi's is a good example - but perhaps the point 
does apply to any case of deliberate speech. 
We can imagine situations in which either of these sorts of 
thinking might be considered more 11 basic 11 than the other. Both 
in terms of the development of the individual, or ontogeny, and 
in terms of the development of the species, or phylogeny, engaged 
thinking probably appears first. And yet basic to our concept of 
what it is to be fully a thinker is probably the idea of reflective 
thought. When someone claims that the deaf cannot think they are 
usually taken as denying the deaf some profound level of dis-engaged 
thinking. 
Other than thoughtless speech seems rather to be like engaged 
thinking. When we stop to reflect on something our words tend to 
die in our mouths, only to·resume again once we decide to proceed 
with our disdourse • 
. This immediately raises a rather interesting question for one. 
sort of Reductionism. If Le Penseur's admittedly dis-engaged 
thinking consists in his inner speech, and if speaking is rather 
more like engaged thinking, then something of a paradox presents 
itself : for are we now to call this engaged or disengaged 
thinking? A request that as soon as speech becomes sub vocal it 
should be regarded as having lost its "engaged" qualities begins 
to try our credulity. On the other hand we do not want to deny 
that sometimes Le Penseur is talking to himself. 
(3) Thinking and Results. 
Sibley (RT 75) points out that some of Ryle's cases of 
thinking, such as trying to solve a problem or translating often 
end in some result (such as a solution or a translation) whereas 
others, such as going over something in our heads or following 
an argument do not attempt "solutions". Ryle is rather more 
interested in dis-engaged thinking of the sort that leads to 
results, conclusions, or solutions. 
(4) Daydreaming and/or Drifting in Idle Reverie. 
Indeed, towards the end of his discussion Ryle decides 
to leave·to one side such "off-center things as the thinking of 
the man who is glumly brooding over an insult; the thinking of 
a man who is, for pleasure, running over in his head a tune or 
a poem that he has long since got by heart; and the thinking of 
the man who is just daydreaming" (TST 112 my underlining). 
This is probably as well for a fairly strong case can be made 
for regarding at least daydreaming or drifting in idle reverie as a 
"secondary" form of thinking. 
J.O. Urmson in his paper "Polymorphous Concepts" makes a 
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distinction between "primary" forms of thinking and "secondary" 
forms of thinking. Primary forms of thinking, on this distinction, 
are those the results or conclusions of which have some truth-value. 
Urmson1 asks us to consider such cases as the following : 
(1) Someone asks us to hold on for a minute until they finish 
thin~ing and later we learn that all they were doing was driftinci 
-I 
in idle reverie. We tend to feel that that was not a sufficientl)~ 
good reason for asking us to bide o~r time. 
(2) We are familiar with the assertion that thinking can be as 
tiring as manual labour - but does this hold for daydreaming, 
too? 
(3) When we admonish p8ople to "Think before you act! we do 
not really want them to then. daydream or drift in idle 
reverie before proceeding on some course of action. 
(5) The Boundary Redrawn. 
Few would deny the deaf the ability to play tennis 
thoughtfully, or multiply 2 x 2, or even drift in idle reverie 
or daydream. But there are those who wish to assert that the deaf, 
being·denied,CI."'language, are thereby denied the chance to realize 
their inherent potential for '"full-blown" abstract, conceptual 
thought such as dis-engaged and pondering Le Penseur might be 
doing. As in Chapters II and III I shall be primarily concerned 
with this sort o£ thinking and I do not feel that such a restriction 
is necessarily out of step with · .Ryle' s own concerns with the 
topic. 
1. Urmson, J.O. "Polymorphous Concepts". In Wood, O.P. and Pitcher, G. RyZ.e. 
London, Macmillan, 1970, p.262. 
113. 
III. THE MULTIPLE-ACTIVITY ACCOUNT OF THINKING. 
·A Reductionist account of thinking, that thinking is nothing 
but a range of certain activities (observable in principle), appears 
to stand in contrast to a Duplicationist account of a certain 
persuasion which does want to argue for ,thinking as one separate 
activity over and above any range of other activities such as 
having mental images, talking to oneself, etc., which might be 
focused upon by a Reductionist. A Duplicationist of a different 
persuasion might not want one activity (thinking) over and above 
such things as talking to oneself and having mental images but 
rather a whole group of separate and 'mental' activities (to 
be called collectively "thinking"). 
Thus when Ryle argues against an account of thinking as one 
specific activity he might be taken as lending support either to 
Reductionism or a 'multiple-activity' version of Duplicationism. 
To the extent that his arguments against a 'specific-activity' 
account of thinking succeed he will have successfully argued against 
at least one version of Duplicationism....: the 'specific-activity' 
version. 
Ryle asks us to draw a comparison between "thinking" and 
words like "gardening 11 or "housekeeping:. We have already seen 
(in section II) that 11 thinking" is commonly used to denote quite 
a range of different activities from composing a poem, to recalling 
an argument or from listening thoughtfully to a speaker, to 
playing a game of chess with care. Similarly "gardening" may 
cover dit.ch-digging, bulb-lifting, lawn-cutting, fence-mending, 
and so on. Thus Ryle (T 296) suggests that though we might initially 
suppose that 'thinking stands for "a' specific process or activity", 
"if I asked you to tell me the basic elements of which working 
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consists, or of which gardening consists, or of which 
housekeeping consists, you would be qui~k to see the trap I was 
laying for you. You would say, quite rightly·, that words like 
1 gardening 1 ,, working 1 and 1 housekeeping; cover a great number of 
widely different things." The ~~stinguishing feature, then of a 
"mul tiple-acti vi ty" is._i ts heterogeneity. "Thinking" is not to be 
seen, as it were, as thinking, but rather as a heterogeneous group 
of activities, or X-ings. 
Ryle 1 s is an argument by suggestion for he does not go on to 
consider counter-examples which might support an essential or 
specific activity account of thin~ing. 
If we consider that sort of thinking with which we are 
particularly interested (abstract, conceptual thought} it might 
be suggested that an essential activity involved here is the 
manipulation of symbols. Manipulation of symbols could then be 
one candidate for the specific-activity required by the specific-
activity version of Duplicationism. Ryle 1 s arguments against 
Duplicationism are not on the grounds that abstract, conceptual 
thinking need not involve the manipulation of symbols but on quite 
different grounds (that intent~ons and skills are ignored, for 
instance}. 
Can we imagine a case of someone who is willing, after the 
fact, to assert that he had been engaged in abstract, conceptual 
thought which did not involve the manipulation of symbols of 
any sort? Or, can we imagine a case where we would want to 
describe someone as having been engag~d-in abstract conceptual 
thought which did not involve the manipulation of symbols of any 
sort? 
Presumably the first claim would be on the basis of either the 
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thinker's own conscious awareness and/or introspection. Our lack 
of any direct access to the mental life of others makes such a 
claim very difficult to dispute. But one means which we do have 
at our disposal involves the very meaning of the notion of abstract, 
conceptual thought itself. If part of what we mean here by either 
"abstract" or "conceptual" is "in symbols" or "by the use of 
symbols" then we would want to say of such a claim that though 
it may be made quite sincerely the claimant has simply failed to 
understand what he has done. Similarly this would foreclose 
the attempt to ascribe to others such a case of thinking (abstract, 
conceptual thought which does not involve symbol manipulation). 
I believe that such a case can certainly be made out for at 
least the involvement of abstract thinking. The concrete s2nsori~ 
motor thought of the young child seems to involve only the here-
and-now or "present". When we are thinking abstractly (for 
instance) about a theorem in logic, or geometry or even whether 
a social contract theory of morality is satisfactory •.•...• we 
must use some representation of some kind. This might be a mental 
image, or a word, or something of that sort. Now, without becoming 
involved in any lengthy discussion of what a symbol might be or 
how it might function I think we can agree that some admittedly 
rough description of this sort is not too far from the truth. To 
think abstractly we must use some 'symbol' of the notions or 
concepts about which we wish to think. 
Now, I would not wish to invoke. "symbol manipulation" as a 
candidate for an essential activity for thinking, but it does 
seem to be crucial for that form or level of thought which ::is our 
prime concern. 
Yet this is hardly sufficient to establish an essential- or 
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specific-activity version of Duplicationism for we need not go 
on to suggest that symbol manipulation is some occult mental 
activity. Rather, it could readily be explained as a mental habit 
or skill developmentally parasitic upon some previously overt and 
publicly accessible process. 
For all types of thinking Sibley (RT 8lff.) has suggested 
that we consider "a~ttention" as being necessarily involved. "The 
composer must attend to the notes he plays or imagines, the man 
trying to recall a telephone number to the numbers that pass 
through-his head, and the architect or mathematician to the bricks 
or numbers that he moves about on his actual or mental tc?.ble 
or sheet of paper. If not, they are thoughtlesaly doodling." 
(RT 81-82.) 
But if attending is necessary to the conc~pt of thinking 
generally, or symbol manipulation to the concept of abstract, 
conceptual thinking, are they sufficient? 
In the case of "attention" Sibley would want to add that 
the attending must be to considerations of a certain type .i··.e~ 
those that are relevant and appropriate : "a man listening~ even 
attentively, to a lecturer's words need not be thinking. He might 
register perfectly the lecturer's words, without taking in, 
thinking about, accepting, or rejecting his (the lecturer's) 
arguments". (RT 82.) So, now, if .I am composing a poem, I must 
not only attend to the trial words or lines in my head but also 
decide which are relevant and appropriate to the poem I am trying 
to develop. 
Sibley's only intention with this.example is to argue that 
,.,_ 
Ryle should have at least considered the various possible prima 
. facie candidates for an essential activity or ingredient of 
thinking. 
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. Ryle's reply, within the terms of an adverbial account, would 
probably be that attending to relevance and appropriateness, or 
engaging in symbol manipulation are not activities~ but rather 
adverbial parasites upon some non-mental X-ings. If the adverbial 
account itself proves untenabl~ then we would want to remind 
ourselves that this multiple activity account, which in TR (219) 
Ryle terms his "las.t resort", may itself be in doubt. 
Even though a multiple-activity account of thinking may be 
Ryle's last resort I think it isfairly clear why he is attracted 
to it sufficiently to include it in his roster of (as we shall see) 
compatible accounts. To hold some specific- or essential-activity 
of thinking accol,1.ni:·would be to lay a possible groundwork for a 
'• 0 0 o;' u" 0 
''I ·..... ... 
non-mental "mind"; for might not such an activity signpost just 
such a thing as The .. Cencept of Mind rejects, and Ryle wants to 
argue that "there are no such happenings; there are no occurrences 
taking place in ~ second-status (non-material) world, since there 
is no such status and no such world •..• " (CM 161 Barnes and Noble 
ed.) 
IV. THE POLYMORPHOUS ACCOUNT OF THINKING. 
A polymorphous activity has two distinguishing features: -
(i) heterogeneity - which it shares with the multiple-activity 
account (thus the supposed polymorphous activity of housekeeping 
might be seen as including at least dusting'· scrubbing floors, 
arranging furniture, polishing tables, and so on). 
(ii) non-constitutiveness - the subsumed activites of a polymorphous 
activity (e.g. "thinking") must be activities which could be 
performed by a non~thinker i.e. we must be able to perform them 
without thereby be thinking. We might say (of "thinking", for 
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instance), that the subsumed activities are non-constitutive soZeZy 
of thinking alone. It is this second feature which distinguishes 
the polymorphous account from the multiple-activity account of 
thinking (the latter being marked only be hetergeneity). We would 
say that the activities must bE1 neutPaZ K-ings. 
Now a polymorphous account might work for "engaged thinking" 
easily enough. The tennis-player moving his arm, positioning his 
feet, or changing hands with his racquet might be either playing 
his game intelligently or thoughtlessly - his X-ings are ~eutral 
viv-a-vis thinking. 
But does this account work for "dis-engaged thinking"? What 
instances can be cited as neutral-X-ings (i.e. X-ings which might 
or might not l::>e instances of thinking)? It is difficult to see, 
for instance, how activities such as composing poems, remembering, 
developing arguments, etc., could be performed by someone who is 
not thereby thinking. Indeed, while scrubbing floors, dusting, 
polishing, arranging furniture, etc., may.be performed by non-
housekeepers yet in doing such things a person does seem to be 
doing housekeeping. 
To maintain the distinction Ryle needs examples of activities 
performed by the dis-engaged thinker which might be eitheP cases 
of thinking oP of not thinking, viz., neutral X-ings. Not only does 
he fail to provide such examples but it is difficult to see how 
he can - the activities which a dis-engaged thinker performs or 
finds himself performing just do not seem to be neutral vis-a-vi:s 
thinking. 
J.O. Urmson argues in his paper "Polymorphous Concepts .. that, 
as stated by Ryle, the notion of a polymorphous concept is capable 
of more than one interpretation, leaving us unclear as to which 
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Ryle means to invoke. 
Urmson is concerned only with Ry~e's introduction of the concept 
in TL and he quotes in full paragraphs 9-11 from that paper. The 
TL account of a polymorphous concept brings out both the features 
we recognized above :. heter0g:~niei ty ("If asked 11 What does working 
consist of?" we would quickly object that there was no general 
answer." -para 9) and non-constitutiveness ("Nothing need be 
done, thought, or felt by the professionsl footballer at work, 
that might not be done, thought, or felt by the amateur at play."' 
(but note again this is more like the engaged thinker) . - also 
para. 9). 
Urmson coins the phrase "action-content" to cover "that of which 
the action consists" and then decides that "the .concept of X-ing 
is polymorphous if there is no action-content. which is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition of X-ing" (PC 25.1). I take it 
that Sibley's "attending to relevance and appropriateness" would 
be a candidate for an Urmsonian "action-contentn/ Urmson immediately 
goes on to suggest that we are to imagine the action-content as 
contrasted with "the context, merits, and intention of the 
performance, the status of the agent, relevant social and legal 
customs, and the like" {PC 251), that is, as I have said, the 
very things which Ryle accuses both the Reductionists and 
Duplicationists of ignoring {cf. TS 125). 
Ryle would probably argue that an action-content such as 
Sibley's fails (as sufficient for thinking) precisely becasue it 
fails to cover these sorts of things (which we might coin as 
"adverb-contents"). That an activity word like "thinking" is 
polymorphous would not, for Ryle,. satisfy our need for som·e 
further account of the adverb-content, hence the fact that he 
does on to add (not replace the former a,ccount(s) with) his 
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adverbial account of thinking. It is not surprising that the two 
(three) accounts are presented as co.mpatible. As Sibley puts it, 
"Proper specimens of thinking, like anagram-solving and composing 
sonatas, might have no common ingredient; each might also involve 
different neutral X-ings, like manipulatin~ tetters and striking 
piano keys; and thinking might be not an activity additional to 
these X-ings, but the manner of X-ing. (RT 80.) 
I take it that by an action-content which is necessary and 
sufficient for X-ing Urmson would imply a possible counter-example 
to the heterogeneity feature. In PC (251-252) Urmson considers the 
non-constitutiveness feature of polymorphous concepts which 
suggests that no single action-content could ever succeed as a sole 
indicator of this X-ing as being that particular activity (fer 
the X-ing-s are neutral to thinking or any number of other activities 
- an X-ing which is thinking here is acting there, .for instance). 
Urmson considers each of these two features in turn as sufficient 
to exp~icate the notion of a polymorphous concept on their own -
something I and Sibley would not find Ryle as ever intending. Finall:y 
PC (253), Urmson suggests that the two features taken together 
provide the "most plausible interpretation of~ Ryle's ·notion 
of the polymorphous concept" and Sibley and I would certainly 
agree with that. 
Urmson believes that the cash value of these two features would 
be the conjunction that "the concept of X-ing is polymorphous if 
no action-content is a sufficient condition of X-ing and no 
action-content is a necessary condition of X-ing" (PC 254)~ Not 
sufficient for no single one description will cover the whole range 
of X-ings under "thinking" and not necessary since any X-ing might 
be something other than thinking. 
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But this leaves us with the further task of accounting for such 
~hi~g~ as intentions and skills. 
V. THE ADVERBIAL ACCOUNT OF T~INKING. 
In The Concept of Mind (CM 199 B & Ned.) Ryle wrote that 
"To talk of a person's mind is not to talk of a repository which 
is permitted to house objects that something called 'the physical 
world' is forbidden to house; it is to talk of the person's 
abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain 
sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things 
in the ordinary world." The implication here is that things like 
intentions and skills do not invoke some non-physical world or 
"repository" (as .a Duplicationist would have it). 
Let us remind ourselves of the Reductionist's problem. Two 
men are muttering to themselves but, even though their behaviour 
seems identical, only one is said to be thereby thinking (one, 
for instance, might be using words of a language he does not under-
stand, or he might be in a fever, etc.). 
Ryle would sort out -t:he two by referertceto (at least) 
'tframes of mind" : "To restate the prob].em, it is possible, if 
not very common, for two or more overt actions done in quite 
dissimilar frames of mind to be photographically and gramophonically 
as similar as you please". (CM 140 B & Ned.) 
Ryle's problem is to explicate things like: "frames of mind" 
(and, perhaps, thereby, "thinking") without courr.ting either 
Duplicationism or Reductionism. Our question (or, Ryle's) is is 
it possible (and correct) to steer the middle ground? It is not 
clear that Ryle's "last resort" account of thinking (as explicated 
in sections III and IV of this chapter) succeeds in this for all 
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possible versions of Reductionism or Duplicationism. For instance, 
Reductionism might well accept that (a) 11 thinking 11 is a whole 
range of different activities which (b) might also be performed 
by non-thinkers, as might a multiple-activity version of 
Duplicationism (at least with respect to an engaged thinker). 
Yet, at least in CM Ryle is not entirely clear just what 
the ontological status of "frames of mind 11 is (as Laird Addis 2 
recognizes, in his 11 Ryle' s Ontology of Mind 11 ) - Ryle writes: 
II But if this special character is unwitnessable, we 
seem to say either that it is some hidden concomitant of 
the operation to which it is ascribed, or that it is some 
merely disposition~l property of the agent ..•. To accept the 
former suggestion would be to relapse into the two-worlds 
legend. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
On the other hand, to accept the dispositional account 
would apparently involve us in saying that though a person 
may properly be described as whistling now, he cannot be 
properly described as concentrating or taking care now; and 
we know quite well that such descriptions are legitimate ... 
(CM 133.) 
If "frames of mind 11 (and intentions and skills if these 
·exist outside the boundary of "frames of mind 11 as at least skills 
might) are neither pieces of behaviour, nor non-physicai 
occurrences, then just what are they? 
Ryle's view (CM 134-135) is that these ascriptions are 
(ordinarily) both dispositional and episodic - they are what he 
2. Addis, 
Ryle : 
Hague, 
L. "Ryle's Ontology of Mind" In Addis, L. and Lewis, D. Moore and 
Two Ontologists. Iowa City, University of Iowa Pr~ss, 1965 and The 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, p.7. 
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calls _,;semi-hypothetical" or "mongrel categorical statements". Thus 
frame of mind-assumptions can be analysed out as semi-hypotheticals 
(i.e. dispositional apd_ e_pi$odic). But further we must note that 
for Ryle (i) the episode is what actually happens, viz., ordinarily 
something public (as if all thinking were engaged thinking) - this 
is what is clockable (CM 134); and (ii) Ryle's account of disposition 
is purely conditional i.e. disposition-ascriptions are analysed as 
conditionals not categorical ascriptions i.e. Ryle is anti-realist 
in regard to disposiitons. 
A Realist analysis involves both a conditional ascription and 
an ontological (categorical) ascription (usually a state). Ryle 
provides no satisfactory objection to a Realist analysis - alterna-
tively, he can give no explanation of why the conditional is 
applicable. 
Peter Geach 3 discusses this problem (with Ryle's account) in 
section 3 of his Menta~ Acts. 
Geach notes two essential "faults"·andone unwanted consequence: 
(i) Ryle "makes no serious attempt·to carry out his 
programme consistently" but "If reports of these mental acts 
cannot be reduced to hypothetical or semi-hypothetical 
statements about overt behaviour, then the.view that the 
distinction between categoricals and hypotheticals is the 
logical distinction between physical and psychological 
statements must be completely wrong. A logical principle 
allows of no exceptions ••••• " (p.4.;..;5) 
(ii) Ryle "is running counter to_ a very deep-rooted way 
of thinking. When two agents differ in their behaviour, we look 
for some actual, not merely hypothetical, difference between 
them to account for this; as the scholastics said, omne agens 
3. Geach, P.T. Mental Acts :Their Content and Their Object. London, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1957, p.4-7. 
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agit in quantum est in actu." (n.S.) 
and· the consequence: 
(iii) "We are invited to regard a stat.ement that two men, 
whose overt behaviour was not a~tually different, were in 
different states of mind (e.g. that one checked a column 
of figures with his mind on the job, the other with his 
mind on his domestic troubles) as being really a statement 
that the behaviour of one man would have been different from 
that of the other in hypothetical circumstances that never 
arose . " (p. 6.) 
Ryle's "analysing ostensible categoricals into unfulfilled 
conditionals"seems to me·to be a use of Occam's Razor which 
requires a larger defence than he provides. There is a sense in 
which Ryle is even more austere than a Materialist such as J.J.C. 
Smart. For Smart mental properties are reducible to physical 
properties (o~ a neural sort). 
For Ryle they do not exist at all. For me; it is at this 
point that Ryle's account of thinking begins to fail. This 
failure undermines his 'adverbial' account of thinking. Thus, 
when we consider that (CM's "When I do something intelligently, 
i.e. thinking what I am doing, I am doing one thing and not two. 
' . 
My performance has a special procedure or manner, not special 
antecedents·" (CM 32 B & Ned.) becomes TR's "The philospher who, 
'thinly', is at this moment mouthing a sentence or sentence-torso 
may, 'thickly' be, so to speak, jerking a tempting premise-branch 
for use, or else for non-use in an argument which is not yet ready" 
(TR 479my underlining) and then TT's "this thinnest description 
requires a thickening, often a multiple thickening, of ~ perfectly 
specific kind before it amounts to an account of what the person 
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is .trying to aacompZish.''(TT 489-490 my underlining), we see 
how (i) the thin description is not as "thin" as Ryle requires 
it to be (at least in the case of the dis-engaged thinker) and 
(ii) how the "thick" description is not as "thick" as we would 
require. For Ryle a "thin" description picks out the behaviour we 
could photograph or record - the "thick" description specifies 
the mental ascription (specifies the behaviour (X) as a case of 
thinking). 
"Thin" descriptions fail to distinguish the Reductionist's 
problematic two mutterers (and·a Reductionist restricts himself 
to only "thin" descriptions)~ a "thick" description iklt=oduces the 
frame of mind, the skill, and the whatever that finds one of the 
mutterers a thinker. But, does the giving of a thick description 
find the describer necessarily a Duplicationist? It does if "frames 
of mind" necessarily invokes the two-worlds ontology. Our question 
becomes, does an adverbial account of thinking avoid Dup1icationism? 
Alternatively if "frames of mind" et al. are public and 
physical proc~sses then.the. danger is a failure to escape the realm 
of Reductionism. 
To find out whether the middle ground is found we need to 
examine further just what is meant by an 'adverbial' account of 
thinking. 
According to the 'adverbial' account, thinking is not to be 
seen as itself an activity, but rather as how we describe "the way 
or circumstances in which other activities are P,erformed" (RT 78). 
This immediately blocks any acceptance of something like "naked 
thinking" for in a case of "naked thinking" there would not be any 
other activities the way or circumstances of which could be 
described. If we examine a case of Y-ing (thinking) and X-ing 
126. 
(some. neural activity) then though X-ing can occur without thereby 
there being someY-ing going on, some X-ing must go on before Y-ing 
can be said to be present. X-ings are autonomous but Y-ing is 
not (with respect to X-ing). 
Thinking, then, is to be analysed out in terms of a neutral 
activity, let us ssy, X-ing, qualified in a certain way. The neutral 
X-ings must not be verbs of thinking or else the mentality of. 
the activity will still be,present: in.the activity and not be its 
adverbial characterization. Yet these neutral X-ings must still 
be characterizable as mental in some circumstances - they must be 
"open" to mental adverbs (they mu~:ft, · that is, be like the X-ings 
required by the polymorphous account : able to function here as 
thinking ·- there as something else as Urmson would put it "No 
action-content must be a necessary condition of their application" 
(PC 258)). 
But are there cases where we want to say that a person is 
thinking (Y-ing) when there seems to be no neutral X-ing to be 
adverbially qualified as Y-ing? Sibley suggests that there is 
the thoughtful listener,·for one (RT 86ff.) : "The latter is 
certainly thinking, _following the speaker's argument, monitoring, 
trying to accept or reject it as it occurrs. But there seems to 
be no neutral X-ing that he need be doing at all, and hence none 
to be adverbially qualified.-" It is the speaker who develops the 
argument, who manipulates the symbols, and perhaps all the 
thoughtful listener does is approve them. Could the approving be 
the nautral X-ing? ~ibley argues that this silent approving is 
nei.ther an activity nor is it neutral (RT 86-87). 
To begin with it is activities which are to be neutral or not 
·--
so of the two claims, the one that the silent approving is not an 
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activity is the more forceful. Why is silently approving something 
supposed not to be an activity? Sibley does not say (he merely says 
th~t it:is not). Perhaps Sibley wants to hold that silent and 
covert mental hap:penings.cannever be activities -that activities 
only happen in a public world. Aside from the arguments of a 
central-state materialist (which such an assumption must ignore) 
one counter-example to such a view would be any visceral action 
we can perform out of sight of others : flexing our abdomen muscles, 
thinking such thoughts as "I'm going to kill Georg~" to cause our 
adrenalin to flow, and so forth. All of these are covert actions 
or activities we can perform. But I do not think that we need to 
place silent approval on a par with abdomen muscle movements to 
challenge Sibley's assumptions. Silent, covert approving (perhaps 
the saying of "Yes, that's right". to ourselves) is readily 
explicable in terms of saying such a thing out loud and having 
learned to keep our thoughts to ourselves (a la Vygotsky) I would 
suggest that we commonly do term silent approving an activity. 
We are to imagine that "thinking" functions in our language 
rather like the adverbial verb "hurrying" (cf TR). When we say 
that someone is hurrying we still do not know exactly what activity 
he has performed (only that some activity has been performed). 
Further inquiry may revea.l.t,hat this person was running or walking 
at some faster than normal speed. If we command someone to hurry 
they must perform some activity (like walking or running very quickly 
to obey our command. Similarly, if asked to think, Ryle would say 
that we cannot just think (that would be naked thinking): we must 
perform some activity (not "other" activity) in order to meet the 
request. Furthermore t~ese activities we might perform have to be 
such that (a) done in some other context they would not constitute 
thinking and (b) they must be activities which can function as 
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thinking. They are neutral in one sense yet not so neutral as 
all that in another. They are rather like a bolt of cotton 
material : ~sewn up in one fashion it can be a sheet, sewn up in 
another a shirt, yet able to be sewn up into sheets when we want 
this. It is the mannter or circumstance ;in which the material gets 
used that makes a piece of cotton material into a sheet. 
Yet if I am ordered to think I can obey the command, argues 
Sibley (RT 84) and prima facie this suggests that thinking is an 
activity (or a sort perhaps a .Duplicationist has in mind). But this 
will not do for if ordered to hurry I can do that also, by running 
quickly, for instance, and prima facie that supports RylP 1 S 
contention. 
Ontologically the neutral activities are autonomous only in 
their description - for in the world they appear with their 
adverbial "coating" of thinking or whatever else.·My mumbling to 
myself is either thinkingo:r mouth.e;xercising or whatever but not 
·some autonomous and neutral "doing". As Ryle says, it is the 
description which is thick or thin, and not the activity. But 
what is the ontological status of the frames of mind (which provide 
at least in part the manner and circ~stance in which the neutral 
. -
X-ing gets performed)? This has become our recurrent question and 
I have already indicated my answers to it (and hence Wll:Y~;I, with 
Geach, cannot accept Ryle's). 
Ryle has told us two things that they are not : pieces of 
behaviour (activities), or non-physical occurrences. This leaves 
only one possible status : physical occurrences which are not 
pieces of behaviour (activities) or categorical dispositions (to 
perform pieces of behaviour (activities) i.e. the acquiring and 
losing of conditional ·<;lispositions to act in certain ways). 
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It is clear to me f~om TS (125) that intentions and skiZZs 
are likely candidates for "cbnditional d£spositions''. Intentions 
and skills are the very things either overlooked by the 
Reductionists or "categorically mis-inflated into extra, but 
non-muscular Actions" by the Duplicationists. For Ryle intentibns 
and skills "qualify'' (TS 125) our actions, but they are not 
"qua'Jifications that· could be expressed by simple active verbs or 
~im~leadjectives .... They provide what (we do) with its point, its 
credentials, and its force". 
Nor are we to 1magine •-that:there is one "monolithic intention" 
behind thinking one uniform intention and/or skill - rather in 
each case there will l:,e some "particular" .·intention or set of 
intentions (and similarly for skills) (cf, TS 131). If our neutral 
activity (X-ing) is some silent soliloquizing then at leas~ partly 
what makes it "thinking" here (but not there) is some set of 
soliloquizing-intentions (and skills). As Ryle puts it : (TS 133) 
II Then is Thinking just talking to oneself? Or is it 
doing something Extra? Not the former, since Pythagoras 
might let his mind wander and just be reciting under his 
breath random and misc~llaneous things like anecdotes, 
Spanish proverbs, lines from Shakespeare, jingles, and 
bits of the multiplication-table; and then he would not 
be thinking. But when Le Penseur is trying fairly hard to 
solve his problem, then what he says to himself, like what 
you and I say in our discussions of, perhaps, the same. 
problem, is said, more often.than not quite unsuccessfully, 
with the.governing experimental purpose of trying by saying 
it to elicit some forward movement from himself. And this 
is not just saying things to himself, nor yet iS it doing 
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Something Else as Well. It is saying things to himself with a 
special governing purposeJ with a specially directed vigilanceJ 
resolutionJ interest~ readiness for failure~ and so on"(my 
underlining). 
There are the three accounts of thinking neatly opposed 
Reductionism, Duplicationism, and "Adverbialisrn". We remind ourselveE:I 
of our question : what is the ontological status of these specific 
heuristic intentions, these "experimental"' intentions, if you like? 
Ryle has said what they are not : not non-physical occurrences 
(for that would lead to Duplicationism), not physical occurrences 
as either pieces of behaviour (or categorical disposition) (for 
that would lead to Reductionism) - but not what they are. The "peg" 
Ryle told Bryan Magee he has yet to find, would seem to be 
categorical dispositions. 
Put another way, Ryle in the Concept of Mind attacked both 
the "Official Doctrine" (of, in.a sense, Duplicationism) and 
disclaimed being a materialist (in a sense, Reductionism). "The 
materialist says either (1) Minds don't exist, or (2) Any mental 
word is definable in terms of behavioural or physiological 
predicates or both. It is clear that Ryle doesn't want to be held 
to (1). Since on his view the analysis of any mental sentence 
always includes a reference to either a conditional disposition or 
a frame of mind (basically the same things), and since such things 
are not bodies nor parts of bodies nor behaviourr he wants to 
deny (2) as well" 4 
Laird Addis 5 has tried to show why Ryle has no positive 
account - why his "peg" remains unidentified. One standard 
account of "a frame of mind" goes like this : 
4. Addis, L. "Ryle's Ontology of Mind". In Addis, L. and Lewis, D. Moore and Ryle-. 
Two Ontologists. Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 1965 and The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, p.ll. 
5. Ibid.3 p.22-24. 
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II A frame of mind may be a disposition to have certain 
mental events as well as to hav~ the disposition to act in 
certain ways. Such a frame of mind may have connected with 
it certain actual mental events. In the case-at hand driving 
carefully involves, say, not merely lo6~ing at the road 
signs but actually reading them. Or a frame of mind may be 
a second-order disposition, i.e. a disposition to have a 
disposition. For_example, someone may be in such a frame of 
mind that he would become depressed over some slight incident. 11 
{My underlining.) 
Ryle disclaims this kind of account for two reasons : {1) he 
wants to deny the Duplicationist-type of mental event, and (2) for 
Ryle to have a disposition is not to b~ in a certain state ..... 
Yet frames of mind are, as Ryle claims, 6 11 clockable 11 • This would 
seem to make them states of affairs. So he is puzzl~d that they 
cannot ever be identified with observable physical events or 
properties. If frames of mind are 11 Clockable 11 then they must have 
the status of 11 0ccurrences" (but not non-physical.oc;:c:urrences he 
wants to argue, nor the status of behavioural activities or 
categorical dispositions). They are also, unfortunately, 11 unobser-
vables... The predicament is, I hope, sufficiently obvious. Furthermor,l!l 
"a property is for Ryle not an occurrence. Nor is having a property. 
Given the nominalism, 7 therefore, insofar as frames of mind are 
' ·~-. . 
properties, they are non-existent non-occurrences. Yet, once more, 
being clockable, they are existent occurrences 11 • Again, the 
predicament. 
6. cf. CM 139 (B & Ned.) 
7. By "nominalism" Addis means the doctrine that properties do not "exist". 
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I. believe that it is on this failure to provide an account 
of the ontological status of things like "frames of mind", 
intentions", and "skills" that Ryle's adverbial account of 
thinking proves unsatisfactory. The ·question now is,. can the account 
be rescued by our providing such ontological explanations? 
VI. AN ADBERVIAL ACCOUNT RECONSIDERED. 
Ryle's predicament is plain enough : how to avoid both 
Reductionism and/or Duplicationism. As Sibley puts it (RT 91) 
"it is not easy to decide, from Ryle's writings, what exactly he 
does hold as between, roughly, the reductionist view that thinking 
just is the occurrence of ordered and relevant X-ings (and the 
readiness to produce others) appropriate to time, place and 
circumstances, and the view that the occurrences of such relevant 
X-ings is normally the outcome of, and explained by, one's being 
on the qui vive and attentive (to put it "adverbially") or one's 
thinking ("to put it :verbally"). " 
Sibley suggests that where Ryle may have essentially "gone 
wrong" is that he has a procession or process concept of activity 
(RT 93). Certainly in the papers by Ryle published since RT such 
a concept of an activity seems in force. Ryle talks about "orderly 
or disordersly processions, the objective, communicable Meanings 
of those soliloquized words, phrases, and sentences." (TS 129) for 
instance. Ryle wants to hold that the only activity-cum-procession 
present when we are thinking is that which can be thinly described 
(the neutral X-ings) : that there is no Duplicationist and occult 
further activity-cum-procession corresponding to our thick 
description : Reductioniststalk about a process that really exists, 
but the process talked about by a Duplicationist is no more than 
a myth. But the procession of the Reductionist account cannot 
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be thinking (end of story) for a non-thinker can also exhibit 
exactly the same proce.ssf.qn. Hence the "adverbial" account even 
if it does leave certain ontological "black holes". 
Sibley asks us to consider a non-process account of what an 
activity might be 11 i.e. an episodic account. 11 The weight-lifter 
who for several seconds holds a heavy weight perfectly still above 
his head is not for those seconds doing nothing, though his 
activity is not of the same sort as when raising or lowering the 
weight." (RT 94.) This would be an episode- but, as Sibley points 
out (RT 95), of the "task" not the "achievement 11 sort. If Ryle 
has shown that thinking is not an acti~ity of a process sort (as 
both the Reductionists andthe Duplicationists want to hold) then 
he has not thereby further shown that thinking is not :m <::.cti vi ty, 
if we allow the possibility of Sibley's episodic account of "activi:t::-1 ;!1 
as applicable to thinking. 
Sibley's example of the weight-lifter (he gives one other, of 
a man holding chest-expanders apart ~ i.e. substantially the same 
sort of example) does not really satisfactorily make the 
distinction between process-type and episode-type activities. 
In a different context one·· might think of a process as something 
that happens over a period of time and an episode as what happens 
at a time. But this will not·apply to the weight-lifter example : 
in ordinary English one might speak of the weight-lifter (or chest-
expander) example as one qf a process - in which the weight (or 
the chest-expander) is held still. 
We might make the distinction more clearly (and successfully) 
by considering a distinction between "thinking that .••• " (either 
a state or an episodic occurrence) and "thinking about •.•. " (an 
activity process). Thus "I thought that the Communists would win" 
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as against "I .. a,m thinking about the war". Both of these seem 
clockable, if' only,:.;roughly so .. But note the I at a time ...... I and 
'over a time .... ' terminology. If we accept Sibley's episodic 
suggestion then even. "thinking about: .... " will get analysed out 
not as a process buf.. /:i::<crthei· as an episode (of· a task sort) , or, 
perhaps,· processioif of episodes.. Indeed it will .be important 
to distinguish processes from processions of episodes. 
Does an "episodic" account of thinking succeed in avoiding 
the problems besetting the other three accounts? 
(1) Distinguishing mental episodes from non-mental pro.:-asses. 
Again we imagine our two mutterers only one of whom is thinking 
(they appear indistinguishable). Presumably the distinction is 
made on the basis of the context, the intentions, and the relevant 
frames of mind, on the adverbial account. 
Presurnabl~, on an "episodic" account the distinction becomes 
one between a man who is just muttering (a process) and another 
whose muttering (a process), because of the presence of certain 
frames of mind, intentions, and skills being utilized, is termed 
an episode (of thinkihgk~ 
It is not clear from Sibley's suggestion whether the quality 
of "being an episode" r~sidei in the description or the actual 
behaviour. If it resides in the description then we would want 
to say that in the world all that occurs are processes and this 
would seem to amount to a modified form of Reductionism (with all 
the problems for that account raised again). 
If we say that episodes occur in the world, the stronger of 
the two claims, ·then we must face the problem of assigning some 
ontological status to such occurrences.· I have already indicated 
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how I would face such a task. 
(2) On the ontological itatus of mental episodes. 
First, I would want to argue that 
Frames of mind are sOmething -like attitudes indicating the 
p . 
dispositional analysis. As against Ryle (on dispositions) I am 
a realist and hold that their attribution implies a categorical 
(ontological) basis - some state or other. Furthermore I would 
want so say (with reference to the episodic nature of the 
ascription) that it is not the frame of mind which is clockable 
but rather the being in a frame of mind which we might time. 
States (ev~nt.~·;,~Jn· 'the world) have beginnings and endings hence 
they must be, at least in principle, clockable. 
Secondly, I want to suggest that 
they are normally "unobservables", but this is not an 
objection for even Ryle accepts that Le Penseur may be saying 
things to himself in his head in such a fashion that another 
person would be unable to verify this. 
Thirdly, we can say that 
neither are they non-physical "occult" events or occurrences, 
nor are they physical occurrences such as brain states (for that 
would be to court all the problems which plague a central-state 
materialism) • 
Let us consider such a mental episode (some "thinking) as 
Le Penseur might be engaged in. Let us further say that it is 
what we would want to call. abstract, conceptual thought. Le Penseur 
was not born with the ability to perform such types of thinking. 
Rather he has learned how to (a la Vygots·ky and Piaget' s stages 
of cognitive development, pe.rhaps). Thus his thinking depends on 
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the e~istence of a vast range of mental habits and skills and 
"ways of going about it"· with ,,.which he has had success before and 
is disposed to try again, even if in new combinations. (It is, 
of course, the exercise of these habits and skills which 
constitute a mental episode.) Under "skills" I would include acquire~ 
abilities to use such symbol systems as some natural language 
(for I have argued elsewhere (e.g. Chapter III, section IV.) that 
abstract, conceptual thought must involve the use of symbols of 
some sort). 
If "frames of mind" are to be analysed in terms of these sorts 
of things, then my understanding of what thinking is (as involving 
an episodic notion of mental activity) must be in one sense 
Reductionist - for "adult" mental occurrences are to be :seen 
as developmentally dependent on the·public and observable 
cognitive operations of the young child. Their ontological status 
is thus dependent on the ontological status of these "childhood" 
mental operations. These ar~ essentially public and observable 
and take the form of sensori-motor episodes of behaviour. Yet even 
at this 11 primitive" level I would face essentially the same 
predicament as Ryle, the resolution of which involves ascriptions 
of categorical dispositions. We could speculate, though I will 
not proceed to do so here, on how these might be tied (at this 
. . 
level) to innate reflexes that the child is born with. 
Yet my feelings of predicament may stem from a false sense of 
simplicity. I believe that I share with Ryle a predeliction for 
Occ·am' s Razor : a certain desir~ . for an elegant, or if you like, 
"black and white" ontology. I am reminded, therefore, of a 
passage from J.L. Austin's "Intelligent Behaviour : A Critical·· 
. . . B 
Review of The Concept of Mind : 
B. .In Wood, O.P. and Pitcher, G. (eds) Ry.Ze, London, Macmillan, 1970, pp. 47-48. 
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" Those who, like Professor Ryle, revolt against a 
dichotomy to which they have been once addicted, commonly go over 
to maintain that only one of the alleged pair of opposites really 
.exists at all. And so he, though he does not believe the body 
is a machine, does believe that it alone, and not the "ghost", 
exists : he preaches with the fervour of a proselyte a doctrine 
of "one world". Yet what has ever been gained by this favourite 
philosophical pastime of counting worlds? And why does the answer 
always turn out to be one or two, or some similar small, well-
rounded, philosophically acceptable number? Why if there are 
nineteen of anything, is. it not philosophy?" 
A sentiment echoed by Laird Addis 9 : 
II There is in Ryle's thought a tendency .toward simplistic 
polarization which·~f£e~~s his general ontology as well as his 
philosophy of mind. The only ontological alternatives he conceives 
are Aristotelianism in its most nominalistic variant on the one 
hand and Platonism on the other. Either only individual substances 
"exist" or "abstract" entities do. Surely this is simplistic 
polarization. Neither Platonism nor nominalistic Aristotelianism 
is adequate. As for general ontology, so for the philosophy of mind. 
Either thereare no minds at all or one must, in addition to acts, 
countenance ideas, concepts, judgements, and what have you. Again, 
neither extreme is an adequate philosophy of mind. " 
One is perhaps inclined not so much to some third realm as 
. . ·- . 
simply a _less dualistic 1 .and larger one. Perhaps all that has been 
shown is that ei.thef-or ·philosophies of mind with respect to the 
giving of some account of thinking are doomed to failure. They are 
9. Op. cit., 98~99. 
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like cut and dried moulds into which the beast just will not go. 
If the 'adverbial' account as expounded by Ryle has also failed 
it is because it too is pervaded with an assumption of .Polarity. 
VII. AND A PRECEPT FOR TEACHERS OF 'J~HE DEAF. 
It has emerged that correct frames of mind, valid intentions, 
relevant skills (including skills in the use of symbol systems), 
and appropriate contexts all contribute to the occurrence of 
episodes of thinking. All of these are to a greater or lesser extent 
the products of learning. 
I am paralelling the sentiments of Austin and Addis when I say 
that the search for one all-inclusive precept for the teachin~ of 
deaf children is to take far too simplistic ~ view of the matter. 
The teaching of deaf children will need to take into account the 
complexity of the goal they at least partially have in mind : 
enabling the deaf to engage in abstract, conceptual thought. This 
will involve teaching a language (as one powerful symbol system) 
. 10 
but perhaps other symbol systems as well. Hans Furth has 
experimented with teaching deaf children logical notation and its 
use in logical operations, for instance, and this would seem to 
be but one area deserving of further exploration. But further to 
that it will involve working on other skills utilized in such a 
level of thought, the inculcation of appropriate attitudes, the 
fostering of relevant intentions, and the like. In a word one 
foresees a whole matrix of interrelated precepts for the teaching 
of deaf children. It would be too easy to concentrate solely on 
either verbal or non-verbal thought processes. 
10. cf. Furth, H. Experiment 11 in Thinking Without Language : Psychological 
Implications of Deafness; and Appendix I : A Thinking Laboratory for Deaf 
chi)jdren in Deafness and Learning : A Psychological Approach. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The following chapter states in a summary fashion the 
most important theoretical conclusions of this work. 
-odOoo:-
. .• 
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When I began this investigation I hardly foresaw that the 
single question : "How should we go about providing an· account 
o£ thinking?" would lead to such far-reaching implications. 
Faced with apparently conflicting preceptS ~n how we should 
approach the teaching of deaf children I asked myself a series 
of related questions : 
(i) Just what are the assumptions about thinking that 
lie behind these precepts? 
(ii) .Are these the only accounts of thinking we might 
provide? 
(iii) What are the criteria for a good conceptual tool 
for the specific purposes of teaching deaf children~ 
(iv) What are the logical relations of the ideas at work 
within these various accounts of thinking? 
(v) To what extent a~e we to say tha~ the deaf can 
think? 
(vi) What sort of a methodological precept should we 
accept as teachers of the deaf? 
I would not pretend that T have been able to ansv1er all 
these questions - rather, it would seem that the value of such 
an investigation as this may not be so much in definite answers to 
perennial problems as in relevant questions for future investi-
gations. 
Since Plato discussed the_ question of what account we should 
provide for thinking philosophers have tended to. use the deaf as 
a test-case for their theories. Our understanding of the condition 
of deafness is relatively modern and those who are not intimately 
concerned with the treatine~t .and education of the deaf are often 
left with an understanding of their condition which is the logical 
result of the rather vague theoretical notions and assumptions 
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of the past. I hope I have indicated some of the pit-falls which 
beset this philosophers' traditional test-case for th~ories 
about thinking. 
Yet it is not just coincidence that philosophers from Plato 
to Wi ttgenstein should have givi~n consideration to a group of people 
suffering a disabling condition which largely denies them access 
to society's verbal language. To the extent that the deaf can 
develop as thinkers - then to that extent our notions of an intimate 
relationship between thought and language are called into question -
and theories which challenge such a relationship seem to find 
empirical support. It is language (and not something else such as 
mental imagery) and thinking which has provided the main point 
of dispute in our attempts to give an account of thinking. Indeed,. 
when other modalities such as mental imagery are introduced into 
the discussion there is usually an immediate retreat to a 
consideration of abstract, conceptual thinking as if this move were 
sufficient to bring the discussion back to a consideration of the 
relationship between thought and language. For most of us, it 
would seem it is this relationship which seems to demand our 
attention. 
It is apparent that the relation of thought and language 
remains unresolved. To ask the question "Are thinking and language 
(or public and inner speech) the same or seperate things?" is in 
one sense to ask "What are thinking and language?" If thinking 
and language are not identical (as the Duplicationists assert) 
then how are they related : can we have thinking without speech 
and speech without thinking? Of course, if thought and language 
are identical (as a Reductionist argues), then the problem of 
their interrelation ceases to exist. We are concerned with the 
deaf simply because they seem to be thinkers without a language. 
144. 
1 In his paper "Wordless Thoughts" Zeno Vendler attempts 
to reject the view that thought (or thinking) consists of speech 
of an internal sort carried on by the thinker in one or other 
natural language with which he is familiar. Vendler links this 
view with Plato on the basis of a passage in the Theactetus 
(189e-19oa - which is also found, although with some changes, 
in the Sophist, 263e-164a). The key words are contained in 
Socrate.s' suggestion that "when the mind is thinking, it is 
simply talking to itself, asking questions. and answering 
them ...... " (189e). Vendler explicitly declines any historical 
claim about Plato's 'real' theory of thinking, but he does claim 
that the Theaet~t·UJ3 passage presents the view he wishes to 
reject : on· that basis he calls it the "Platonic Theory". (It is 
open to question whether this is an accurate interpretation of 
the Theaetetus passage. The context of the passage is the problem 
of false (mental) judgements (if and how possible). Plato's idea 
of thinking as inner speech amounts to the suggestion that the 
logical properties of (mental) judgements correspond, at least 
in many r~spects, to the logical properties of (linguistic) 
assertions. It is difficult to see how the "Platonic Theory" 
can be extracted from that.) It might be more accurate to say 
that the Theaetetus passage suggests the "Platonic Theory" rather 
than that it contains it. 
For a.<::ontrasting view of the relation of language to thought 
Vendler.turns to Aristotle (in De Interpretatione 16a for example). 
This is the thesis that (a)"spoken words are the symbols of mental 
experience .•••.. " and that (b) while human beings.have different 
languages "the mental experiences which these (different speech 
sounds) directly symbolize, -are the same for all, as are also 
those things of which our experiences are the images ... The 
1. Vendler, z. "Wordless Thoughts". An unpublished paper presented at the World 
Congress of Anthropology Chicago, 1973. 
Aristotelian thesis st?-ted here clearly contains much more 
than the negation of the "Platonic Theory". It implies {i) 
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not only that thought is independent of the use of a language, 
but also of a thinker's having a language. In addition it contains 
(ii) a theory about the relation between thought and language and 
(iii) makes a claim about the common character of human mental 
experience and the objects of such experience. 
Actually we might wish to go further than a mere refutation 
of the "Platonic Theory" and argue that (as it turns out Vendler 
does) thought is both independent of the use of a language and 
of a thinker's having a language - rather different claims. 
'The emancipation of thought from language was continued in 
Mediaeval scholasticism. One finds, fo~ instance, in a realist 
such ~Thomas Aquinas, three modes of existence : in the thought 
of God, in things in their finite form, and in the thoughts of 
man (irrespective of words). Perhaps the distinction remains in 
Abelard's dictum : "Language is generated by the intellect and 
generates it" ("Sermo generatur ab intellectu, et generat 
intellectum"). This is not unlike Bacon's statement that "People 
believe that their reason rules over their words, but sometimes 
it happens that the words turn their power against reason". 2 
One begiqs to see two currents of thought. In one thinking 
is seen as tied to sense perception while in the other (which we 
might associate with the 17th century rationalists) thinking is 
seen as tied to something that transcends mere sense perception 
of the world - i.e. human consciousness : providing the Cartesian 
assertion "I· think, therefore I am". The next step is probably 
2. Bacon, F. Novum Organum quoted in Sokolov, A.N. Inner Speech and Thought. 
New York, Plenum Press, 1972. p.l5. 
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a dualism with speech associate with the body (the speech 
musculature) and thinking with the soul (or the mind) . 
The separation of thought and language continues with Locke 
who seems to have admitted the possibility of "speechless" thought 
when he writes of our ability fo compose a "mental sentence" althougl 
he writes that "it is very difficult to discourse on mental sent-
ences".3 
The opposite trend is perhaps most evident in the rather 
naive view of Max MUller who argues in his Science of Thought 
that "There is no reason without language. There is no language 
without reason." (The epigraph of the book.) 
What then is the true account of thinking - MUller's view 
that "Language is thought, and thought is language" - or the 
Piagetian view which finds in the development of thought and 
speech both elements of "divergence" and "convergence" and the 
related notion that genetically thought is antecedent to speech? 
I first considered the Reductionist account of thinking and 
began by attempting to·sketch in the context in which it may 
have arisen. A naive version of Reductionism might attempt to 
identify thinking with sub-vocal speech. Watson, for instance, 
seems to have sited thinking in the movements of the larynx. A 
logical extension of this would be a physicalist account of 
thinkin~ : thinking is to be identified (primarily) with brain 
states or processes. Such an ident·ification might be made on 
either empirical or logical grounds. Certainly the former type 
of identification trades on the relative infancy of neurophysiology 
3. also quoted in Sokolov, Op. cit. 3 p. 17. Sokolov is quoting from a 
Russian translation, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1960. pp.559-560, of An Essay 
ConcePning Human Understanding. 
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Both o£ these types of identification call for a radical change 
in how we normally talk about thinking but in defense the advocate 
of such a view would argue that his is the simplest explanation 
we can provide. It is not to be denied that the attraction of Occam's 
Razor remains strong. 
Another form of Reductionism presents an argument along the 
following lines. Abstract thinking requires, by definition, the 
manipulation of symbols. What we mean by a language just is a symbol 
system- hence, at least in the case of abstract thinking, thinking 
must be identified with the use of a language. Of course, a 
Duplicationist might also agree that the (best) medium for abstract 
thinking is a language (inner or public speech). This thesis 
becomes Reductionist when it is argued that thinking just is the 
employment of such a "medium". Here the identity is more likely 
to be seen as a logical one. I have tried to sketch out a form of 
.such an account which (at least at this level of thinking) 
identifies thinking (+) with its expression (or ''medium") (e) 
(providing the result(T) ) but holds back from a second step of 
identifying (T) with any physical processes (that is, a form of 
Reductionism which avoids Physicalism). 
Before attempting a further consideration of such an account 
I considered a number of related topics which help to clarify 
the issue. First, following the work of Vygotsky, I considered 
how we might get from the learning of a public language to the use 
of inner speech. Secondly I argued that language may not be the 
'Sole available form of symbolization available to the abstract 
thinker. Thirdly I argued against the possibility of 'naked' or 
'pure' thinking. Thinking does require at least~ medium even 
if there may be an element of medium interchangeability or 
148. 
"plasticity'. This provides further support to the idea that 
abstract thinkers might employ some symbol system other than a 
natural language. Thus the deaf, despite a relative lack of 
language sophistication, need not necessarily be denied the. 
possibility of thinking abstractly. 
The Reductionist argument that the concept of thinking can 
be fully explicated in terms of its expression (that thinking is 
nothing but such things as inner speech) essentially rests on an 
argument of sufficient explanation : that to identify thinking 
with its expression leaves nothing unaccounted for. It is this 
assertion that Duplicationists dispute. If successful in this 
Duplicationism provides an argument against Reductionism. 
Duplicationists a~gue that Reductionism is ontologically 
inadequate : theirs is a two-world view (against Reductionism's 
(observable in principle) one). A Duplicationist would argue 
that our account of thinking requires certain (mental) "things" 
which might well be seen as having the status of· theoretical 
entities (even though they are empirically unobservable our theory 
requires their presence). A case of 'naked' thinking would in 
principle reveal these (mental) entities but I have argued that 
such a thing is logically irnpossible._A Duplicationist might 
concede this and yet wish to assert that thinking (as a separate 
(mental) activity) is logic~~ly distinct from and theoretically 
independent of the ability to speak a language or to perform other 
external (or internal e.g. inner speech) behaviour (even though 
public behaviour is the evidence of thinking for obseroveros). 
Applied to the case of intelligent speech such an account 
.would hold that thinking is a distinct (mental) process eifher 
prior to or concurrent with verbal utterance. Thus intelligent 
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speech involves two distinct processes : thinking and verbal 
utterance (the same applies to other intelligent behaviour such 
as exhibited by Ryle's tennis-player). 
Similarly, in the case of some instance of inner speech we 
are to logically distinguish the activity of using language in some 
covert fashion (as the medium of thought) and another logically 
distinct "activity" of thinking i.tself. 
Once again the deaf need not be denied the possibility of 
abstract thought i.e. thinking is seen as independent of knowing 
or necessarily using a language (some other symbolic medium might 
be employed) . 
Since both Reductionism and Duplicationism need not deny 
the deaf the chance 0~ thinking abstractly (even if they lack a 
language) - albeit for different reasons - one result of this 
thesis is to highlight the efforts of a Hans Furth to teach deaf 
children symbol systems other than language. Unfortunately our 
schools place language skills at a premium. The child who fails 
to gain sufficient of these skills (be it for reasons of sensory 
handicap, social disadvantage, or whatever) tends to be viewed 
as a failure or "poor learner" and the tendency is to view such 
children as unlikely candidates for other than manual training. 
Such stereotype thinking tends to deny such chidlren the oppor-
tunities they deserve and which they might be able to take advantage 
of through other than language-dependent means. This is perhaps 
the main message to teachers in Wachs' and Furth's Piaget's 
Theory in Practice : Thinking Goes to School.· 
As regards the vehicle-cargo model a Duplicationist would 
say that it is misleading to suggest that we have to look for the 
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occurrence of some separate activity of thinking (the occurrence 
of the vehicle is the occurrence of the cargo - but they are 
not one and the same (identical) -the two are logically distinct). 
One can speak of the 'cargo' in an abstract sense to indicate what 
is common to the different occurrences of the same or equivalent 
type of mental symbol, viz. the same sense. It is this that 
a Reductionist (in saying that thinking is nothing but (is 
identical with) its expression) overlooks or fails to explicate. 
The sense of mental symbols (or of verbal symbols for that matter) 
is not an occurrence or an event, i.e. 'cargo' used in this way 
is not an event. So to look for some occurrence further to the 
occurrence of the mental symbols which constitute thinking is 
necessarily fruitless ~ a logical mistake - ju~t as it is also 
a logical mistake to look for nothing else but the occurrence of 
some vehicle. Duplicationism is not Reductionist in the standard 
sense of identifying thinking with some non-mental process; nor 
is it "Reductionist" in the sense of tying think_ing to language. 
If we accept the Duplicationist assertion that there is 
more to thinking than a Reductionist would admit (as I think we 
must) then (a) we have an argument against Reductionism (one 
which I feel is largely successful) but (b) we have to go on to 
ask whether Duplicationism, as it stands, is a logically consistent 
account of thinking. Unfortunately it is not for it can be shown 
that Duplicationism results in an infinite regress. 
The regress arises when a Duplicationist attempts to provide 
some account of the relationship between this overlooked (by 
Reductionism) aspect of thinking and the vehicle or expression. 
Suppose that at the time of the occurrence of some expression or 
vehicle (e) we have a belief that it is related to some such 
151. 
further element - the theoretical entity required by a "full" 
account of thinking- let us say (+). (If we did not have such 
a belief then how would we know what 'cargo' (e) carried?) On this 
assertion, :Eor (e) to be the vehicle of some(+), both (+)must 
in fact be present and there must be some (e) to which (+) is 
related present at the same time. Yet to maintain the relation (R) 
- (+)R(e) = we must be able to think of (+) other than by means 
of the occurrence of (e). This would seem to require the occurrence 
of some (e2) (for we have denied the possibility of 'naked' 
thoughts), hence (+)R(e2), but this generates an infinite regress 
for now we shall need some (+)R(e3) to make sense of (+)R(e 2 ) and 
so on, ad infinitum. 
Given the logical inconsistency of Duplicationism we look 
to some third account of thinking which (a) like Duplicationism 
provides an account of that aspect of thinking overlooked by 
Reductionism but which (b) yet avoids the infinite regress. 
Hence in Chapter IV I turned to a consideration of Ryle's 
'adverbial' account of thinking. 
A·ctually, Ryle presents three successive ac·counts of· thinking, 
each, in a sense, building upon the one(s) that have gone before 
(though.~ the distinction between the first two is not explicit in 
Ryle's discussion). 
First Ryle argues that thinking is not just one essential 
activity but rather that "thinking" refers to a diverse range of 
activitie.s much in the way that "gardening" refers to lawn-mowing, 
hedge-clipping, seed cultivation, composting, etc. This (multiple-
activity) account of thinking identifies an element of heterogeneity. 
I have argued that thinking may involve an essential ingredient : 
at least at the level of abstract thinking -·symbol manipulation. 
152. 
Secondly Ryle argues that these diverse activities which 
con~titute "thinking" must be neutral vis-a-vis thinking (the poly-
morphous account of thinking) - that is, that they must be 
performable by both thinkers or non-thinkers. Ryle makes a 
·-
distinction betw~en.~-"engaged 11 and 11 disengaged" thinkers. Engaged 
. --·- :--·- .. --· . 
thinkers are exemplified in a thoughtful tennis-player whose 
strokes, movements around the court, and suchlike are the neutral-
activities (or X-ings) which might be performed equally by a 
thoughtless player. The dis-engaged thinker is the man who is 
pondering, meditating, composing, calculating, or something 
similar (that sort of thinker captured in Rodin's sculpture 
Le Penseur). Now it is difficult to see how these might be neutral 
X-ings for the man who is pondering seems to be necessu.rily 
thinking) • 
But these two accounts constitute Ryle's "last resort ... 
More importantly, and thirdly, Ryle offers his adverbial account 
of thinking. 
In the adverbial account thinking is to be analysed out in 
termsof the neutral and diverse activities of the two previous 
accounts quaZified- in a certain way (thus the adverbial account 
already faces the objections to the two previous accounts). 
Thinking is not to be seen as itself an activity but rather 
as the mariner or context in which these neutral and diverse 
activities get performed (hence the 11 adverbial 11 terminology). 
Two objections can be made against such an account ·of 
thinking. The 11 neglected" aspects of thinking which Duplicationists 
accuse Reductionists of failing to consider in Ryle's account become 
conditional dispositions. This amounts to a policy of analysing 
the ostensible categoricals (+) of Duplicationism into conditionals 
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which might be (but need not be) cashed in episodes of thinking. 
In a sense Ryle and the Reducitonists agree in that they want to 
purge from their ontology the theoretical (mental) enti·ties which 
form the essence of Duplicationism. The problem with such a 
programme is that it results in an inadequate account of thinking 
the cure for which is the assertion of these dispositions as 
categorical. 
Secondly Ryle's assumes a process account of "activity" 
(he wants to argue against any procession of mental acts or 
occurrences). But if we allow an episode account of "activity .. 
then our thinking can be analysed in terms of some activity 
of thinking such a.s the use of inner speech, the employment of 
which constitutes an episode of thinking. 
Ontologically Dupli¢ationism, Reductionism, and the Adverbial 
~ . - _·;_.' -~.. - ..... ~... -.. - .· 
account of thinking·· a.l]_··o:~-~rate·. in a polarized universe (they all 
·:.-':·=- ... 
accept the existence o~ odcurrence of observable in principle 
·activities such as having mental images, saying things to 
ourselves, and so forth - they than dispute the existence of another 
element which casts these activities into the mould of thinking -
Reductionism identifies this with' the expression, Duplicationism 
makes of it something else, and Ryle regards it as an adverbial 
characterization). If we abandon the dispute between one 11World" 
or two we begin to see our way clear to an account of thinking 
which accepts as many,ontological "entities" as our theory 
requires (and which it· can defend) . This is to seek some balance 
between a principle of parsimony and a need for an adequate 
explanation of the thing we call "thinking ... 
Let us conclude by again asking ourselves "What sort of a 
methodological precept should we accept as teachers of the .deaf." 
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My answer is that what we need is not one precept but rather a 
whole matrix of injunctions and pedagogical exhortations sufficient 
to cover the complexity of the human behaviour (thinking) we hope 
to develop ~n deaf children. It is certainly a handicap to be 
largely denied language - we should not add another by denying 
such children the chance to become "thinkers" in the fullest 
sense of that word simply because we have written them off as 
(linguistically) inadequate for such levels of human behaviour. 
-ooOoo-
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1. PORTER, S. "Is thought possible without language? 
Case of a deaf mute." Princeton Review. January, 
1881 : 104-128. 
'(P,aragraphs 1-2, 5-7 and 9-15 of Mr Ballard's narration 
were reprinted in JAMES, W. The Principles of Psychology. 
Volume I. London, Macmillan, 1907. pp.266-269.) 
On the basis of this evidence James argues that 'a deaf 
and dumb man can weave his tactile and visual images into 
a system of thought quite as effective and rational as 
that of a word-user .•••• it makes little or no difference 
in what sort of mind-stuff, in what quality of imagery, •• 
••.••• thinking goes on." pp.266-269. 
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PRINCETON REVIEW~ January, l88l.Porter. 
IS THOUGHT POSSIBLE \VITI-TOUT LANGUAGE?· 
CASE OF A DL:-\F-1\IUTE. 
·T· HE relation of tl10u£;ht to language has Cn£;agcd the atten-
tion of philosophical thinkers from the earliest times. 
And now, in the discu!>~;ion of the Danrinian theory of evolu-
tion, it has come into new prominence, in its beariug upon the 
question of the diffcrc:lCC hcl\recn the brute <lllU the human 
intelligence. This theory aamits a difference only in degree, 
and not in hnd. It docs not take the q uitc extreme nominal-
istic ground, which m;-~kcs a name, or word, to be. the essence of 
a general notion,-sincc it claims for the brutes some sort of 
cap;1city for general ideas ;-but it fully adopts the dii:tum of 
Coudillac, that the a1·t of reasoning is reducible to "!'art de bim 
parter," is nothing other than "1ou· lrulgue bim faitc." Lan-
guage it vi·cws as an oJ-gtliWil, which serves, however, not as an 
instrument employed by the reason, but which constitutes, in 
its working, the reason itself. In short, the intellectual superi-
ority of man depends essentially on the possession of language, 
and language is the procluctof faculties which man shares with 
the brute, only more highly developed in him. (Darwin: Dcst·c;tt 
of 11lall, Part I., Chaps, H. and VI.; Huxley: flume, Ch. V.) 
I>rof. Max 1\1iiller has contcuclecl most strenuously, and with 
a profuse expenditure of erudition, that the nature of language, 
as disclosc:J by tbe rescatchcs of comparative philology, furnishes 
a triumphant rcfutati~n of the Darwinian views. The earliest 
roots arc grounded in general conceptions: the names of objects, 
such as lwrse, man, bird, tree, etc., .spring from roots significant 
of some general attribute o( ·the species or class to which they 
arc applied. Not only is a general conception the essential 
constituent of the word, but it is, he maintains, impossible of 
existence except as rcalizctl in and by the wonJ__:ft is the life of 
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which the articulate or other symbol is tltL: l>ndy. And be dra1\·:; 
the conclusion that the cap:tbility for gcJH.:r;tl concc:pt ions is a 
special faculty, difkring in kind from anything manifested by 
the brutes, and therdorenot to be accounted for as the 1•roJuct 
of evolution. 
The argument, however, amounts to just this: that, hecausc 
language begins with general ideas, thcrdore general ideas lH.:gin 
with language. It is pbinly a 1/(JJt stql(i/ur. As an argument, 
it i~, indeed, worse than a failure: the very interesting and 
instructive facts adduced by the learned professor may fairly be 
taken so as even to lend their weight to the opposite side. 
vVhat a thing_ begins with may be what it springs out of, and 
may have prior and independent existence. 
In this and in o~lter similar discussions, reference is made to-
the case of infant children and to that of uninstructed deaf-
mutes. On the Darwinian view, children and deaf-mutes cannot 
be accorded the possession of any mental power or any form 
of mental action that distinguishes man from the brutes. 
(Huxley: flume, Ch. V.) Prof. 11Iax l\hilier is, so far, at one 
\vith the Darwinians, in that he ranks the mental processes of 
children and deaf-mutes in the same Class with those of the 
b~ute animals. Thus he says (in writings already referred to), 
"The uninstructed deaf and dumb, I believe, have never given 
·any signs of reason, in the true sense of the word." "Brutes" 
are "irrational being-s simply in the sense of devoid of forming 
and handling general concepts." And," according to thosewho 
have best studied the subject, it is perfectly true that deaf and 
dumb persons, if left entirel)r to themselves, have no concepts, 
except such as can be expressed by less perfect symbols-and 
it is only by being taught that they acquire some kind of con-
ceptual thought and language." . 
Philosophers of the ultra-nominalist school would, of course, 
concur in relegating the mental processes of untaught deaf-
mutes to the same category with those of the brute creation. 
Archbishop \Vhatcly e_xprcsses their views in words as follows:-
·"A "deaf-mute, before ltc has been taught a languag-e,-cithcr the fingcr-
langungc or reacling,-cannot carry on a train of reasoning, any more than 
a brute,· He dilTcr:>, indeed, from a brute in possessing the mental capa-
bility of employing language; but he can no more make usc of that capo..-
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bility, till he i;; int""'"'"""i"n uf snnw sy.-avrn of arbitrary general signs, than 
apcrsnn bnm !>lind fn>In cataract can make usc of his capacity of sccinr; till 
the cataract is n·III0\"<'<1. You will lind, arcnnlin~ly, if you question a deaf-
mute who b;t.~ lJ,·:·n tau~ht lan~uage afta l!;l\·ing grown ·Up, that no such 
thin•' as a train of r•·asoning had C\-er pas~cd through his mind before he wa~ ~au~l1t." (\\"h;,tcly: J~,·.fs,ms on J.',·o~.,W:/11.:;', I., Vlll.) 
Tht.: importanct.: of an accurate ascertainment of the factc 
comcrning the mind of the uninstructed Jeaf-mute is suffici-
ently c\·ident. The following- narrative is offered as a contribu-
.tio11 fqr.Jh;\s~cnd. The writer, 1\Jr. l\lc!ville Ballard, has been for 
years ~u·1 instructor in the Columbi:l Institution for Deaf-Mutes, 
at \Vashintiton, D: C., and is a graduate of the National Dc:1f. 
1\lute College, the higher department of the same in:titution .. 
It will be seen that lw himself had, in his early ycars,-with no 
power of clothing his thought in any form of languagc,~put 
clearly before his mind the question concerning the first begin-
ning of thin[;s; and haJ even come t0 a vague notion of a power, 
of a nature undefined, as directing the motions of the heavenly 
bodies. 
The case is an extraordinary one. The only instance on 
record that makes even the faintest approach to this is ·given in an 
article by the btc lJr. II. P. Peet, in the American Amw!s of t!te 
Deaf ami /)umb, Y ol. VIII., (Hartford, I SSG), entitled "Notions 
of the Deaf aml Dumb before Instruction." The article reports 
the answers to a series of questions that had been proposed 
to the more advanced pupils of the New York Institution for 
the Deaf and Dumb; and to this among others: "Did you ever 
try to reflect about the origin of the world or its inhabitants?" 
One of the replies, by a girl fifteen years old before coming 
under instruction, was, "I tried to think, but could not do it. .I 
thought the inhabitants came from the South." Another one 
wrote, "It is impossible for me to assert whether I had ever 
tried," &c. All the othc'ts. s·tated that they ktd not, or to the 
best of their recollection had not, reflected at all upon the sub-
ject. The Twmty-sccond /lmnwl Rt"}ort of tke Amcrica1t Asy. 
lttm (l Iartford, 1838) gives replies from pupils to a similar set of 
qucstio1~s. To this one, "Had you reasoned or thought about 
the origin of the world, or the beings and things it contains?" 
all the answers were decided· negatives. 
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One well-authenticated instance is as goou as a hundred for 
the purpose of determining the gc.neral capacity of the human 
mind in the circHmstanc..:s ·supposed. l\1 r. lbllard is known, to 
those who know ]Jim at an, as a person of more than common 
clearness of perception anJ accuracy and vividness of recollec-
tion, as well as of a most scrupulous rcga1d for truth; and has 
been especially .cardul to include, in this statement, nothing of 
which he was at all doubtful. There "·as apparently, in his 
case, a somewhat precocious development of the n.:l1ective facul-
ties; which, tho otherwise unaided, may have found a favor-
ing circumstance in. the isolation which shut hi:n in to the com-
pany of his own thoughts. It is to be here remembered that 
the education. of ~eaf-:nutes commences ordinarily in immature 
age-commonly notvadays at as early an age as six or eight 
years,-and it is to be consicJr.rcd that such glimpses of thought 
in this direction as may not improbably have been experienced 
in some instances would not be likely to be retained in the rec-
ollection of after years. 
vVe arc not unfrcqucJ1tly told by educated deaf-mutes how, 
in their early years, the more striking and inaccessible objects 
and phenomena of nature awakened t.hcir wonder and curiosity, 
and were made the subject of various fanciful explanations, not 
tin like what may have been the germs of some of the myths that 
have obtained prevalence among men unenlightened by science. 
Their notions of this sort arc interesting and worthy of atten-
tion; and are themselves evidence of a grade of intelligence quite 
above that of the brutes. · Evidence of the like import is to be 
observed in the working of the language-making faculty, which, 
with the rare exceptions of the idiotic or imbecile, is always 
exercised by uneducated mutes, to a greater or less extent, 
through the medium of gestural signs. This is not a mere faculty 
of acquiring and using language; the sigi1s arc, for the most part, 
originated by themselves, arc a creative product of their own 
minds, and they afford a more striking exhibition of innate en-
dowment than docs the mere acquisition of language on the part 
of those '"ho bear and speak. 
It is, however, with particular reference to the question 
whether thought is po~siblc without language, that attention is 
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now invileu to the case of 1\Ir. Ballard, as n:bteJ in his own 
wonk. 
!\ARRATIO:-: IIY MR. IL\LL\RD. 
' 
"In consequence of the loss of my hearing in infancy,' I was 
deharrnl froJil enjoying the ach·anta;.:;-cs which children in the 
full possession of their senses derive from the exercises of the 
cumJnuJl pri1nary school, from the e\·ery-day talk of their school-
fellows and playmates, and· from the conversation of their pa-
rents and other grown-up persons. 
"I couhl convey my thoughts and feelings to my parents and 
brothers by natural signs or pantomime, and I could understand 
what they said to me by the same medium; our intercourse be-
ing, however, confined to the daily routine of home affairs and 
hardly going beyond the circle of my own observation. 
"I\Iy mother made the attempt to teach me to articulate by 
speaking loULl close to my car, ;md also by making me look at 
her lips ami try to repeat what she had uttered. There was 
many a \\·orll of encouragement from the mother and many <iii 
expression of discouragement on the part of the child; and she 
persevered, hoping a~·ainst hope, in this labor of love, until I was 
five )'l!ars old, \\"lll!n she gave it up as a hopeless task. She, 
however, rl!newed the attl!mpt occasionally at different periods 
afterwards~ 
"There was one thing to which she e\'er adhered, in our rela-
tions as mother and child. That was her endeavor for the 
molding of my character. She did not indulge me in anything' 
on account of my privation. She did not suffer my misfortune 
to lead her to surrender her judgment to the fondness of her 
affection. She taught me to treat my bi·others and sisters just 
·1 He becnme deaf at the age of less th::m seventeen months, in consequence 
of a fall down a flight of stairs. Those who lose· hearing at so early an age are 
not found by their instructo1·s to have any appreciable advantage. over those deaf 
from birth. 
Readers interested in the questions <>f heredity may desire to be informed of 
the fact that l\Ir. Ballard comes from a family of the old Puritan stock of New 
England. Ilis home was Fryeburg. l\le. A great grandfather was Simon Frye, 
who was a lawye1· and a jndge ·or some court. Otherwise his ancestors, so far as 
he know~. have not been members or""thc learned professions. · 
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as they were to treat me, and especially to respect their property 
in the playthin~s \\"hich belonged to thun. An uncle of mine 
remonstrated with her in my behalf, s;Jying that my brothers 
would be willing· to gr;ltify my humor. She ans\\·crecl him that 
she did not wish to havl! me grow up in the belief that· I \\'as a 
person difkrcnl from oliH:rs, havint-:" claims 0U.perior t(, theirs. 
"l\Iy father adopted a course which he thought would, in some 
measure, compens:ttc me for the loss of my hearing. It \\'as that 
of taking me with liilll, when business requirl!d him to ride 
abroad; and he took me more frequently than he did my broth-
ers; giving, as the reason for his apparent partiality, that they 
·could ;J.cguirc information through the car, while: I depended 
:solely upon my eye for acquaintance with affairs of the outside 
world. He believed that observation would help to clevclop my 
faculties, and he also wished to sec me deriving plca~uJc from 
some source. 
"I have a vivid recollection of the dclisht I fcl~ in watching 
the d!ffcrent scenes we passed through, observing the various 
phases of nature, both animate and inanimate; tho we did 
not, owing to my .infirmity, engage in conversation. It was dur-
ing those delightful rides, some two or three years before my 
'initiation into the rudiments of writ1ei1 language, that I began 
to ask myself the question: .f-low came t!tr: wo,r!d ill to being? 
\Vhe11 this question occurred to my mind, I set myself to think-
ing- it over a long time. My curiosity was awakened as to what 
was the origin of human life in its first app.earance upon the 
·earth, and of vegetable life as well, and also the cause of the ex-
istence of the earth, sun, moon, and stars. 
"I remember at one time when my eye fell upon a very large 
·old stump ,,·hich we happened to pass in one of our rides, I 
asked myself, 'Is it possible that the. first man that ever came 
into the world rose .out of that stump? But that stump is only 
a remnant of a once noble magnificent tree, and how came that 
tree? "Why, it came only by beginning to grow out of the 
ground just like those little trees now comingup.' And I dis-
missed from my mind, as an absurd idea, the connection between 
the origin of man and a decaying old stump. . . 
"For my knowledge of the motives of my parents in their 
treatment of me during my chilclhoocl, I am indebted to a long 
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recital. gin:n by my mother about fj\·c years ago, of incidents of 
my early life and the details con1wctetl thcrc\\'ith. 
"I ha\'c no recollection of \\·k1t.it was that first suggested to 
me the question as to the origin of things. I had bdorc this 
time gained ideas of the descent from p:1rent to child, of the 
propa~ation of animal,;, and of the production of plants from 
sccLls. The question th:1t occurred to n1y mind w;1s: \\'hcnc~.: 
canw the first man, the first animal, and the first plant, at the 
remotl:st distance of time, bdorc "·hich there \\'as no man, no 
animal, no plant; since I knew they all had a beginning and an 
end. 
"It is impossible to state the exact order in which these differ-
ent questions arose, i.e., about men, animals, plants, the earth, 
sun, moon, &c. The lower animals did not receive so much 
thougli.t as was bestowed upon man <111ll the earth; p.:.;~1aps be-
cause I put man and beast in t!1e same cbss, shce I believed 
that man woultl be annihilated aml there was no resurrection be-
yond the grave,~tho I am now told by my mother that, in 
answer to my question, in the case of a deceased uncle who 
looked to me like a person in skcp, she hau tried to make me 
undc;·o;t;md that he would aw:1.ke in th.e far future. It was 
my belief that man and beast clcri\·ed their being from the same 
source, and were to be laid down in the dust in a state of anni-
. hibtion. Considering the brute animal as of secondary impor-
tance, and allied to man on a lo\\'er level, man and the earth 
were the two things on \Yhich my niind dwclle~ most. 
"I think I was five years old, when I began to understand the · 
de:;cent fronl. p:trent to child and the propagation of animals. I 
was nearly eleven years old, when I entered the Institution 
where I was educated; and I remember distinctly that it was at 
least two years before, this time that I began to ask myself the· 
question as to the origin of the univer:>c. My age was then 
abo.ut eight, not over nine years. 
" Of the form of the earth, I had no idea in my childhood, 
except that, from a look at a map of the hemispheres, I inferred 
there were two immense discs of matter lying ncar each 
other. I also believed the sun and moon to be two rouml, flat 
plates of illuminating matter; and for those luminaries I enter-
tained a sorl of r~;verencc on account of their power of lighting 
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and heatin~ tl1c earth. I thought from their comin~ up antl 
going down. traveling across the sky in so rcgubr a manner, that 
there must be a certain something having power to go~'ern their 
course. I believed the sun went into a hulc at the west and 
came out of another at the cast, traveling throui,;"h a great tube 
in the earth, dcscribing<·the same curve as it seemed to describe 
in the sky. The stars seemed to Ill<.: to he tiny lights stlllldetl 
in the sky. 
"The source from which the universe came '"as the question 
about which my mind revolved in a vain struggle to grasp it, or 
rather to fight the way up lo attain to a satisfactory answer. 
"When I had occupied myself \\·ith this subject a considerable 
time, I pet·ccivcd that it was a matter much greater than my 
mind could comprehend ; and I remember well that I became 
so appalled at its. mystery and so bewildered at my inability to 
grapple with it lh~1t I laid the subject aside ami out of my mind, 
glad to escape being, as it were, dr:nvn into a vortex of incx. 
tricablc confusion. Tho I felt relieved at this escape, yet I 
could not resist the desire to know the truth; and I returned to 
the subject; but as before, I left it, after thinking it over for 
some time. In tl1is state of perplexity, I hoped all the time to 
get at the truth. still believing th<1t, the more I gave thought 
to the subject, tl1e more my mind would penetrate the mystery. 
Thus, I was tossed like a shuttlecock, returning to the subject 
and recoiling from it, till I came to school. 
"I remember that my mother once told me about a being up 
above, pointing her finger towards the sky and with a solemn 
look on ber countenance. I do not recall the ·circumstance 
whiCh led to this communicatiOIL \Vhen she mentioned the 
mysterious being up in the sky, I was eager to take hold of the 
subject, and plied her with questions concerning the· form and 
appearance of this unknown being, asking if it was the sun, moon, 
· or !=>Oc of the stars. I knew she meant that there was a living 
one somewhere up in the sky; but when I realized that she 
could not ariswcr my questions, I gave it up in despair, feeling 
sorrowful that I could not obtain a definite idea of the mysteri-
ous living one up in the sky. 
"One day, while we wert.: haying in a field, there was a series 
of heavy thunder-claps. I asked one of my brothers where they 
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c::1.me from. He pointed to the sl-:y ::1.nJ made ::1. zigz::1.~ motion 
with hi~ f1ngcr, signifying lightning. · I imagined there w::1.s a 
great m;m somewhere in the blue \";\Uit; ,,·ho made a loud noise 
\\'ith hi~ yoice out of it; and each tifne I heard' a thunder-clap 
I was frightened, and looked up at the sky, fearing he was speak-
ing a thr<"atcning word. 
" In the year after my admission into the school for dcaf-
muks, at I brtford, Conn., I lcarneLl a few sentences every 
Sunday, such as 'Gocl is great,' ' God is wise,' 'God is strong,' 
'God is kind,' etc., and tho I studied· those simple words, 
I never ::1.cquircd any idea of God as the Creator. I attended 
the chapd services, but they were almost unint'elligible, owing 
to my imperfect knowledge of the sign-language as employed in 
the Institution. The second year I had a small catechism con-
taining a series of questions and answers. The first questiori 
was, '\ Vho made this watch?' Answer: 'A man made it.' 
Second question: '\Vho made that house?' Answer: 'Some 
men built it.' Third question: '\Vho made the sun?' An-
swer: 'God created the sun, moon and stars.' Fourth ques-
t~on: \\'liO made the earth?' Answer: 'God created the 
earth, sea, trees, grass and vegetables.' 
"This mcthou of proceeding from the lower stages of intelli-
gent construction to the act of creation began to clear away, in 
my mind, the mystery of the origin of the universe. I was now 
able to understand well the sign-languag~ used by my instructors 
in their explanations. \Vhile the creation of the heavens and 
the earth was being related to us, the Creator ·was described as 
a great invisible spirit, seeing and knowing all things, and at 
whose creative word the world sprang into existence. As 
this truth was dawning on my mind, I felt a sensation of 
awe at the m<tgnitude of the work done by the one ruling 
mind. Ftcom the uncertain perplexing round of speculation in 
which I had been groping back and back through the dark 
··depths of time, seeking to discover the origin of the universe, I 
foul1d myself translated into a world of light, wherein my mind 
. \vas set at rest on this great question; and I felt as tho I 
1 Not literally luttrtl, of course. Deaf-mutes arc quick to perceive shocks and 
jars that can be fc:lt,- even when so slight as to be unnoticed by those who can 
hear. 
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had become a m:w hc:in~. This revelation of the truth seemed 
to give a new dignity to everythin~:·, as· deriving. its existence 
from an almighty and \l"ise Creator; and it seemed to elevate 
the ,,·orld to a higher ami more lwnor;tblc place. 
"It may be said, and perhaps to my reproach, that my inquir-
ing disposition ought to have been s;tlisficd. ft was not so; 
for when I had learnc<l of the creation of the universe by the 
one great ruling spirit, I bL:g;ll1 to ask myself whence came the 
Creator, and set myself to inquiring after his nature and origin. 
\Vhile I revolve this question, I ask myself, "Shall we ever know 
the nature of God and comprehend his infinity after we enter 
his kingdom?" And would it not be better for us to say with 
the patriarch of old, " Canst thou by searching find out God?" 
"1\"lELVILLE D.\.LLAPD." 
That there may be no uncertainty as to how far 1\Ir. Ball.ard 
may have been aided by signs in his early mental processes, I 
wm add "some facts obtained from him by personal inquiry. 
There were bvo brothers, uf an age not far from his own, wi~h 
whom he was accustomed to communicate. freely by signs, as 
well as. with his mother and sisters, and to some extent his 
father. A considerable vocabubry of signs, determinate and 
fixed in form, "·hile retaining the natural significai1ce of their 
origin, had by degrees grown up and become together with 
. purely natural pantomime the established mean~ of communi-
·. cation. Thus, there were signs, not only for the more common 
actions of men and animals, but for most of the surrounding 
objects, animate and inanimate; the signs for objects were 
derived, for the most part, from some characteristic pec\lliarity 
of action anc! movement, or from some fe~ture pertaining to the 
shape and figure. of tl~e object. The signs for actions, as well 
. as for objects, \Vere specific rather than generic; thus, there 
was no general sign for !.:ill, or for ma!.:c. Qualities were indi-
cated, so far as they could be; by significant action; color by 
pointing to some object,-to the shirt-bosom, ordinarily,· for 
w!titc. N um bcr of days was so many sleeps; years were winters, 
described by the snow falling and accumulating and then wasting 
away. Y cars of age were marked as stages of growth or of 
increase of stature. There were, however, no sped fie signs by 
ll.J 
whkh time future was distingui.~hcd fr,)m tiine p:~st, the circum-
stances of the ctse being, ordinarilr. the only means of indica-
tion. · The ,)n:;tsion for noting pniods and points of time \\"oulu 
commonly h;t \·e r~:i ere nee to the fu tu rc. There \\-ci·c no si6Il"> 
for past ·or future time. 
One ur h\·o incidt·nts which Mr. Jblhrd relates will serve the 
pr..:scnt purpose better than any t;cner.tl statements. I I is broth-
er <>nL·c tultl him of an occurrence ,,·lJich he !tad just read the 
accuunt or, from a lle\\'spapcr, to othL'I'S of the family. A man, 
\Vhile out hunting-, discO\'ered a squirrel and was preparing to 
fire at it, when th<.: dog, in his excited capcrings, struck the trig-
ger of the gun, and the man \\·as killed. Young Ballard under-
stands ~he story perfectly, and soon after tries to make it knom1 
by sign:;; to the boys of the neighboring- school, but without suc-
cess; he then r~Hl'l home, and brings the papCl' and shows them 
the paragraph, having asked his mother to point out and mark 
it. Ag-..tin: his mother ~onvcyccl to him the idea that he was to 
go from home to a distant place for instruction ·in school, also of 
his return (for the \'acation)~ after the folluwing fashion :-You 
go far yonder; ride day nig-ht; read-book; write; write fold 
[as a letter]; I unfold read glad; snow [falling flakc;;s cold 
\vhite] piled-up [hand gradually rai,;ccl from ncar the gr~und] 
' waste-away [hand gradually lo\\'ered,-that is to say, after one 
winter] you come-back glad. . 
That the train of thought pursued by ::\Ir. Ballard ill his boy-
hood, as he relates, was not dependent on the aid of signs of any 
kind, verbal or not verbal, is evident, not only from the scanti-
ness of his vocabulary of signs, but from the fact that he did not 
make his tlwught the subject of communication \\·ith any one, 
·and that the cndeayors of his mother to give him some ideas of 
the St,premc Being and of a life beyond the grave were an en-
tire failure. 
It is clear that the mental processes he describes were of a 
l1igh order of conceptual thought. They involved the possession . 
and the handling of general notions,-notions, not only of men 
and animals, but of things as related by succession in a series, 
and of time as past, and of things as beginning and ceasing to · 
exist. The attributes thus involved were distinctly and defi-
nitely apprehended. 
The itka of a ~t:rie:; of events or thin~~s r\lnninr..:- back indefi-
nitely bdun6S clearly to tli!Hlght of the hi~hcr order. It em-
braces in· one vit:w r~lll inddlnite number uf p:lrticulars. The 
members of the series arc not, and c;mnot be for the most part, 
represented individually aml scvcr;dly; but arc apprehended 
merely as things similar to the sm;d) portirlll that arc.: kno\\"n and 
rcpn:scntcd individually. They an.: apprchcnclecl also as having 
iiuliviuual diiTerl'nces that arc specifically unknr>\\'n. There i;-; 
in this way brou~ht into exercise \\'h.at \\'e lll:lY c;dl the cowpmd-
ious 11Wtk llf tlwnght: and this it is \\'hich distinguishes the 
higher from tht: lower operations of the intellect; and it obvi-
ously surpasses the capacity of the brutes. 
In the 111<1ttcr of general notions, as this term is commonly 
applied, we arc to distinguish two operations, of a widdy differ-
ent order. l\Icrcly to recognize a thing newly presented as sim-
ilar to a thinti or things previously known, and in this sense of 
the s.-1mc dass, is an operation of tht: lower order. But a thought 
such as finds expression in a general proposition-that is to say, 
in a proposition that predicates something of a whole class of 
objects, or of an ind~{wite portion of a class-is of a highci· and 
quite .different order. · The former cannot be denied to the 
brutes, and it makes up a large part of the ordinary thinking of 
men. The distinctive char;1cteristic of the latter is that it brings 
into exercise what I have described as the compendious mode of 
thought. \Vhcnever we employ a general proposition of even 
the simplest ~;:haracter-such, for instance, as, All men arc mor-
tal; All sheep cat grass ; Some men arc un\\'isc; Some sheep 
arc blad{,-Wc embrace, in a comprehensive survey, an indefinite 
number of objects, which cannot by any possibility be all at one 
time individually represented-which we apprehend only collec-
tively as" an assemblage of things similar to what we have known 
individually and at ·the same time differenced by peculiarities 
that are not definitely known or represcntecl. 
In any usc of general words, just so far as the object or ob-
jects signified are regarded as appertaining to a class ·indefinite 
in the number and the variety of the things it embraces, just so 
far, and so far only, is the operation of the higher order as abo,·e 
described~ Such action belongs to what Leibnitz. designated 
as symbolical knowledge, in his division of knowledge into srm-
116 'TilE 1'1\1.\"Cl: '/'0.\' 1\J:: I"JE IV. 
bolical aml intuiti_n~. Ev~:n indi\"idual objects th;tt arc cog-. 
nizcLI as hi:;hly complex in their composition--as, for instance, a 
JV>ly~on of a thous;tnd sidcs--·-Ctll .ue apprehemkd all at once 
only compendiously or syntbulically, .and not intuitively. In-
deed, every complex ohjcct of sense-perception nuy, for the hu-
man intdlcct, be m;tch: an object of this kind o.f cognition. Not 
till we come to a full understanding of the n;ttun.: and import of 
symbolical co:.~:1ition, and duly emphasize this clement and 
assi~n to it its ri~htful pbcc in the operations of the mind, can 
we justly distinguish between what is peculiar to man and what 
he has in common with lower forms of intcllig·ence. 
There arc, inclectl, diffct'ent gradl:s of general notions, accord-
ing as the points of similarity on which they dcpencl arc more 
or less ob\'ious--more or less easily apprehended, or by faculties 
of a lower or 1-iigher order. The notion of a horse or of a tree 
is more easily formed than the more generic notion of an ani-
mal or of a plant; anJ far more easily than the notions expressed 
by such terms as beautiful, wise, true, just, convenient, hurtful, 
civilized, and otlwrs that depend on still more tenuous similari-
ties. But the dinlet1lty lies wholly in the recognition or appre-
hension of the points of similarity. The difference, if not 
throughoi1t a matter simply of degree, yet stands upon no single 
bt'oatl line of _dcmarotion. Some rescn1blances arc obtrusive, 
and obvious to sense-perception ;mel the lowest forms of ·the 
understanding-: others arc more subtle and require a higher 
development of the intellect or sensibilities, or imply faculties 
and endowments, it may be, of a distinctly higher nature, in or~ 
dcr to apprehend them. The process, in the formation of the 
general notion, is, however, always the same, except as regards 
the injtial step, namely, the recognition of the resemblance. 
This once attained, the process of classification, and that of hand-
En~ the notions thus formed, is in all cases, and may be in all 
respects, the same. Unless we can find a clividing line that 
marks off plainly classes of a lower from those of a higher order, 
we canrwt make a distinction between representation and con-
. cept, as grou~ded in the nature or. character of the classes to 
which the notions correspond. Objects the most concrete and 
the most obvious to sense arc subject to the higher functions of 
thought as well as to the lower opel'ations of intelligence. 
On the subjL·ct of conceptual kriowlccl~c, there arc sundry 
traditional prq>ossessions that ltave too Jon~ survi\·ed and still· 
wait to be sWL·pt ;1\\·:ty. The nominalist contends that, as !loth-
in~ exists, so 110lh in~ em be conceived, but individual objects. 
· \Ve cannot concei\·e of a tri3n~lc th;tl is neither rig-ht-angled, 
acute-angled, nor obtusc-angkd; neither equilateral, isosceles, 
nor scalene ;-nor .can we concci\·e of a horse that is of neither 
this nor that color, figure, &c. Now, while \\'e cannot think o( 
a trianglcas being neither equilatcr:1l, isosceles, nor scalene, we 
can think of a group of three trian~lcs that arc severally equi-
lateral, isosceles and scalene; and we can think of an individual 
triangle as one of this group, and yet indeterminate as to which 
one. \Vc call, further, think of a group made up of an indefinite 
number of triangles, all alike as triangular figures, but all unlike 
and cliffcrc.;nced as individual triang-Ics,-the group embracing all 
possible triangles, and the nm11bi.:r and the individual differences 
being of course not all distinctly apprehended. \Vc can think 
of a single triangle as a some one indeterminate individual in such 
a. group, that is to sa:y, as either this or that definitely rrprc· 
sentcd, or as some other quite indeterminately apprehended. It 
is not more difficult to think of a group of things than of a single 
thi.ng, especially if the thing be at all complex--and every 
indivicl ual thing is so in a ·greater orless degree. And the notion 
of what we call an individual thing is a product of the mind's 
operation, as truly as that of a group of things. A coJtccpt, then, 
may be defined as the notion of a group of things that arc recog-
nized as related by certain common features of similarity, and 
are apprehended as indefinite in number and in rcspecfto indi-
vidual variations. When we think of a single thing as coming 
under a concept, as simply one of a certain class, but.otherwise 
indefinite, there comes into exercise, over and above the sym-
bolical or compendious operation, what, for want of any estab· 
lishcd designation, we may venture to call the a!tcnwti~'e, or 
perhaps better, the disjunctive, mode oft!toug!tt,-the thing being 
apprehended as either this, that, or the other, but undetermined 
as to which it may be, or as perhaps some one of many others that 
are not at all rcpre~entcd. So also is it when we think of some, 
as a ·not individualized, an iildetenninate, portion of a class. 
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The clement nf indefiniteness in the concept, a,; just now defined 
in\'olvcs the disjuncti\·c mmk of thou~·ht. 
] n symbolical co,;nition, m: ha\·c a k:"n~l of knowkcl~e that 
is Sl'p:tr:ttcti l>y a widl~ clt:t:>lll from all that i,; of a lower·kind, 
iwd \\'ith nn steps for a gradu:tl pas~a<_;c frum one to the other. 
. There is, hol\\'l:n:r, suiih:thing- ;tbu\\t such c.o~·nition that 
sl'l'll\s p:traduxical, and '\'hich perhaps no ;tnalysis may be able 
fully to cxphin. An l'sscntial part t•f tbc <•hjL·ct of such cognition 
is J,nmvn mcrclr as a something that might be distinctly repre-
.scntctl and intuitively knO\nl. To kno\\' a thing in this way is 
to know it, in some sense, as a. thing tint ,,-e do not know. A 
part of the, object of symbolical knc"\'lcdge is consciously 
unknown. \Vc have '\'hat is quite similar in the cas.e of efforts 
of the memory. \Vc do indeed knm\· :'omcthing about what we 
arc trying to rememlx·r, but there is sti~i something that \';;; do 
not kno\Y, am\ of ,\·hich we haYe a. ll(ltion or know!ecl;;;e as a 
thing unkil0\\'11, It may perhap,; be said that, in this part of the 
obj.xt, the notion we have of an unkno\\'ll something is, Itself, 
simply an extremely gcneral notion. This, howe\'er, cannot be 
ad mittel!: fnr it would be a self-e\·idcn t absurdity to explain a 
general notion, as such, by representing- it a·s composed in part 
of .a general notion of a particular kind or of any kind,---the 
absurdity of a circle in definition. But, if the clerpent which I 
have triell to tlescribc, and h;n-e pointed out as involved in all 
rational thinl--'ng, should pro\'C to be, after all, inexplicable and 
mysterious, it is yc.:t n:al ; and is not to be ignored, even if we 
can110t explain it to full satisfaction. The solution of the diffi-
culty seems to me, however, to be this: that what, by an after 
act of reOcction, may be brought under a general notion is, in 
and during the act of symbolical cognition, apprehended simply 
as an individual thing related to actual and possible knowledge 
as above cxplained;-and it is known as a thing that is unknown : 
that is to say, is l:nown positively, as a thing related in the way 
mentioned, <tnd negatively, as a thing not more specifically known 
or rcprcscnted, and thus in this sense unknown. 
1 n the ordinary handling of gencr;-tl conceptions, it is not 
. necessary to have a perfectly di~;tinct apprehension or knowledge 
·· of the points of siinilarity on which the conception is grounded,-
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that is to s;-~y, of the content of the concept. It is only rerptisite 
that the ;tpprehcnsion be so clear as to sufrtce for the reco~ni· 
tion of objects as belonging to one and the same class, anu for 
uistinguishitlg' different cbsses of which one and th~ S~l!l)e object 
may be~ a member. And general word,; m:ty be serviceably and 
intelligently enmtgh employed, \\'ilhout even such clear appre-
hension, provided such apprehension be ready to suggest its<:!£ 
so far as occasion may require. 
It is t-cquisite (or a general conception-is necessary in sym-
bolical cognition-that there be somethin;:;, either presented or 
reprcs!.:ntcd to the mind, upon which to h;tng-by \Vhich to hold--
that which is not i"eprescnteu, and all that which is compendiously 
f;(nd indeterminately apprehendell. \Vorlls serve in this way and 
to this eno ; but along with the \\·orcl and serving th'c same end, 
there ordinarily goes sonH.:thing more-some men tal image, or rep-
resentation. Such iruagc, in the case of a given word, will not, 
ordinarily, be the same for different _persons, nor for the same 
person at different ttmes. It will commonly embrace, together 
with more or lc~s of the marks or characters common to the 
class, others which arc accidental and pccul:ar to certain indi~ 
viduals within the class. For objects _having visible form, it 
may be a shadowy outline of the figure characteristic of the 
class, or it may be a distinct picture of some individual that is 
familiarly known. \Vith the same person, it may, as I just now 
said, vary froln time to time: thus, to one who had just before 
attended a horse-fair, or a horsecrace, the word lwrsc could hardly 
come into mind at all without suggesting the image of some of 
the individual horses he had so lately seen. The word sm•agc, 
or barbariall, probably suggests to most minds an i1nage that is 
quitcspccial, or even individual, and that is consciously inade-
quate, and also coi1sciously includes \\'hat is unessential, as 
··measm:cd by the real and proper meaning ·of the word; and in 
other instances the case is the same. Now, the im:1ge th:1t thus 
goes-with a name can serve as well without a name. That is to 
say, it can sen•e for thought ; tho, of· course, not for cxpres. 
sion. For some orders of conceptions, a name, or some de~ 
terminate symbol, i~, as concerns thought,, of more importance, 
ancl for others, .of k::;s. The name is not in any case essential to 
the formation of the general conception; the application of the 
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name comes of necessity after the formation of the concep-
tion. 
If ther~ ,\·ere a com-cnicnt term by whidt to designate the 
dcterminatt.: and rcpres,cnted part of a general conception (asiJe 
fro·m the n:unc), a,; llistin~·uishcd from the indeterminate and 
· unrepresented {>:trt, it \\'Ould help to ~c1ic\·e one of the Jiffi. 
tnlties \\·ith \\"hich the treatment of this subject is beset.' The 
thing to be dcsignatcJ is a shifting and \·ariablc thing: not only 
different for different persons, bnt chan;i~1;; even from moment 
to moment as one thinks more carefully ancl intently and appre-
hends the conception more distinctly. It differs thus from the 
mental representation of a name, inasmuch as the latter is a 
more fixed thing than the former commonly is. It differs also 
by ordinarily including more or less of the distinctive attributes· 
that mark the given conception :-in so doing, it is made to be 
something more than merely an internal symbol, something other 
than a bare sign, inasmuch as it indudcs more or less of what is 
signified. 
To disprove the doctrine that a word, or name, is essential 
to ·the cxi::;lcncc of a general notion, I h;n-e now to offer an· 
.-argument which, I think, will be seen to be quite unanswerable; 
tho, strange to say, it has, unless I greatly mistake, never 
b~cn brought forward in all the interminable discussion to which 
·this subject . has given occasion. \Yhat is a "·onl? \Vhen \\"C 
speak of the word lwrsc, mall; or any othcr,-\\·hen we say "this 
word," or "that worcl,"-wc mean, not a single, individual 
utterance, at a particular time, nor a ~ingle copy in writing or 
print. \Vhcn a word is repeated in sp.::cch or writing, we call it 
the same word ; evidently it is not the s:une individual thing. 
Not only so, a word admits of great Yariation in pronunciation 
and voice and tone and manner of utterance, when spoken, and 
in form and color, \\·hen written or printed, while it is still recog- _ 
nized as the same word. \Vhen we call it the same, we mean 
simply that it is fashioned after the same type-m.arked by the 
same general characteristics ;.,-just as \\·c may say, of two horses, 
"this is the same animal as that," meaning, of course, an animal 
of the same species. The difference in the word !torse, from the 
I Colla}l-itizag~. qr C011CI.'j1-plumtasm, is perhaps as soo~ a . term as can be. 
devised. 
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mouth of two persons, inay be fully as great as that between 
two actual horses. \Vc know a given word-consi<lc:red now 
with reference to the external furm·---simply as a thing of a 
certain type to which every single instance is ~c;nformcJ. It is 
thus a general object of thought, allll the noti<Jll we have of it is 
a general notion, and it is only thro,ugh ~;uch ~~c:ncral notion th:tt 
we recognize the word as the samt: in the rq>t:atc:d instances of 
its occurrence. \Ve have really to accjuire a gt:neral notion of 
the external form of a givt:n word bdorc 'l't: can attach meaning 
to it and have it as an auxili;uy to a general notion of any sort.· 
Hut, the notion of the word, being thus a general notion, would 
by the doctrine in question, require another word to constitute 
it such-which we know it docs not,--ancl that, again, would 
require still another, and so on, in a ugrcssns ad i11jinitum. 
That all this should ever have been overlooked is owing mainly 
to the ambiguous usc of t!tis, tlwt, t!tc same, &c. 
Now, an actual horse is an object of sense-perception, and 
of representation in memory and imagination, just as is the 
word !tOrse. And a general notion of the one has no more nc;::d 
of extraneous aid for its apprehension than that of the other. 
The doctrine here opposed is that at least the mental image of 
a word is an indispensable clement in the concept'. The truth, 
and the whole truth, is that words and the mental representation 
of the same bring with them, on many accounts which n.ecd not 
here be specified, immense practical advantages ;-and the same 
is true, in a greater or less degree, of any other uniform set or 
system of symbols. But this docs not in the least affact the va-
lidity of the argument just presented; the bare statement of 
whkh carries the evidence of its conclusiveness. 
It \voulcl hardly be proper to pass without notice the ex-
planation of general notions that has recently been put forth 
by Mr. Francis Galton. He is favorably known as an expcri-
_:menter and an author who has contribt1tcd to physiology and 
to psychology some valuable concrete facts. For this \Ve can 
thank him without accepting all his inferences ancf reasonings. 
He has invented. a method of obtaining, by photography, what 
he calls "composite portraits." By means of successive in 
stantancous exposures, very faint and singly imperceptible 
impressions of the features of a number of persons arc super-
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impo,;cd, and thus ;1 pictHr~ is obtained th:tt gi\'es a general 
avcr:~ge of all. only the common traits bcin~~ distinctly brought 
out, and the individual Ji\'cr:;itics being indistinct or evanes-
cent in proportion t.<o the· infrcqUL'llCY of their occurt:L:nce. 
\\'lll'n th~ indidduab arc of a common type of kature, as, 
fnr inslancc, hy f:tmi!y rcsL·mblancc, o"r as when character 
is ,nitkn in the lines of the face in the Cbc of certain 
crimin:tl cl~sscs, it has· been found ·possible, by a proper 
selection of specimens, to bring this common type distinctly to 
view in the composite portrait. All this is, so far, interesting 
and Jlot without value. Bwt, ,as)s:nahirJ.l to one in the flush of 
a successful tliscon:ty,"l\Ir: Gattc;11·has conceived an exaggerated 
estimate of the imrortancc and the \'arious applicability of what 
he has pmduccd. In particular he thinks it of value as illustrat· 
ing the mental prou.:s:; of generalintion. The matter derives 
atldilional importance in consequence of tlie endorsement of the 
idea by i\Ir. Huxley, in his recent sketch of the life and philoso~ 
phy of Dadd B ume (Chap. IV.). l\Ir. H uxlcy, as docs H umc, 
reto~nizcs iwthing "a~ existing in mind other than impressions 
and itl..:a:-;; the ideas being copies of impressions. He ranks 
"abstract or general ideas" under the category of " memories;" 
and Lldincs them particularly as "the generic ideas which are 
formed fro'n1 several similar, but not identical, complex expericn. 
ccs." They arc a result of the repetition of imprc:;sions from 
individual objects; the common features being thus blended 
togetht.:r and mutually reinforced by their greater frequency of 
repetition, while the individual diversities, by their less frequent 
occurtcm:c, fa.Il away and disappear from the view. This he 
illustrates by referring to ""·hat takes place in the formation of 
compound photof:!raphs," meaning, of course, the process of I\-ir. 
Galtori, as just described. 
It must, however, be added, in justice to Mr. H uxlcy, that 
he gives expression to some misgiving as to the entire adequacy 
of this expbnation, in the hcsitatinft admission conveyed in his 
remarks on the nominalistic doctrine of Berkeley, as follows:-
"But the subject· is an abstruse one; and I must content my. 
self with the remark, that tl1o Berkeley's view appears to be 
largely applicable to such general ideas as arc formed after Jan. 
guagc has bccn acquired, and to all the. more abstract sort of 
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·conceptions, yet that g~m:ral ideas of sensible objects may never. 
thekss be producell in the \l'~ty indicated, and may exist in· 
<.kpendenlly of language." . . 
Of this way of explaining general ideas, it is to be said, in 
the first place, that, even if the analu~;y should hold &;nod to the 
extent that is claimccl for it, till: cxplanatioil ncvcrlhekss, fails to 
reach the heart of the matter. It applies only to the repre-
sented and determinate p;nt of a g"l:nnal conception: the 
existence of the other and essentially dist inctivc p;ut is wholly 
ignored. In a concept there is something other than <1 memory~ 
something that is not to be explained as a congeries of impres-
sions, or as the accumulated effect of rcpe;-tlecl impressions. 
But the analogy is, at best, quite defective, and goes only a 
very little way. Repeated sense-impressions do not make an 
idea more vivid; they simply tend to fix it in the memory: l<dnt 
impressions, ever so many times repeated, never make a vivid 
idea. "With these qualifications noted, there IS, indeed, to be 
recognized. a real analogy, so far as concerns certain opc;ations 
of the memory. That is to say, there may be, in the memory, 
"-blending and a mutual reinforcing of similar impressions. But 
there is a law of the memory that breaks in: with fatal conse-
quence upon the analogy, ·as concerns general conceptions. Re-
cent impressions arc more vivid, and stronger every ,\·ay, than 
earlier impressions, and tend to supersede and obliterate them 
for the time being. According lo the memory theory, therefore, 
individual diversities recently impressed "·ould make a promi- · 
nent figure in the general idea, or would even wholly supersede 
it. Moreover, in the compound photograph, the individual im-
pression disappears, or rather in fact never appears; while, on 
the co11trary, individual impressions on the mind may remail\ 
perfectly distinct alongside of the general idea to the formation 
of which they may have contributed. 
· It is not to be doubted that blended memories of similar 
things arc possible and of frequent occurrence. And, again, it 
need not be questioned that the naturalist sometimes does, as 
1\'Ir. Huxley says, make up for his own mind a distinct image 
which represents, in some sort; the average of a number of 
varying specimens; he docs this purposely, and to subserve for 
ltimsclf a valuable end. But it is not the fact that the reprc-
sented part of a concept i~ tt"::ally limited to the common 
char~lCLel"s," the point~ of similarity. that go to the making of the 
clas:>. 1\lost certainly, it i:> not made up by an average that 
gives the mc;m between ind i\·id ua I \"aria tions. 
The illustration, ob\·iously, and .indeed confessedly as ex-
plained by l\Ir. Galton, can apply :.otrictly to only a very limited 
and sl·h:ct portion out of the \Yholc \\·ide field of general ideas; 
Jtamdy," to those of a highly concrct~ description, and those in 
v:hidt the similarities greatly prepo;1derat1~ on~r the diversities. 
\\'hat sort of an average, as a rc:'t:h of indh:idual impressions, 
should we ha\'e for such a concept as that of an instrument, or 
of a thing, or an animal, or e\·en of a person? To make the 
illus~ntion hold good throughout. it woulJ be necessary also to 
superadd a neutralizing influence: thus, for instance, in the gen-
eral idea of a horse, we should ha\·e to dispose of the attribute 
~:~f color in some way not proYided for by the analogy of ~he 
compound photograph. 
·Enough, now, of this.' It is all of a piece with the various 
other ways of explaining, or tryi1!~ to explain, mental phenom-
ena by means of analogies dra\\"n irom the material world, which 
have constantly misled and· deluded philosophers and psycholo-
gists, as wdl as others. As for )Ir. Huxley, it will not be 
claimed, on his behalf, that he has g!\·cn to the facts of con?cious-
ness the thorough study that he ha,; bestowed upon the natural 
sciences. He, certainly, has not, in this department, foll_owed th-e 
method of positive ~ciencc, the rule of induction, which requires, 
above everything else, a comprehensive suryey inclusive of all 
the facts in the given field of i;1quiry. Tho his gropings in 
this field, lxith David Ilume as pioncet, have been earnest and 
serious, we know that the special :::tudies in the pursuit of which 
he ltas achieved success and \\'On renown have lain in quite an-
other region and been concerned "·ith phenomena of a ·quite dif-
ferent order. The misfortune is that the prestige gained by tl1is 
success lends weight to his opinion.;:; on these subjects, of which 
he l1as not obtained a mastery, and for ,,·hich his special sttidies 
tend, in certain ways, to incapacitate him, and which arc subjects 
of the greatest difficulty and of the highest importance. 
13cfore concluding, it remains for us to give some considera-
tion to the case of "our poor relations," the brute animals. As 
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may be inferred from what has bccnprcmisecl, I cannot abso-
lutely c.leny them the po~;scssion of [~encral ideas-cannot ex-
cluck them from all that we designate by that term. In a sense 
they have them; and in a sense they have them not. It is not 
for the want of a sufficient stock of general idc;1.s, and these of a 
sufficiently high order, that they attain to no grcatcr proficiency 
in· the way of language tlun they do. The provision in the 
former respect goes far beyond t hcir a lla in men t in the latter. 
In this I agre.c to a certain extent with iii r. Darll'ill and Mr. 
Huxley. It is at another point that the view I take diverges 
from theirs. So far as it may be possible to reconcile the con-
flicting opinions, by determining and setting in the proper light 
whatever of truth there may be on either side, it is desirable, of 
course, to do so. 
It cannot rcason;~.bly be questioned that animals of the more 
intelligent orders recognize mullitudes of objects according to 
their kinds, when new to. them as inclivit1ual objects. A dog 
knows a bone as a bone and not a bit of wood, even tho he 
has never seen the same bone before. He knows his own kind 
from human beings, and ·vice '<.'Crsa ,- and kno\'/s various other 
animals as of the kinds of which they are. He knows a gentle-
man from a. beggar; and sometimes an honest man from a thief. 
He knows '-'-·hat it is to go and come, to fetch and carry, to pur. 
sue and to stop, to keep watch; ai1d so of various other actions. 
He knows things by single qualities: knows them, for instance, 
as·hot or cold, and as having an odor which he likes; that is to 
say, he may recognize objects, when he sees them, as having 
these qualities~ Domestic animals, too, understand the meaning 
of many words and other sig·ns of ideas; aml it is possible to 
train them to understand many mo1'e than they often do. The 
words and various. other signs employed in the case of trained 
animals arc, many of them, cntirc:ly arbitrary and artificial. By 
repetition and the law of association they are made to suggest 
. the ideas, just as words suggest ideas to our minds. It is. true 
the -\vords or signs arc addressed to them, for the mostpart, if 
not solely, in the way of command. But animals arc able, them-
selves, to usc signs for the purpose of making known their \\'ants, 
or at least as a means of obtaining what they want; and the 
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mor·~ intclli:;cnt -atH.l docile caq casil)· be t:l\t~ht to usc arbitrary 
sign,; in thi.;; manner. 
\Yc pruh:ti.Jy can tint! no e\·idence that any of the animals 
can under:-;taml bng-uaf;c of any kind used in the way of directly 
communical in~~ information; much k~s that they c;m thcm-
st·!Ycs so u:-;e it. This may reC]uirc a more distinct knowledge· 
than they pos.scss, of thcit mn1 minds and of other minds as 
knn\Yjn~~ ag-enls,--a knowledge tktt cnmes from sdf-cnnscious· 
ness, such as they have not. They Clll obtain information 
through signs; but that is a different thing from understanding 
a sign as made \\·ith the intent of giYing information. 
Their knowledge ami usc of language is, also, probably limit-
ed to single words or other single signs, and to phrases which 
they apprehend in singlc:ness, without cognizance of the compo-
nent words or parts of the phrase, and thus without the power 
of making or of understanding a nc\\" combination. Tlms, sup-
pose the most intelligent and pro!tcicnt parrot to unclerstan? the 
two phrases, blacl.· s/.-r,J and -;;•/:it,· dog, ·we have no evidence 
that from this he would be able to make out, still less to make 
up, the new combinations, -;;•!tile sll.-,t and blacl: dog. !n the 
article, by Dr. Samuel \Vilkcs, entitled "Notes on the History 
of my l'arrot as related to the Nature of Language,'' in the 
Yourua/-of Jl!o:tal Scimcc for July, 1879, we find, as the ~csult 
of his observations, that phrases "·ere apprehended in no ot!tcr 
way than as single expressions. This is made quite evident by 
the occasional incongruo_us blending of different phrases that 
included some words in common. 
The only faculties mentioned by the ·\\'riter as concerned in 
the linguistic performances of this parrot ·were those of articula-
tion, imitation, and the assoCiation of ideas._ Any object or cir-
cumstance with which a word, or any kind of sounu, had become . 
associateu, awakened by its recurrence a propensity to reproduce 
the sound. The utterances were made, however, many times, 
for purposes such as some of those for which human language 
is employed. 
It is to .be remarked, hO\vever, that to understand or to pro-
duce a ncw:··c:ombination is nothing more than to bring one and 
the same object under two or more general ideas at the same 
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time; or, it may he, under onlr a sin~nbr :111(1 a ~cner;tl idea; anLl 
possibly this is not quite beyond the reach of the lmn.:r orllcr of 
intelligence. If, for instance, we suppnsc a pack of dogs to know 
each other's names, let the master of thc lings ctll one 1J)' name 
and command son1c aclip.n, herc would be a combi-llalion of a 
singular name "\l'ith a general word; and thi:-;, we may bcli~.;ve, 
might be understood by ~dl the other do~,; a,; well :1s by the one 
addressed, even tl1o, as a comllinalion, it might be new to 
some of them.· Some \l·cll-authenlicall'd · cascs arc related in 
which dogs have !'eemcd to understand a com1Jination as a com-
bination; and possibly sowc of the in:;tances were really what 
they thus seemed to be. 
\Vith these mere hints on the subject of brute intelligence, I 
have simply to rcrnark, in brief, that a very consiJerable devel-
opment of language is supposable, with no higher graJe of capac-
ity than \Yhat may suffin· for the reco:_::-nition of objects accord· 
ing to kinds-for the handling of g-eneral iJeas to this extent. 
Moreover, a large }Jart of the orJinary· language of mankind 
requires no l1igher '=apacity .. But anything of the nature of 
what we have rcfen-cd to as compendious thought, and thus of 
symbolical knowledge, is entirely beyond and cannot be con-
ceived as developed out of the lower intelligence of the brutes. 
The brutes can infer and reason, after a fashion, from instance 
to instance, and ;u-c thus able to learn something by experience; 
but they cannot apprehend a general law as such. The mind of 
man is capable of somethirig higher than what !'11r. Huxley calls 
"potential bclids of memoty," and "potential bc:liefs of expec-
tation;" hig11er, even, than these as raised to the dignity of act-
ual belief by being put into a form of words. 
\Allowing to the brutes the utmost that can be claimed for 
them, is it J.wt still plain that man has faculties ivhich we cannot 
conceive as developed out of or as simply exaltations in degree 
of anything that he possesses in common with the lower ani: 
mals? We know, if we know anything, that phenomena of 
consciousness are things wholly unlike matter and motion, what-
. ever we may think of the relation between the one and the other. 
We know, also, th~t among phenonicna of consciousness there 
are some wbolly unlike others, so that they cannot be conceived 
128 1'111:' l'RlXClc' TO.\" RJ·.' 1"/E If'. 
as dC\·cloped out of them; nor .:til <ts developed out of a common 
l'kmcnt. \\" e knm\', for instance, that perceptions of color and 
colorctl extension, arc, as phcnomcn;t of consciousness, quite dis-
tinct and different from thost: of cilhl:r touch, taste, smell, or 
soutlll. "'h;tt{.;\·er may be the similarity in the wa)· in which the 
imprcssi0ns arc produced, or in the structure of the organs, and 
,,·hatcvcr may be the dependence upon organic action,-that is 
t" s;ly, howcn:r they may be allied physiologically,-yct, as sen-
sations or perceptions, those of the eye arc different in thcm-
sdvcs, anll imply a special gift or power not implied in those of 
the car, or the hand, or the tongue. Is it not thus "·ith the acts 
of the reason as compared with the working of the lower facul-
ties? That the two have some clements in common docs not 
prove them to be throi.1ghout of the ;;amc order, or render it pos-
sible for one to bedcvclopcJ out of the other. And if the eye 
of the soul, tl~c higher reason, by which we look through the 
universe of things, cannot look in upon itself anJ clearly discern 
its own 11ature and its own processes, we ought not, therefore, 
for!,!ettin~ what it do.es, to deny its essential superiority, and to 
assimilate it t;o those lower and sul.Jsidiary faculties which we. can 
bring under its scrutiny. That by which we understand all 
thing-s-must it not be o{ a natur~ essentially superior to aught 
that is unclerstood by it? . 
If man has special endowments which set him in a rank 
above all other ct·eatures on this globe of the earth, it cannot be 
well {or him to renounce, disown, or barter away his birthright. 
\.Yould not a true science, that should comprehend all the phe. 
nomcna and all the facts, be able to characterize man by some 
other marks t.hai1 as the two-handed family of the Primates? 
The design of this article v.-as to present the facts of an in eli. 
vidual case. The. remarks into which I have been led, at greater 
length than I intended, have been added, not, certainly, with any 
idea that they amount to a thorough discussion of the subject, 
but as suggestions, offered with the view of contributing towards 
clearing away some errors of long standing, which have made 
this ~mbjcct a so fruitful, and at the same time so fruitless, theme 
of disputation •. 
SAMUEL PORTER. 
2. JAMES, W. "Thought before language : a deaf-mute's 
recollections" Philosophical RevieW 3 i, 
1892 : 613-624. 
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(My underlining PR 613) 
THOUGHT DEFORE L\XGUAGE: A DEAF-:\IUTE'S 
RECOLLECTIONS. 
ON page 266 of the lir!-it \'olume of my work, T!te E'rillciflt"s of Psyc!tt'!'~!;}', I quoted an ac:-cou:'t of a certain dcaf.mute's 
thoughts bdore he had the use ·of any sig-ns fnr n:rbal lan-
guage. The deaf-mutt! in question is :\[r. ~kh·ilh! lkL!bnl, of 
the.Institution fur the Deaf anc.l Dumb at \\'ashin;;ton; and his 
narrati\·e shows him to h:tvc had a very extensin! comriuncl of 
abstract, e\·en of met:tphysical conceptions, when as yet h·~ 
only lan;;tt:tge was pantomime confined to practical home affairs. 
l'rofcssur von Gizycki o[ D~.:rlin, whose nominali~tic preposses-
sions were apparently startkcl by l\Ir. Ballard's account, wrote 
to me to ask if I had made sure of his being trustworthy. 
This led me to make inquiry amongst those who knew l\lr. 
Ballard intimJ.tdy, and the result was to show that they all 
regarded him as an exceptio nail y good witness. 1 :\I r. Fay 
I rrofcssor S~mucl rurtcr (who first pulili;l:c•l :\[r. )~albrd's· statemcr.t in the 
rrin.:ctun l~cview fur Januar~·. 1SS1) ;ays: " [ rc;;:1.r·ll:im as a person •;uitc rcmar\..al.lc 
(l~r the cka.rness :tn.l ;u;curJ.~)· of hi:t rc:c~·llcctLm c..·f mJ.:~~rs 1:f t'a·, t, ~:-;pc,~b~1y st.:...h :15 
hl.Vt! occurrt!\l under hi:;. U\\'0 obst.:n·ati,;n ur in hi:; U\'.'11 c:<pl.."ricnc~. an1l a:; s~rupu .. 
)oJusly hunc;t anti truthful. lndc~,l Iii; trait; vi char:~.cl<:r, li<·th intellectual ;tnJ 
nlioral, ar~ su~h th:J.t I .cannot concci\·c ,,f a case in which testimuny <•f the l.ind in 
<JUCSti.•n coulol be less open t,·, suspidun and ulojt·cti•>n." :- :'llr. Edw;wl Allen Fay 
writes: ":\lr. D:~.lbr,l is ;~.n exceptionally conscknti .. u,; persun in making stat<-mcnts. 
There is nuhoJdy whose testimony "·ith rc:<pcct to any facts of lli>ich h~: might li:~.1·e 
kn<~wk·l~~ 1 should nwrc rca<lily accept than his. I pbc~ implicit cunfi<lcncc in his 
honesty :ts a witness. Is it possible that he is himself cl~ccin•l, an•l that, as Pn•f. 
,.~ (;. su~;.:est:-;, he '\"crl'-·:.!t sdn jct1ig~s gcbibktcs f)enl.;.cn in di~ Sc.:c.:Ic· jL·n·es 
Kin.lcs zurii~k?' I Sllf'I"'SC it is l'"~'ihlc, hut it docs nnt set' Ill tn me prok1Llc. 
I lis r<:colkclinn uf ihusc early year; j,; ,;, distinct, he ·recalls su 1·iridly ulh~:r cin:um· 
stances whid1 arc •lircdly as<>•ciak•l with the train of thought dcscril>t·d, an<l ahout 
which there cuul•l he 1111 mistal;e, that I am cnm(•dk.l t•> nccq>t his stat<:mcnt as 
• unct>n•liti•mally tru~t·,\·orthy.'"- ~lr. J. C". Gur•l•>ll says: ":\lr. ll. is p~culiarly 
•tualilic•lln rdak inci•l<'llts intt•n·,tin:.: to~ him in the nr•kr in \\ liich they orit:inally 
occurrc<l, an.f with C.trt•mc accuracy. I li,; pcrcq•ti"ns arc acul<', an• I his power of 
rccollcctiun of facts within the r:1.n:.:c of his cxperi~nce I curi;i<l~:r 'Illite c'traonli· 
11ary. lie i-< not a ::real stu•knt nf h•>•>b, an•lprvld,ly has no i·k:l vf the b•·arin:,: 
uf his stat.-mcnts un md:1physical sp~:cubti.;ns.'' 
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(the gist of whose statement about 1\!r. Ballard I print below) 
was kind enou;_;h to refer me to another printed account of a 
deaf-mute's cosmological ideas before the- acquisition· of lan-
guage; and this led me to correspond with its author, l\rr. 
Thcophilus H. d'Estrclla, instructor in drawing (I unclcrstancl) 
at the California Institution for the Deaf and Dumb, ancl the 
Blind. The final result is that I have 1\Ir. d'Estrclla's permis-
sion to by before the· readers of the PnrLosormcAL REVIEW 
a new document which, whilst it fully tends to corroborate 1\Ir. 
Ballard's narrative, is much more interesting by its intrinsic 
content.1 
The printed account just referred to appeared in :he 1Vcd:ly 
News (a paper_ published at the Institution at Berkeley, Cali 
fornia, and printed by the pupils) for April Zj, 1889. Although 
expressed in the third person, :\Ir. cl'Estrelb informs me that it 
was prepared by himself. I give it here as it stands, in the 
form of a note to a paper by 1\Tr. ]. Scott Hutton on the notions 
of deaf-mutes before instruction: 
This interesting extract reminds :\[r. d'Estrella of his similar notions. 
Nothing stimulated his curiosity like the moon. He was afraid of ~he moon, 
but he always loved to watch her. He noticed the shadowy face in the full 
1 ~Ir. \\', Wilkinson, Superintenrlcnt of the Institution, writes to me of ~lr. 
d'Estrdl:l th:~t "he is :1 m:m of the hi;;h~st ch:~mcter :1nJ intellectu:~l honesty. He 
was the tirst pupil that e\·er entered this Institution, and when I t<>~k charg-e of the 
school in 1S65 he wns :~bout fourteen ye:~rs old. It was at that tim~ that I became 
spcci:llly interested in his a.:count of his expbnations of the various. physical phe-
nomena as they presented thcmsch·es t<J his untutored minrl. At that time I wrote 
out many p:~ges uf his storr, &ut this account, with a good deal of other material, 
was destroyed in our great fire of I S75. It very often occurs that deaf-mutes are not 
ahlc to Ji;tingui;h between the concepts obtained before and after education. By 
the time they have oht:tined e<lucation enough to express themselves clearly, the 
memory of thin:,:> happening before education has become dim and untrustworthy; . 
but ~[r. ti'Estrclla was, and is, unusually bright and of a very in'luiring turn of mint!, 
so th:~t bcf,m! cumin;,: to school he entlea\·orctl to expb_in to hi~ own satisfaction the 
rc~son uf many things, anti it is quite surprising how simibr hi; explanations were to 
the expbn:~ti.lns which nrc fount! in the childhood of m:my races. :.\lr. d'Estrr:lla is 
imagin:ttin~, hut quite as mud1 so before crluc:~tion as since, and the early age at 
which he ga\·c me the account of himsc·lf forbids the nriti•Jn that he coulrl have hcen 
innuencc·•l h>· mythul••gies, an<l the nearness of tim·e, t:ll;en with his honesty, is surti· 
cient :~.ssur:tnce of the accuracy of his stJ.tcment. \'ou m:~y trust ~lr. d'Estrella_ 
perfectly fur any st:~t~nv:nt he may m:~ke." 
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moon. Then he supposed that she was a lil'ing hein,:;. So he tried to 'prove· 
whether the moon was alive or not. It was accordin;;ly done in four ditTc:r-
ent ways. First, he shook his head in a zi;;-zag direction, with his eyes fixed 
on the moon. She appeared to follow the motions of his head, now rbing 
and then lowerin_;:, turnii1,;: forward and IJackward. lie aL;o thou;;ht that the 
lights were alive too, because he repeated simil:tr experiments. Secondly, 
while walking out, he watched if the moon would follow him. The orb 
seemed ·to follow him evcry11 here. Thirdly, he wondered why the moon 
appeared regularly. So he thou.:;ht that sh<.: must ha1·e come out to see him 
alone. Then he talked to her in ge~tures, and fancied that he saw her smile 
or frown~ Fourthly, he found out that he hall been whir,::·~C: of::.::1er l'.'hen 
the moon was visible. It was as though she were watchin;; him anu telling 
his guardian (he bcin!;an orphan boy) all about his bad ca~crs. He often 
asked himself who she could be. At last he IJccame sure that she was his 
mother, because, while his mother lh·ed, he had nel'cr seen the moon. After-
wards, every now .and then, he sa11' the moon and behaved well towards his 
friends. The little boy had some other notions. He belic1·ed that the earth 
was flatancl the sun w:~s a ball of lire. At firs~ he thought th;1t there were 
many suns, one for each day. He could not m:~ke out how .they could rise 
and set. One night he happened to sec some boys throwing and catching 
burning oil-soaked balls of yarn. He turned his ·mind to the sun, and 
thought that it mu;;t ha1·e ucen thrown up and C:lught just the S:lme- bu't by 
what force? So he supposed that there was a great and strong man, some-
how hiding himself behind the hills (San Francisco being a hilly city). The 
sun \\'as his ball of fire as a toy, and he amused himself ·in throwing it very 
high in the .sky every morning aud catching it every evening. 
After he began to convince himself about the possible existence. of such 
a mighty god, he went on with his speculations. He supposed that the gnd 
lit· the stars fur his own w;e as we do the gas-li~hts in the street. \Vhen 
there was wind, he supposed that it was the. inuic;ttion of hi-' passions. :\ 
cold gale bespoke his anger, and a cool brce~e his h;tppy temper. \Vhy? 
Because he had sometimes felt the breath bursting out from the mouth of 
angry people in the act of quarrelling or scolding. \\'hen there were clouds, 
ht supposed that they came from the big pipe of the god. \Vhy? Because 
he had often seen, with childish wonder, how the smoke curled from lighted 
pipes or cigars. lie was often awed by the fantastic shapes of the floating 
clouds. \Vhat strong lun.~s the god had! \Vhcn there was a fog, the boy 
supposed that it was his breath in the cold morr;;ng. \\'by? Because he 
had often seen his own breath in such weather. \\'hen there was rain, he 
did not doubt that the god tnok in much water, and spewed it from his . big 
mouth in the form of a shower. \Vhy? De cause he had several times 
watchecl how cle,·erly the heathen Chinese spewed the water from his mouth 
over the washed clothes. The b«?J did not suppose that the people grew . 
. He seldom saw a hahy, but when he did, he hated it, and thought it a horrid-
Jookin:; thin~. lie had contempt for girls. He was ne,·er bad on Sundays. 
In fair weather he would always go to church and Sunday-school. \\'hy? 
Because he fancied that the moon wanted him to go, as he h<tt.! been in the 
habit of :;oing to the Catholic church with his mother. He wa:> in rat;s-
6r6 THE FI!fLOSOFJ!lC.·Il. REVfEH~ (VOL. I. 
sometimes. hut the church·rcoplc and Sur:cl:~:·-school children m~rc gcner:~lly 
kind to the homclc-<-; lit:lc Loy. 1 [c had some Ltint idea of death. lit.! saw · 
a dead baby in a little cortin. He wa.> told that it could nut cat, drink, or 
spc.1k, and so it""\Yould go into the ground and never, never come back home. 
Again, he w:ts told th:tt he \rould get sick :tnd go down· into tfH~ gn1und. 
He got angry. He said that he would go up to the sky where his moon-
mother watHcd him. 
1\lr. d'Estrclb's autobiogr::tphic letter to me runs as fol-
lows : 
. The history of my parents is a rery little known. I never saw my father. 
He was a French-Sn i~s. )!y mother- a nath·e of ;\lexico-:- died when I 
was five years old. Then rtud no other !king rel:tth·e known to me. It is 
about seven y·ears ago when I first leamcd that 1 had one aunt and two cousins 
yet living. .I am now forty ye:trs old. 
I was born quite ckaf. Howe\·er, I h::t,·e been able to hear a little in the 
left ear only. Abo;tt ei;ht years ago my cars were examined, and .it was said. 
that the external ear and the. drum as well as the nen·es going to the brain 
were perfect. but th<! trouble was the inner car or the mechanism of the inter-· 
nal ear. Suppose, if l were not born dea(. it must then be that I became dea[ 
somehow in my inf.mcy. :\ly two friends who saw me in my infancy said that 
I was not born deaf. They remembered that c,·erybody would speak to me, 
and I should immediately turn towards them. The doctors attributed my 
deafness to a fall or fri;;ht. I cannot sec th::tt either the fall or the fright had 
anything tn do with my deafness. It is said that those who are born deaf 
never hear in their tln::tm-;. I am strongly subjected to. dream,;, but I nc\·er 
heard any sound in my dreams until once in tSSo. Since then I had not 
heard again till t:-iC)O. Later, since, I ha\·e heard three times- m:tking up 
lh·e times in all my liie hitherto. Howe\·er r do not belie\·e that f:tct. bccau~e 
I know that a go1od m:tny deaf mutes \\·ho lost their hearing at the or ~ix 
years h:n·e nen:r heard in their dream.-;. 
The first recoll~ctinn is that I cried. l think I was four years old then. 
One morning- my mother left me alone for the first time in a room and locked 
the door~ I was afr:tid because I had ne,·cr remained alone in a dosed room. 
S~ I cried.· She came back in soon and ran laughing to me. She comforted 
and caressed me with kisses of Im·e. This only is all what I can think instinc-
th·ely of a moti1cr's l"'·e. Probably the next rccollect_ion is one of the few 
I ha\"e cherisl1cd throu:,:h years of memory. I remember it as though this 
had occurred yesterday. \\"hilc walking one sunny Sunday morning with my 
mother to a C:ttholic com·cnt, it took me by surprise when I heard the bell 
tolling. R:tpture seized me at once. I cried joyfully, Then I felt a dreamy. 
wandering sens:ttion amid the hustle of the people. £\·en after the good bell 
ceased tolling, the \%rations continued rin;;ing in my o\·er-cxcited brain fur 
a while. Often do I think of this undying recollection- sometimes with 
awe, sometimes with delight. \Vhen I think of it, I feel as though l were 
acllf<Zl/y he:tring- the hell toll- toil slowly ant! sweetly. Eren, while writing 
thhs p:trt, I feel appan.:ntly paralyzed in my sense~ as if my soul were giving 
way to the mesmeric spell of the very recollection. 
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I have several other early recollectiom, more or le.,s perfect. I remem-
ber that I saw a pricst burning a numLcr of BiLk.;; that I attended a Cttho-
lic spelling-scho•JI (I often wonder if I learned to say 'papa' there. I can 
say' papa' as plainly as any one can- this is the only word f have ever 
lisped); that I saw much excitement in mu1·ing the furniturcs am.! other 
household articles in a hurried and confused m:tnner, bepuse thcre was an 
earthquake (which I afterwards learned in the Annab of S. F.- I was born 
inS. F.); that I ~aw a great red comet; that my mother told me that we all 
should be knocked down if the comet struck the ground: that I ,1·atchctl the 
comet every night until it di.<appeared; that I saw a man lassoing another, 
both on horseback :H f::ll ~pet:d throu;;h the street; that l saw two fires near 
my home; that my mother took me to church on Sundays and on other days 
oftener early in the mornln;. If I was restless during the sen·ice, she would 
give me something to eat. (Aithou.;h l am not a Catholic, yet now ~.nd 
then I go to t!tc Catholic church, and enjoy my meditation mainly to keep 
· the memory of my mother.) While my mother was ali1·e, l did not know that 
I was deaf. I did not sec the sun. and stars figuratively. I remember that I 
had never oiHcrve.d the moon but once with a sort of wonder,- the r.•oon 
was new. I seldom went out by myself and played with the children. I was 
then p:tssh·dy quiet and good, almc;t an inte!lt::ctuai blank. 
I know almost nothing about my mother's death. \Vhile she was sick, 
she gave me some marmalade and kissed me, for the last time. I was then 
put away. I do not remember if I saw her corpse or attended her funeral, 
nor how I felt about her death. Only that my friends said that she had 
gone to the sky to rest. 
\Vhat then became of me after ~y mother's death? I remember at be,;t 
that 1 \vas taken to the house of my ~ad-mother. Since she was my mother's 
best friend, I did not mi~,; my mother consciously at all. A short time after-
wards, a French eon,ul (I bdieve. mr father's brother) took me to the house 
of a Mexican woman and kit me there, wi:la a box of :\"oah 's animal,;, in her 
charge. I did not feel homesick. She continued as m}· guardian until I 11·as 
taken to school (I was the first pupil, then, in the California institution). 
I remained about four year.~ with her. She, I learned when in school, was 
my mother's bitter enemy out of jealousy in lo1·e afTairs. 
Hitherto till this time I had hut a little, if e\·er possible, of instincth·e lan-
guage. I could hardly m::!kc intelligible signs; out my mother might under-
stand my gestures, that is, such as were mo\·cd by feelings for what I should 
either wish or deny. For example, the idea of food was aroused in my mind 
by the feeling of hunger. This simply constitutes the Logic of Feeling; 
bear in mind that it is different from the Logic of Signs. I could neith<~r 
t~ink nor reason at all, yet I could recognize the persons either with delight 
or with dislike. Still, nearly all the human emotions were absent, and even 
the faculty of C{)nscience was wanting. E\·erything seemed to appear· bl:ink 
·around me except the momentary pleasures of perception. \\'hat happened 
at home had not come back within m)' memory until I went to school. The 
state of my mental isolation, I bclie1·c, is wholly due to my confinement at 
home. I was then five yeJ.rs old, thou.::;h. 
Dut no sooner had I been left in char;;e of my gu;~.rdian than the know!-
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edge of good a:~d evil was opened to me slo~dy but surely. As Minerva the 
goddess of wisd,>m was said 10" han! h:apcd forth out of the brain of her 
father Jupiter, full grown and full armed for the lmsiness of life, so was my 
new life formed apparently mature and complete. The unwomanly treatment 
of my gu::trdian was, in tmth, t.he direct cause of the evolution of my instinc-
tive- or better speaking-latent feelings for the higher. Not only could I 
think in pictures, but almost spontaneously I was abo able to learn how to 
think and reason. Thinking in pictures or images is prevalent among most 
of the congenitally deaf chilllrcn at different degrees in proportion to the 
different powers of perception. That faculty predominates in this class, and 
consequently compensates fur the loss of hearing. no matter even if they do 
not think at all. [ learned to knnw that there was a differenr:e between ri.;ht 
and wrong, and tc. umkr::>tand that there was a relation between cause and 
effect. This pro\·es that my conscience must ha,·e been in the act of dc,·elop-
ing. i\Iy mental condition was favorably elaborated and properly reduced to 
the Logic of Signs. . 
How were tte essential signs acquired? :.\[y mother must h;we known my 
wants beforehand, without any forced attempt on my part. But mi guardian 
wa:; ·a stranger to me, and could not understand my desires. It was ncces-
:o;ary th:tt she. or I would seck something rational or con\·entional to make us 
understand each other .. So we made signs, one after another. Imitation 
constitutes the foundation of the sign language. \Ve traced as intelligibly as 
possible the shapes and peculi;trities of the objects and the actions of the 
bodily mo\·ements. The language thus acquired was greatly augmented by 
the expression and play of the features to emphasize the meanings oi the 
signs. She soon made herself a good sign-maker. The i\Iexicans, as well 
a.o;.the people of the Romance races, are expert in pantomimic gestures which 
they are in the halJit of using while speaking to one another. How natural 
aU the imitath·e si~ns are! \\'"hen I came to school, I had no difficulty in 
underst:wdin~ th.: true deaf and dumb lan;;uage of signs- the conventional 
languagc. The si:;n bn;.,ruage is the universal one. (I do not pretencltu say 
that I am about the Lest sign-maker in this institution.' This must be 
attributed to the early training of the mind during my ante-speech days.) 
My guardian let me go about in the rear yard. There I learned to lo,·e 
hens, ducks, turkeys, parrots, canary-birds, dogs, cats. Quite a bustle of 
life- A no\·clty of ohsen:ation. 
The wom:tn often went out shopping. I sometimes accomp:tnied her. As 
I had learnctl to reme~1herthe plan·s she frequented- within a radius of two. 
or three blocks- she sent me to the grocery to get something, such as bread, 
milk, potatoes, etc- l enjoyed it, he!=ause she would not let me go otherwise~ 
\Vhile out on errand, I no": and then might make acquaintances with boys 
and play with them fur a little time. One mornin~ I was carrying a .pitcher 
r,>f milk. A boy accidentally broke it ami let the' milk spill. I cried and went 
home with the broken >esse!. [ told the woman honestly abottt it. She 
would nut listen, Lut she got angry and whipped me. [ belic\"c that this was 
the first whipping I hall c\·er got from any person. Because I thought that 
it was nut good. my IJlood. rose in protest. She whipped me harder, and I 
yielded n:luctantly. 
No.6.] TJJOUGl!T BEFORE LANGUAGE. 
I now began to notice the gambols of the boy:; out on streets. So new 
and keen was my instinct for sport .that I envied their play. Then I slipped 
stealthily out of the yard to the gate and looked at their pranks with- delight. 
At last I went out to pby. The woman caught and whipped me. I played 
again. She wl~~Pli~d nw again. \\'ell, I then began to think why. I thought 
and thought. ·She CijHJtl not nuke· me understand that I was a bad boy. 
Playing seemed to beg<'''"· I soon learned to hate her. If she had scolded 
me gently and g:wc me decently to undcr;;tand her command, it might ha·.-e 
been all right. But it was too late. I made .up my mind that I would ha1·c 
my own way, rcg:~rdkss of consequences. I did not want to be whipped so 
often. I all at once hated whipping. It would m:~kc m·~ anything but good. 
I played out whenever I liked. She whipped me nearly .:1·ery time. ·It diu 
me no good. It h:~rclcned my body as well as my l:e:!rt. She desired sbme 
other way of punishment by takin~ otT my hat. rt iaib!. She then took 
off my shoes. It m~t the same fate. She took ofT my j:Id.:d. I still played 
only with pants and a shirt on. It a1·ailed nothin~. I had already dt:ler· 
mined that she would be re1·enged. She found it useless to brl·ak down my 
obstinacy. Now and then she would \l'hip me very Ion; and hard when I 
was ou,t too long. I saw it rationally. but I deli6hted in f,)i[owing the boys 
on the alert far from home- say, ten blocks. One day I was playing with 
two larger boys. There was a large miry pond acro~3 t!J.: alley. \Ve wanted 
to cross it. They succeeded, but I \i·as unfortunate. While I was ·walking 
along the picket fence, one of the pickets g:~,·e \,·ay and I lost my balance, 
falling flat into the mire. I, from head to foot, w~s covered with the mud. 
I waddled and cried until I got out of the pond. By chance, my guardian, 
who had made a call, saw and took me. It was quite a far way ofT. The 
children out at recess stared at me and laughed 'wickedly' like the imps. 
\Vhat a funny picture it must be! As soon as we got home, she made me 
strip ofT my clothes and wash them. I was then completely naked-still 
worse. I was made to do the washing' o:tt in the yard. It meant punishment. 
Se\'eral of the boys peeped m·er the yard and made faces at me. I rebdled, 
but the woman was the more determined, and the boys were the most 
delighted. I had to remain so in this_uncomfortablc place for hours·until the 
clothes got dry enough. 
A good ~tany of the neighbors knew from the hearsay of the children and 
by hearin~ my cries that I must have been cruelly treated. They were kind 
to me, and would let me come in and have something nice to eat. Several 
of them dared to sec the bad woman, and tell her not to be so hard on me. 
But' she had her own way. · 
. Her new husband was an American captain and owned some barges. The 
woman sometimes took me with her to his office at the wharf where she 
usually got meat. Afterwards she sent me alone to the '"harf .and bring 
th~ meat. \\'hat a long journey it would take for ·a smali boy to cross a 
dozen of blocks- alone! Howe1·er, what a splendiJ tramp it was! How 
much I lo,·ed to g-o to the bay! The sea was a ,\-onder to me- nay, a won-
der of wonders, since even a boat was a man·el. \\'hat a variety of life along 
the whan·es! Such a life with such a variety awakened in me a \'Jguc feeling 
of mystery- sadness(?) -loneliness(?). At my request, the woman would 
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let me go to the \dnrf early in the morning to get the meat. As soon as I 
brought it home, I m:Hle haste to the bay, and spent many long hours to view 
the cosmopolitan sights. I made acquaintance with the rough-looking though 
good-natured sailors. They taught me many good and qad ways. I was 
quick to sec and understand. I lc:trned from them how to draw a picture of 
a ship. I made very good picture~, indeed, for a boy of my age. I some-
times doubt if I can draw a ship with her details so good now as I did that 
time, because I used to notice .all the parts of the whole ship. (I am now 
an amateur artist and photographer. I teach dra\dng at school.) 
I lo\·ed money. I liked best to luve dimes and h:tlf-dimes. The lo\'e of 
money led me to steal some little money. I was an ::tL:ept in theft. I could 
steal some small thing easily, most without being dc:..:c:~d. Yet my friends or 
SOme other person knew from hearing my steps tl1.1~ f had taken SOlltcthi.ng, 
usually eatables .. But I never confessed it, e\·en by threats, nay, by ready 
force. That habit was mainly owing to the condition of hunger; this was an 
excusable necessity, I say. I was often ill-fed at home. It meant punish-
ment for staying away too long. This stung me dearly tuwards stubbornrtt:ss, 
and I became worse and worse. It shows plainly that there is no greater 
fallacy than 'the child's will must be broken!' Will forms the production 
of cha1.1.ct~r. \\"ithout stren;:;th of ":ill there will be no strength of purpose. 
I began to find a new kind ofpleasure in being out at night, because I 
could see more vicissitude;; of edl amid the din of di:>sipation peculiar to the 
early days of California, then before the si,xties. I was as a moth midst the 
dazzling lights of the night re\·cls. I became quite a· nocturnal ·bein;;. In 
this way I contracted many b:td things during my abandon.ed youth,- a 
period of four years. The influence of this evil has still retained some fasci-
nating but unhealthy influence o\·er my imagination. On this account I 
sometimes ask myself, with a certain sense of mystery and gratitude, if I had 
left school twenty years ago, and gone somewhere for a lidng; what mrght 
have become of me? I have been connected "·ith this school thirty-one 
years. My long, home-like stay pre\·ents me from ever returning to that 
pernicious life too soon. 
More about stealing. Often did I go out at night rdth an empty stomach. 
I had to find som•:thing to satiate my hunger. Sometimes I returned home 
at midnight without a morsel, and entered the kitchen quietly. -I took bread 
or meat, or what else I could hold, and slipped away. Sometimes it was 
done at the different houses of my friends. They \\'ould be too glad to give 
me some food, bntl was too proud or ashamed to beg. Sometimes I took 
a loaf of fresh bread off the door-steps \d1ere the baker put it. Sometimes, 
while passing close to the fruit-stand, I slipped one apple or two into my 
pockets or shirt. I had no intuitive conscience at all. There might possi-
bly be a mote of it when I thought of the moon (you ha\·e already known 
my cosmology). Of course, hunger was stronger than conscience. Y ct that 
faculty seemed to be more or less acti\·e. I shall say how I was cured of 
stealing. I frequented a meat-shop. _ The good-n;U,ured b_utcher let me go 
about at large~ -I happened to se.csoni-c mo(ley in a box under the·· counter. 
behind. I thought of g"etting some ·little money there.· So I went' back and 
crept slowly to the Lox and took a dime. l fca,;teJ on its worth of candy. 
No.6.] TFIOUGIIT EEFORE LI.\"GU..tGE. 621 
Fond of sweets I wa:;. I sll91c anoth.:r dim.: in a r~w c!ays. I wanted more 
money, so I stole a quarter of a 1h>lbr. ;\ly ct)nscil!ncc 11orketlup as thuu;.:h 
saying th.lt it was too much. I knew th;lt it cost two dim<!,; and one half-
dime togdhcr. As long as I" had it with me I it:!t I".:L"tlliarly unhappy. 
turned around to sec if it was all ri;ht. I spent all ui it. and ~aw how much 
more good time l coult! h;n-e with one of ;;rcatc.:r 1·alt:e. l did not come back 
to the shop so soon for the mon.:y. A good whiie btc:r l stole the other 
quarter, ami so on ahnut weekly I took the qu:~rter.;. pi..:ce after piece. That. 
ne\·cr-forgntten tuorning 1 wanted a quarter. \\'hill! lJcldnd under the 
counter, I was about to put my ha:1d into the bnx. Th.: man· opened it. 
I was quite frightened, Lut remainecl still. l would n,,t le.tl·c. but I waitc:d 
and slipped my hand int<J the b•>X• So nen·ou,; wa,; l that l took whatever 
piece I could touch tir.st. l too:;; llnl!. and thou.:;ht irum the size of th.: pice.: 
that it was a quarter. I m.~ll<! !1.1~te to the nearest :_:mct·ry-store and asked 
for candy. I put th'! n1one~· on tlte counter. It w.~:< .!,;old!- ten doll:lrs!! 
I felt as th'>ugh I \1·ere a ti-;h out of the water: with my ey·~s shooting out. 
At once I took it back and ran ot:t. I could see nuthing Lut g''ld el·ery-
where. 1\ly heart beat. Did l know that .I was guilty? If so, how could I 
know? Simply by seeing tktt [ had stolen '''" ""'"·ft. /,t"thottgh l did not 
know the rcbth·e \·aluc of gold. :- c-t l knew that gold cnst tn•>re than sih·er. 
Because it was hea1·y, bright, ami could be had only Ly the rich. I felt that 
. it was too much for me. I never saw gold amone;- th.: poorer people, and 
always noticed it in the hands of the more respectable ones. How could I 
get rid of the gold? I ran and ran with the go!d tight in my hand until 
I returned. to the senses. Then I went to the conf...:ctioncry and bought 
much candy, regardless of the con:<equenccs about the change. The man 
looked surpri:<ed, but yet. knowing th:1t I was deaf, h.: mi;ht not suspect any-
thing ill with me. He gave me the change all in sih·cr. many !talvcs. I was 
quite bcwilllercd. but I tried well to b.: still. The siln.:r wa~ now too heavy 
for me to carry alon; as easily. The conscience c:tme. s:tw, and confJU<:red. 
I'went some 11·ay with caution. and hid :tl! the money under a saloon. I fdt 
free. I thought of f!Hing to th<! minstrels in the even in.!,;. \\'hen· the time 
came I werit back for the money. I found it all gone. l 11·as momentarily dis-
appointed. but in f;tct I fdt happier than sorry for conscience's sake .. Strange 
to say, anybody, eYen the butcher, never ga\"e me to understand that I had 
been suspected of the theft. Still more stran;;e, I ha1·e nc\·er stolen money 
again. Besides, I did not steal as many other things. particularly food, as 1. 
used to. ~IV" conscience must have become keen enntigh. It began de-
\"eloping mm~e antt' more, mainly owing to the influence of the moon. (Then 
the moon wa;; full. wlten I found the money gone.) Thcrdurc my cosmo· 
logical specula.tions Gl.llle out, as those already gh·en in the Annals. 
Let me add as to the nri.~in of the ocean. One day I went with some boys 
to the ocean. They went bathing. I first went into the ocean, not knowin~ 
how it tasted and how strong the wa\·.cs rolled. So I· was knocked around, 
with my eyes ami mouth open. I came ncar Lcing drownt·ll. I could not 
· swini. 1 went to the bottom and in,;tinctiveh· crawled up on the sand. I 
spit the sa1t water out ,;f my mouth, and \;·ondc;:eu why the water was so salty. 
1 thou:;ht that it wa.."> ·the urine of that mighty g<Jd. 
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~ hated gi;ls with contempt. I never pbyed with them. I would not visit 
my friends who ha<l girls at home. \\"hy? lkcause from my accidental 
observ:1tion I found out the ditfo.:ro.:nce bo.:twcen th.: girls and boys,- not in 
dress, but in s~:x. This led me to despise fcmalt: animals. \\"hen I was 
hungry, I might occasionally ·go to the women for fnuds, but I could not stay 
Ion~ with them. While at school, I retained this dislike three years before I 
could like a girl. 
I cannot remember if I ever knew that I was deaf. I knew that I .equid 
not talk, but I never asked myself why, not because I w:~s satisfied with my 
condition, bnt because 1 was too wide awake to think of my own sel.f. I often 
wondered how others could speak, particularly while they were quarrelling. 
I believed that the people could ne\·er grow. I had neve• wanted to be ;;. 
man, because I could do enottgh what I liked to. I seldom s:1w a baby. I 
hated it and thought it a dirty thing. 1 have still retained the dislike for 
babies. (1 am single.) 
This is all what I can say for the present. Mr. \Vilkinson, when he was 
my teacher, u~cd to make mi.' write abont what I did h.,fore I came to school. 
It helped me much thus to repeat the memory. Ever since my recollections 
have been the same, though the words have changed now and then to get 
better style and more detinite meanings in language. 
It shows that I thought Jn pictures and signs before I .came to school. 
The pictures were not exact in Jetails, but were general. They were-momen-
tary and fleeting in my mind's eye. The signs were not extensive but some-
what conventional altt!r the i\Iexican fashion- not at all like the symbols of 
the deaf anddumb language. I used to tell my friends about s.ome of my 
cosmology. Several of them encouraged me. 
One always took so much interest in me that he attempted to teach me. 
But he knew almost nothing, only he cottld say yes or no with more or less 
emphasis in gestures, when I said in pantomimic \vhat I did or what I saw, or 
what I thought. He was the means. of sending me to school as soon. as he. 
learned that the school started. He was an Italian. Some of the signs. I 
used were beard for man, bre:tst for ·woman, moustache with spelling papa 
for papa, the hand moving over the face and one finger of each hand meeting 
parallel (alike, meaning that some one looked like me) for 11/{l/ll<'r, the hand 
down over the shoulder mavin~:: like a !Jell for Sunday, two hands open before_. 
the eyes for book or papa', one hand stretching sideway for going, the hand 
moving backwards for coming, the hand moving slant for 'li!hij>ping, the fin-
gers whirling fur slt"tilil{~, the ru1Jbit1g of the thumb and one of the fingers 
for money, two hands turned opposite fur bYL'aking, one finger stretching from 
.the eye fur suing, one finger stretching from the mouth for sp,·al.:in,l{, one 
finger stretching. from the forehead for lllllh·nlandin_i{, one finger rapping 
lightly on the forehead fur knowing, ditto with negation for 11{1/ km>7:t•tilg; one 
finger resting on the forehead with the eyes shut for tluitking, one finger now 
resting on the forehead and then stretching with emphasis for undtrslanding, 
etc., etc. The signs for meat, bread, milk, water, chocolate, horse, cow, were 
as natural as the Mexicans make nowadays. The Mexicans generally ask 
with faci:ll gestures, '\Vhat do you do?' 'How do you do?' 'What is the 
matter?' 'WhJ.t is the news?' It is natural. I could then understand 
these questions. 
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The reader will h~we noticed that many of the si~ns which 
'Mr. d'Estrclla reports himself to have used arc regular conven-
tional gestures of the dcaf-muts sign language. Son1e of these 
may be used habitually by the l\Icxicans, others the poor boy 
probably captured out of the social atmosphere, so to speak, in 
the way in which needy creatures so generally fii1cl a way to 
the object which can satisfy their want.. It will be observed, 
however, that his cosmological and ethical reflections were the 
outbirth of his solitary thought ; and although he tried to com-
municate the cosmology to others, it is evident, since the most 
receptive of his friends could only say 'yes' or • no' to him 
in return, that the communion must have been very incomplete. 
He surely had no conventional gestures for the causal and logi-
cal relations involved in his inductions about the moon, for 
example. So far as it goes, then, his narrative tends to dis-
countenance the notion that no abstract thought is possible 
without words.· Abstract thought of a clccicleclly subtle kind, 
both scientific and .moral, \\;cnt on racrc in advance of the means 
of expressing it to others. To a great extent it doc~ so in all 
of us to-day, for nothing is commoner than to have a thought, 
and then to seck for the proper words )n which to clothe its 
most important features. The only way to defend the doctrine 
of the absolute dependence of thought on language is so to en-
large the sphere of this latter word as to make it co,·er every 
possible sort of mental imigery, whether communicable to 
others or not. Of course no man can think without some kind 
of mind-stuff to think in. Our general meanings and abstract 
conceptions must always have for their vehicle images more or 
less concrete, and 'fringes' of tendency ariel relation which we· 
feel between them. To a solitary untaught individual .(could 
such a one exist) such um·crbalized images would be ratioqally 
s·ignificant, and a train of them might be called a monologue. 
But such a monologue is not what any one naturally means by 
speech; and it is far better to drop the language-doctrine alto-
gether than to evaporate its meaning into triviality like this. 
Mr. d'Estrella's reminiscences also help to settle the ques-
tion of. whether moral propositions arc 'intuiti,·e' or not. He 
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begins life as a thief, with, as he s:tys, "no intuitive conscience 
at all," and yet with a knowkdgc tlut wh:.tt he docs is an out-
w:.tr~ soci:tl offence, since he must ncclls do it secretly. At last 
he is converted to honesty .......::-by what ? Not by the te:tchings 
of others, not by d.::tcction and punishment, but by the very 
magnitllllc of his own crimes. He steals so much th:tt the 
burden becomes tocr he:t\'Y to bear. It sobers him ; and :1 suc-
cess which wou!J have turned a non-moral or an immoral boy 
into a confirmed criminal, proJuces in him a reaction towarcls 
honesty. This would seem to be a common experience. A 
youth tries dissipation, or indulges himself in tyranny or mean-
ness, till at b.st an experience supervenes which tastes too 
strong, even for him, the agent, He didn't intend quite that! 
It casts a 'lurid light' on. all the rest of the performances, so 
he cries 'halt' and 'turns over a new leaf.' Now I take it 
that the doctrine of an innate conscience in morals, as opposed 
to the pure associationist doctrine of nursery-teaching plus pru-
dential calculation, means no more than this, that bad deeds 
will end by tasting bad, even to the agent who does them suc-
cessfully, if you let him. experience them concretely enough, 
with all the circumstances that they comport. They will, in 
short, beget an intrinsic disgust ; the need 6f stealthiness in 
our tread, the satiety which our orgies leave, the looks and 
cries of oi.tr victims lingering· obstinately behind, spoil the fun 
for us and end by undermining it altogether. For the poor 
deaf and dumb boy the fun of thieving stopped as soon as the 
ill-gotten gold-piece saddled him with so important a responsi-
bility that even his moon-mother in the sky grew mixed up with 
the affair. 
Few documents, it seems to me, cast more light on our un-
sophisticated intellectual and moral instincts than the sincere 
and unpretending narrative which 1\Ir. u·Estrella has allowed 
me to print. 
WILLIAM ) AllES •. 
liARVARO U.liiVERSITY. 
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APPENDIX 2 
THINKING AND THE DEAF· 
160. 
This thesis has necessarily dealt with the logical 
Pelations of the ideas incorporated in the specified 
precepts currently at work in the field of education 
of the deaf. I have listed below a number of reviews 
of the literature dealing with the· thinking of the 
deaf. 
The two most important reviews of research in this area 
are: 
1. FURTH, H.G. 'Research with the deaf : Implications 
for language and cognition' Psychological 
Bulletin, Sept. 1964, pp.l45-164. 
reprinted in Volta Review. Jan. 1966, Vol 68 (1) 
with a special addition 'Additional Cognitive 
Research with the Deaf'. pp. 51-56. 
reprinted without the Volta Review addition in 
HELMUTH, J. Cognitive Studies'. 'Vol. ! , 1970. 
Brunner/~zel, Inc., NY. pp.291-319. 
2. FURTH, H.G. 'Linguistic deficiency and thinking : 
Research with deaf subjects 1964-1969'. 
PsyehoZ.ogieaZ. Bulletin. July, 1971. Vol. 76 (1) . 
. PP·· s.~-12:., 
reprinted in Cognitive Studies. Vol. I, pp.320-338. 
i 
Among other reviews are: 
3. MYKLEBUST, H.R. The Psychology of Deafness : Sensory 
-
Deprivation, Learning~ and Adjustment. 1960. 
Grune & Stratton, Inc., NY (especially ch.5 
'Deafness and Mental Development' pp.57-114) 
4. PARSONS, M.B. 'A study of conservation as an 
aspect of cognitive competence in hearing-
handicapped children' 1969, Unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of Canterbury. 
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5. LONG, D.S. 'Cognitive deve·lopment of deaf children' 
1971, Unpublished B.A. paper, University of 
Canterbury (Appendix B combines Parsons, (1969), 
Furth., (1966), and Myklebust, (1960) tables of 
research in this area, ii-v .. 
6 •. FURTH, H.G. Thinking Without Language : Psychological 
Implications of D-eafness. 1966. The Free Press, 
NY. (The early chapters add an historical 
perspective to the experiments that follow -
see above.) 
7. MEYERSON, L. I A psychology of imparied hearing I in . 
Cruickshank, W.M. Psychology of Exceptional 
Children and Youth. (2nd ed.) 1963, Prentice:-
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. 
8. LEVINE, E. The Psychology of Deafness. 1960. 
Columbia University Press, NY. 
9. REICHSTEIN, J. and ROSENSTEIN, J. ,. Di 1=·~ferential 
Diagnosis of· Auditory Deficits : A Review of 
Literature.·'.· Journal for Exceptional Children. 
1964. Vol. 30, pp.73-82. 
10. TELFORD, G.W. and SAWREY, J.M. The Exceptional 
Individual : Psychological and Educationat 
Aspects. 1967. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood 
Cliffs. (Ch~l2. 'The Aurally Handicapped' pp.297-325. 
11. MILCENT, F.E. 'L'intelligence et les operations 
· intellectuelles chez ies enfants sourds.' 
(Intelligence· and inte·llectual operations 
in deaf children) Information Psychologique. 
1966. 23, pp.l3-32. 
this is a review of 17 mainly French studies including 
some Piaget-type and Rey-type studies. S.G. Vanderberg 
in Psy. Abstr. Vol. 41 entry 17070, p. 1730 summarizes 
"It is concluded that the deaf get lower scores than 
dearing Ss because language.is a tool which helps in the 
development of intelligence. The deaf have less of a 
learned tendency to ask questions, such as why and how, 
and thus to develop intellectual curiosity."· (Note that 
Furth (1966) also found a lack of intellectual curiosity 
until in experiment 14 he set up a training session which 
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did not penalize linguistic deficiency. We may further note 
the large percentage of time that is spent· in: mc;,.st_schools 
. . . 
for the deaf in trying to develop linguistic proficiency with 
only minor success by and large.) 
12. HARING, N.G. and SCHIEFELBUSCH. Methods in Special 
Education. 1967. McGraw-Hill Book Co., NY. 
(C~. 10, Frisina, D.R. 'Hearing Disorders~ 
pp. 302-35'0. 
13. GROENSBOOM-ELBERS, L.H. 'De taalontwikkeling van let 
kind : Een bespreking van enige recente publica-
ties (The language-development of the child : 
A discussion of several recent publications) 
Nederlands Tijschrift voor de Psychologie en 
.haar Grensgebrueden. 1971. Vol. 26 (6), pp.319-334 . 
. 
(found that the perception of relationships among objects was 
more dependent on language development·than on maturation). 
163. 
14. SCHIF, Zh.I. Usvoenie Yazyka i Razvitie Myshleniya 
u Glukhikh Detei (Mastery of Language and 
Development of Thinking in Deaf Children). 1968. 
USSR Proveshehie, Moscow. · 
15. YASKOVA, N.V. 'Voprosy naglyadnogo myshleniya 
glukhikh detei v zrubezhnykh issledovaniyakh' 
(Problems in visual thinking of deaf children 
in foreign research). Spetsial'Naya Shkola. 
1968. 4, pp.ll8-127. 
(Stresses the importance of non-verbal thinking in the 
mental development of deaf children.) 
(With respect to entry (11) above and Furth (1966) 
experiment 14 it is interesting to note that 
16. ARBITAILO, A.C., MONAKHOVA, V.A. and FANDEEVA, B.G. 
'Razvitie rechi i myshleniya glukhikh detei pri 
izuchenii privody' (Development of speech and thinking 
in deaf children while studying nature). Spetsial'Naya 
Shkola. 1967. 4, pp.2B-32 
found that independent work (where linguistic deficiency . 
is not penalized) improved the ability of the deaf to observe 
an object and talk about it logically. 
This is by no means a complete list of such reviews but 
perhaps it will serve as a starting point for the construction 
of such a list. 
Of interest, but not mentioned in any western reviews of 
research, are two studies which go completely against 
Thinking Without Langu.age and argue that higher forms. of 
164. 
thinking are possible only via the use of natural languages 
such as English or Russian are 
KOLBAYA, M.G. 'The part played by speech in the 
thought process.' Unpublished thesis, TbilisiUniversity, 
(in Georgian). 
PRANGISHVILI, A.S. 'Psychological problems of the 
development of thought' Komunistura Agzdisatvis~ 
No. 7. Tbilisi University, (in Georgian). 
both of which are reviewed in 
NATADZE, R.G. 'Studies on thought and speech 
problems by psychologists of the Georgian S.S.R.' 
pp.304_.326 inN. O'Connor (ed.) Recent Soviet 
Psychology, 1961. Pergammon Press, Oxford. 
and both of which deal specifically with the topic of the 
relation of thinking and language in the deaf. 
R E F E R E N C E S 
(Wl).ere abbreviations have been·used (in Chapter IV) these 
are.irid_icated here e.g. (CM) for The Concept of Mind.) 
Adams, P. (ed.). Language in Thinking: Selected Readings. 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd. , 19 7 2. . 391 p. 
Addis, L.C. and Levvis D. ·Hoare and Ryle: Two Ontologists. 
Iowa Publications in Philosophy Volume 2. The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965. _ 184 p. 
Armstrong, D.M. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. 372 p. 
Arnheim, R~ "Words in their place". In Visual Thinking. 
London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1970, p. 226-253. 
Aune, B. "Thinking". In_Marras, A. (ed.) Intentionality, 
Mind and Language. Urbana, University of Illinois 
Press, 1972, p. 149-286. 
Austin, J.L. (ed. Urmson, J.O.). How to do Things with 
Words. (The William James Lectures delivered at 
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Harvard University in 1955). London, Oxford University 
Press, 1962. 166 p. 
Ayer, A.J. Thinking and Meaning. London, H.K. Lewis & 
Co. Ltd., 1947. 28 p. 
Ayer, A.J. Philosophy and Language. Oxford, The Clarendon 
Press, 1960. 35 p. 
Berlyne, D.E. "Soviet Research on Intellectual Processes 
in Children". In Basic Coqnitive Processes in 
Children. Monograph 28.2.1963. Society -for Research 
in Child Development. 
Black, M. "Thought and Language". In The Labyrinth of 
Language. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd., 1968, 
P• 83-122. 
de Bono, E. "So you thought you could think". Four 
discussions broadcast over the YC station of the NZBC 
radio over four weeks beginning January 21, 1975. 
Boring, E.G. A History of Experimental Psychology .. 2d ed. 
New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts 1 1950. .777 p. 
Boring, E.G. (ed. by lvatson, R.I. and Campbell, D.T.) 
History, Psychology and Science: Selected Papers. 
New York,.John Wiley & Sons, 1963. 372 p. 
Borst, C.V. (ed.) The Mind-Brain Identity Theory. 
London, Macmillan, 1970. 261 p. 
Brentano, F.C. Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt. 
Hamburg, Heiner, 1955: Psychology From An Empirical 
Standpoint. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. 
415 p. 
Britton, J. "Language and Thought". In Language and 
Learning. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd., 1970, 
p. 190-218. 
Bruner, J.S. et. al. Studies in Cognitive Growth: 
A Collaboration at the Center for Cognitive Studies. 
New York, Wiley, 1966. 343 p. 
Bugelski, B.R. _"Words and things and images". American -
Psychologist 25, 1970-: 1002-1012. 
Burrell,_ D. B. Analogy and Philosophical Language. 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973. 278 p. 
Carroll, J.B. Language and Thought. Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. 118 p. 
Chappell, V.C. (ed.) The Philos~phy of Mind. Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1962. 178 p. 
Cofer, c. "Experimental Studies of the role of verbal 
processes in concept formation and problem solving". 
Annals of the New York Academy-of Science 91, 1960: 
94-95. 
Cornford, F.M. Plato's Theory of Knowledge. London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1935. 336 p. 
Corning, \AI.C. and Balaban, M.W. (eds.) The Mind: 
Biological Approaches to its Functions. New York, 
Interscience (John Wiley & Sons), 1968.- 321 p. 
Cowan, J.L. "Introduction". In Studies in Thought and 
Language.- Tucson, The University of ArizonaPress, 
1970, p. 1-7. 
Dale, D.M·.c. "The Patriotic Sandals". Education 23, 
1974:. 23-24 (A report on a visit to the Peninsula 
Oral School) • 
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Davidson, S.G. "Mental Development Through Language 
Study"-. P..rnerican Annals of the Deaf 59, 1914: 113-117. 
D'Estrella, T. "Virgil Williams' Art Notes to a Deaf-Mute 
Pupil". Overland Monthly (new series) 9, 1887: 285-294. 
Edwards, P. and Pap, A. (eds.) A Modern Introduction to 
Philosophy. Rev. Ed. New York, The Free Press, 1957, 
1965. 797 p. 
Fraser, G.M. and Blackley, J. The Language Disordered 
Child: A New Look at Theory and Treatment. Wind~br, 
NFER Publ. Co. Ltd., 1973. 56 p. 
Furth, H.G~ and Youniss, J. "The influence of language 
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and experience or discovery and use of logical symbols 11 • 
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